00031941

Digitized with financial assistance from
Rotary Club
on 06 November, 2019

ASIATIC SOCIETY MUMBAI

THIS BOOK HAS BEEN ADOPTED
FOR CONSERVATION & DIGITIZATION BY

ADITYA SOMANI

ROTARY CLUB OF BOMBAY

DATE : FEBRUARY 2017

HISTORY

OF

THE INDIAN ADMINISTRA

OF

LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

IN HIS

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, BY PERMISSION OF HER MAJESTY,
LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S LETTERS TO THE QUEEN
DURING THAT PERIOD.

31941

EDITED BY

LORD COLCHESTER.

9 9 b 33

LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY AND SON.
1874.

00031941

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET
AND CHARING CROSS.

HISTORY

OF

THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

OF

LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

PREFACE.

THE following letters, according to the desire expressed by the late Earl of Ellenborough, are published without introduction or comment.

The Editor desires humbly to express his gratitude to Her Majesty the Queen, for her gracious permission to publish the letters addressed to Her Majesty from India by the late Earl. He has also to offer his best thanks to His Grace the Duke of Wellington, for kindly permitting the publication of his Father's correspondence with the late Earl during his Indian administration.

= Page No 1 to 58

missing =

unless the control of affairs should fall altogether into the hands of the heir apparent, who is insane; but this is a most improbable event.

"It does not yet appear to be certain whether the Ameers of Scinde will resist. Their forces were collected before they knew that any alteration of the treaties would be proposed to them in consequence of their infraction of existing treaties and of their acts of hostility. They profess submission to the terms proposed. There is disunion amongst them, and the British force assembled at Sukkur is ample for their subjection.

The Governor-General of India, with his most ble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your sty that he has addressed a letter, of which a is enclosed for your Majesty's information, to ain Baron Von Orlich, of the Prussian Guards, fficer sent to India by His Majesty the King of sia, requesting him to convey to His Majesty of the guns taken from the Bala-Hissar, as a nt from the Government of India, in acknow- ment of His Majesty's friendship for the British rnment, and of the gratifying mark of that lship which His Majesty has given in sending icer of His Majesty's Guards to serve with the h army in Cabul

he Governor-General humbly hopes that it will reeable to your Majesty that this mark of respect l have been shown to His Majesty the King of ia."

"The Governor-General of India, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly requests that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to accept two small guns brought by the army from Cabul, in token of their triumph.

"It would be particularly gratifying to the army if your Majesty should think fit to place these guns on the Terrace of the Castle of Windsor.

"The Governor-General most humbly entreats your Majesty's permission to present a curious small gun—a 1-pounder, with a rifle bore, brought from the Bala-Hissar—to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.

"These guns will be taken to England by M Fraser, of the 11th Bengal Light Cavalry, on w your Majesty has recently been pleased to confe honour of the Order of the Bath for his servic the siege of Jellalabad."

" Camp, Duthul, January 18, 1

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty the force under the command of Major-General forming the rear-guard of the army returning Cabul, passed the Sutlej on the 23rd of Dece The last followers of the army had hardly when the river came down in one great wav swept away both the bridges.

"The Maharajah of Lahore, having made an

apology for the misconduct of the chiefs deputed to wait upon the Governor-General at Loodianah having withdrawn them with expressions of strong displeasure, and having deputed other chiefs and the son and brother of the Minister to wait upon the Governor-General at Ferozepore, they were received, but without the honours which had been prepared for those who did not come at the appointed time at Loodianah; and subsequently the son of the Maharajah and the Minister Dhian Singh were sent as bearers of presents offered on the part of the Maharajah to your Majesty.

"The Prince and the Minister, with other chiefs, came to the durbar of the Governor-General on the morning of the 31st of December, and attended him to t[illegible] review of the united armies of reserve and of [illegible]nistan.

[illegible]rd Ellenborough has been informed that the [illegible]ajah was so much gratified by the reception [illegible] to the Prince, his son, that he presented [illegible]upees (£500) to the person who brought the [illegible]to him, and he likewise gave lands to the [illegible]er Ayezoodeen, who had acted as his agent in [illegible]np of the Governor-General.

[illegible]e Governor-General went on the 2nd of [illegible]y to the camp of the Prince, to receive the [illegible]ts intended for your Majesty, and afterwards [illegible]sed a review of about 4000 Sikh troops.

[illegible]return mission, headed by the Secretary to the [illegible]ment, to which was attached Captain Von

Orlich, of His Prussian Majesty's Guards, was sent to Lahore, and was received with great distinction and cordiality by the Maharajah.

"The presents intended for your Majesty were embarked upon the Sutlej on the 7th, under the charge of Major Fraser, C.B., of the 11th Regiment of Light Cavalry, an officer distinguished on many occasions and recently at the siege of Jellalabad.

"The army assembled at Ferozepore was broken up on the 10th. Many regiments had moved before that day. Your Majesty's 41st Regiment embarked on that day in boats upon the Sutlej, and will proceed direct from Kurachee to England.

"The descent of that regiment, and the march to Sukkur of the cavalry and artillery of the Bombay army recently attached to Major-General [illegible]ott's force and now returning to Bombay, will faci[illegible] the negotiations in progress with the Amee[illegible] Scinde.

"Major-General Sir C. Napier having, how[illegible] already under his command fifteen battalions an[illegible] regiments of cavalry, is not in want of force[illegible] Lord Ellenborough is most anxious that the[illegible] settlement of affairs upon the Lower Indus shou[illegible] effected without bloodshed.

"The Ameers have, in words, assented t[illegible] propositions made to them, the object of which[illegible] give to the British Government entire militar[illegible] session of the Lower Indus, and to secure the fr[illegible] of commerce upon that river.

"The chiefs and army at Katmandoo have proceeded with admirable moderation and firmness, and in the true spirit of constitutional loyalty, to obtain practical security for the people of Nepaul without infringing the rights or dignity of the reigning family. The Queen Consort is made regent, and there is at present every reason to expect continued peace upon the frontier of Nepaul, guaranteed by her known character and the regard for justice which appears to animate the chiefs.

"Lord Ellenborough has instructed the British Resident at Katmandoo to take a favourable opportunity of making known the sentiments of respect with which the recent conduct of the Nepaulese people has inspired him.

"The Five per Cent. Loan, which had been open for twenty-one months, was closed on the 4th of January, the increased receipts of the revenue, and the diminished expenditure on account of the army, rendering it possible now to carry on the government without further borrowing.

"Lord Ellenborough has had, within the last few days, much satisfaction in personally thanking the chiefs of Sirhind for the pecuniary aid they afforded in our difficulties, and in informing them that, those difficulties now being at an end, the Government was prepared to repay them the sums they had advanced.

"The creation of a financial secretary, and an improved distribution of duties amongst the other

secretaries of the Government, will lead materially to economy and the more efficient administration of India.

"Mr. Robertson, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, having taken his departure for England, the Governor-General has assumed the Government of those Provinces.

"The Governor-General is now on his march to Delhi, where a force of 7000 men will be assembled, in the midst of which he will receive several of the chiefs of Rajpootana and the Mussulman feudatories who reside near the ancient seat of imperial government.

"The recollections of the imperial authority, now practically transferred to the British Government, will thus be in a manner revived; but Lord Ellenborough cannot but feel that the anomalous and unintelligible position of the local government of India excites great practical difficulties in our relations with native chiefs, who in an empire like ours have no natural place, and must be continually in apprehension of some design to invade their rights and to appropriate their territories. All these difficulties would be removed were your Majesty to become the nominal head of the empire. The princes and chiefs of India would be proud of their position as the feudatories of an empress; and some judicious measures calculated to gratify the feelings of a sensitive race, as well as to inspire just confidence in the intentions of their sovereign, would

make the hereditary leaders of this great people cordially co-operate with the British Government in measures for the improvement of their subjects and of their dominions.

"Lord Ellenborough can see no limit to the future prosperity of India if it be governed with due respect for the feelings and even the prejudices, and with a careful regard for the interests, of the people, with the resolution to make *their* well-being the chief object of the Government, and not the pecuniary advantages of the nation of strangers to which Providence has committed the rule of this distant empire."

"Camp, Kurnaul, January 27, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acknowledges the receipt of your Majesty's most gracious letter of the 2nd of December, expressing your Majesty's satisfaction at the gallant behaviour of the army and navy and their distinguished commanders in the recent successful operations in China and in Afghanistan. When, on the evening of the day on which they passed the Sutlej, Lord Ellenborough received Sir Robert Sale and all the officers of the garrison of Jellalabad, he did not fail to observe to them how much of personal interest in their fortunes and of high approval of their services your Majesty had evinced in raising the lieutenant-colonel of the 35th Native Infantry to the honour of being one of your Majesty's aides-de-

camp, and in permitting your Majesty's 13th Regiment to bear the name of his Royal Highness Prince Albert.

"All were deeply impressed with a sense of your Majesty's goodness, and gratefully felt that your Majesty's kind sympathy had been extended to them in their dangers and in their success.

"It is a subject of much satisfaction to Lord Ellenborough that your Majesty should approve of his humble endeavours to reward the officers and soldiers who have served India and their country so well.

"Your Majesty's most gracious rewards, equally bestowed upon both armies, have perfected that union between them which made the garrison of Jellalabad invincible, and have cemented that noble brotherhood in arms which animates the whole body of the victorious troops lately united in the camp at Ferozepore."

"Camp, Delhi, February 19, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that having received intelligence on the 9th instant of the death of the Maharajah of Gwalior, he immediately determined on proceeding to Agra instead of Meerut, in order to be near Gwalior, where, the Maharajah having died without heirs, and the widow to whom the right of adopting a son belongs being

only eleven, it could not but be a subject of anxiety in what manner the government would be carried on, and the necessity might possibly arise for instant intervention.

"Hitherto everything has been conducted at Gwalior peaceably and properly. The boy, about eight years old, nearest in blood to the late Maharajah has been adopted, with the consent of the chiefs and army, and every deference which could be justly expected has been evinced towards the British Government.

"Still the necessity exists for appointing a regency, and for some time there must be a difficulty in carrying on any new administration. Lord Ellenborough therefore adheres to his intention of proceeding to Agra, and has made some change in the disposition of the regiments, in order to have with him ole corps upon which he can entirely depend, and especially the 35th Light Infantry, commanded by your Majesty's aide-de-camp, Colonel Monteath, as his rank of colonel makes him the senior officer in the event of many regiments being brought together, and he may be safely entrusted with a large command.

"Lord Ellenborough arrived at Delhi on the 5th, and has been visited in his camp by all the neighbouring chiefs. The camps of the Rajahs of Bikaneer, of Ulwar, of Bhurtpore, of Kotah, and of Dholepore, and of the Nawab of Tonk, almost encompass the walls of the city, and extend in some

directions far into the country. They have with them many of their troops and numbers of followers, being attended by their families and principal feudatories. The total number cannot be less than fifty thousand persons.

"There has been no such assemblage of feudatory chiefs at Delhi since the time of Aurungzebe. They all appear to be satisfied with their reception.

"Yesterday, Lord Ellenborough invited them all to a review of the eleven regiments and eighteen guns attached to his escort, and they were apparently much gratified by what they saw, and by the attention paid to them.

"The gates of the Temple of Somnauth, which have been escorted to Delhi by five hundred cavalry of the Protected Sikh States, will be escorted from Delhi to Muttra, and thence to Agra, by the same force of cavalry furnished by the Rajahs of Bhurtpore and Ulwar.

"While there has been universally evinced a feeling of gratitude to the British Government for the consideration shown to the people of Hindostan in the restoration of these trophies, there has not occurred a single instance of apparent mortification amongst the Mussulmans. All consider the restoration of the gates to be a national, not a religious, triumph. At no place has more satisfaction been expressed than at Paneeput, a town almost exclusively Mussulman, where there exist the remains of the first mosque built by Sultan Mahmood, after

he had destroyed the city and the temples of the Hindoos.

"In Scinde, Sir Charles Napier had the good fort[illegible]e to find Emam Ghur, the fort in the desert, ned by the Ameers, and he destroyed it. is now no open resistance. The several s have mostly sent their agents to arrange tails of the interchanges of territory con- upon the new treaty, which all have ac- and the districts retroceded to the Nawab wulpore have been occupied by him with a force.

bts have been thrown by the Resident in upon the permanence of the settlement made; but the national movement out of t arose was of too decided a character to the entertainment of any just fears for the of the Queen's influence, and all that will ed for the maintenance of good government rnal peace.

ill be gratifying to your Majesty to learn re is at present every prospect in India of a ndant spring harvest. The great diminution diture consequent on the withdrawing of es within the frontier, and various circum- nding to produce a temporary increase of will, in the ensuing year, give an appear- eturning prosperity to the finances, but ars of economy are required to place them ld foundation."

"Palace of Agra, March 21, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your M[ajesty] that having, on the 2nd instant, received th native report of the battle fought near Hyd he immediately gave directions for the prep of reinforcements to be sent at once to Suk the Indus, under the impression that Major- Sir C. Napier would be obliged to call troo thence to strengthen himself at Hyderaba Bombay Government was likewise instr relieve the 1st Grenadiers by another regim to send various supplies which it seemed l that Sir Charles Napier would require.

"The Bombay Government appears to hav fested much useful zeal and intelligence in for to Kurachee and Cutch whatever was necessa

"The general order of the 5th of March, subsequent order appointing Sir C. Napier G of Scinde, and making certain regulations province, will place your Majesty in poss Lord Ellenborough's views.

"The new treaty proposed to the Ameers by their violation of the existing treaty various acts of intended hostility, would h to the British Government in India pract mand over the Lower Indus. Between that command and retiring at once from there was no safe course. The retirement,

upon the withdrawal of the armies from Cabul, would have given credit to the misrepresentations studiously circulated with respect to the circumstances under which that withdrawal took place; and it would have had the necessary consequence of leading to the violation in all its details of the commercial treaty which secured the free navigation of the Indus.

"The position in which the Government of India would have stood, had the new treaty been acceded to, and at first faithfully carried out, would not have been without its embarrassments. It could not be expected that the Ameers would have at all times quietly submitted to provisions they had accepted with reluctance, and war would have been forced upon us hereafter at an inconvenient moment.

"It cannot be regretted therefore that the treachery of the Ameers should have obliged the British Government to take at once a more decided course, and to establish its own authority in all such parts of Scinde as it may be desirable to hold in our hands.

"To attempt to enter into terms with the defeated Ameers would have been an act of weakness and self-destruction. No faith could be expected from them; and even if they were disposed to adhere to their engagements, the barbarous violence of their followers would not permit them to do so. There appeared to be no advisable course of policy but that of at once taking possession of the country which had been thus thrown into our hands, and so using

our power as to make our conquest beneficial to the people.

"Sir Charles Napier most sincerely endeavoured to effect the pacific purposes of the Government without having recourse to arms. He deferred to the last moment every measure of actual war, notwithstanding the collection of forces in his front, and he has been rewarded for his long forbearance, and for his distinguished conduct and courage in the field, by one of the most brilliant and important victories which have ever attended your Majesty's arms.

"The approaching heats render the present prosecution of operations upon the Lower Indus impossible, but your Majesty may be assured that every measure will be adopted to secure to the British Government the full possession of all that has been so justly forfeited by the Ameers.

"The movement of Lord Ellenborough to Agra immediately on his receiving the news of the death of Scindiah has apparently had the desired effect of establishing, without contest, a strong government at Gwalior in the person of Mama Sahib, who feels that the support which has been given to him by the British representative has practically given to him the regency.

"It is to be hoped that the settlement which has been made at Gwalior will ultimately lead to some improvement in the condition of that ill-governed country; and immediately to the adoption of decisive

measures for the suppression of plunderers upon the frontier.

"Various measures have been adopted, the tendency of which is to confirm the good feeling which the chiefs of Rajpootana appear to be disposed to entertain towards the British Government.

"Generally there appears to be at present every desire amongst the native princes and chiefs in all parts of India to act in accordance with the wishes of the paramount Power.

"The army, pleased with its successes and with the honours bestowed upon it, is in the best disposition; and the personal interest your Majesty has appeared to evince towards your Majesty's soldiers of both nations has been appreciated by all.

"There is every present prospect of an abundant harvest. The sense of security, the expectation of continued peace in India, must tend to invigorate trade, and your Majesty may be assured that no efforts will be spared on Lord Ellenborough's part to create a feeling of affection for the British Government."

"Agra, April 20, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly begs to offer to your Majesty his congratulations on the second and decisive victory obtained by Major-General Sir Charles Napier on the 24th of March, on the occupation of Meerpore and Omerkote, and the entire conquest of Scinde.

"It must be most satisfactory to your Majesty that these events, glorious to your Majesty's arms, should be accompanied by all the prospective increase of national resources which must result from the occupation, in our own right, of the whole navigable course of the Indus and of the fertile territory on both its banks, which is, by irrigation, capable of great improvement.

"The joy with which the inhabitants of the conquered country have witnessed their change of masters and the anxiety with which they desire the permanent substitution of British rule for that of the Ameers are circumstances which will not have failed to gratify your Majesty.

"It will be Lord Ellenborough's earnest desire to prove to the people of Scinde that their confidence in the beneficent intentions of the British Government is not misplaced.

"If the state of affairs in any other part of India should not appear to require his presence still more in some other quarter, it is Lord Ellenborough's present intention to proceed to Scinde at the very commencement of the next cold weather, as it is of much importance that our government in that province should from the first be placed upon a good system, and there are several points connected with the proposed retrocessions of territory to the chiefs of Bahawulpore, Jodhpore, and Jessulmere, upon which it is difficult to decide satisfactorily without visiting the country.

"In the Punjab no collision has taken place between the party of the Maharajah and that of his ministers; but the tendency of things appears to be to a rupture. The minister is not concealing his suspicions that the Maharajah is only waiting for a favourable opportunity of getting possession of his person, and of those of his brothers and son. General Ventura appears to have joined the party of the Maharajah, and his Highness, relying upon his aid in the field, may be induced to precipitate measures against his minister.

"Mahomed Akbar has been moving troops into the Khyber Pass, and has endeavoured to make arrangements with the Khyberees for the safe passage of his father Dost Mahomed and his family from Peshawur to Jellalabad.

"The Sikhs are sending troops to Peshawur under the apprehension that an attack may be made upon it by Mahomed Akbar.

"The Chief of Khytul, one of the protected Sikh States within thirty miles of Kurnaul, having died without heirs, four-fifths of his territory lapsed to the British Government, and the remaining fifth became the property of a distant branch of the family. A political officer was sent with a small escort, afterwards increased to 300 men, to receive possession of Khytul, which belongs to the lapsed portion of the territory; but he was met by passive resistance on the part of the female relations and the ministers of the late chief. The military retainers of the State

flocked to Khytul, and a most indiscreet disposition of a part of the small cavalry escort having been made, attack was invited, and the consequence was the repulse of the whole force with the political officer, with some loss, and its retirement to Kurnaul.

"Lord Ellenborough, on being informed that troops would be wanted, had directed that so large a force should be taken as would preclude the chance of any collision. Unfortunately the collision took place, through the indiscretion of the officer at Khytul, before this direction could be acted upon. On the 14th, however, 1800 troops were assembled at Thanesir, and on their arrival on the 16th within eight miles of Khytul it was found that the town and fort were evacuated by the armed retainers on the 15th. The ministers and the merchants of the place had come into the British camp on the 14th.

"What has happened is very much to be regretted, although it has been repaired.

"The affair might have become very serious had not the place been so soon approached by a preponderating force after the unfortunate collision on the 10th.

"No other events of any consequence have taken place in India since Lord Ellenborough last addressed your Majesty.

"The administration of the new regent at Gwalior has been carried on with tranquillity. It appears probable that some further steps will soon be taken in the peaceful revolution which seemed to have

placed power in the hands of the Queen at Katmandoo in December last, the Rajah having recovered too much of authority through the intrigues of some of the ministers.

"The Nizam's Government seems to be on the eve of serious difficulties arising out of financial embarrassments. Some improper transactions at Moulmein have apparently placed us in the wrong, and occasioned some risk of hostilities, but Lord Ellenborough hopes that the new Commissioner, Major Broadfoot, will arrive in time to prevent collision and restore peaceful dispositions.

"The harvest has been fine, and all your Majesty's old dominions enjoy peace and prosperity, which will soon be extended to your Majesty's new conquests upon the Indus."

"Agra, May 11, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that the Ameers of Scinde, who were taken at Hyderabad, are now prisoners at Bombay. As soon as they become satisfied that they have no prospect of being restored to their dominions they will probably prefer Mecca to India as a place of residence, and it would be more convenient.

Should no fit residence be soon found for them in the interior near Bombay, they will be conveyed to Calcutta, and thence marched 200 miles into the

country to an abandoned cantonment at Hazaree-bagh.

"Sir C. Napier appears to be adopting very judicious measures for the establishment of a police and for the collection of the revenue in Scinde. The removal of the Ameers has had the effect of depriving the Beloochees of all hope, and thus has tended to the tranquillisation of the province.

"Horsemen from Jessulmere and Jodhpore had been directed upon Shahgurh in anticipation of Meer Shere Mahomed retiring to that fort, which he appears to have reached. It is forty miles from Jessulmere, and formerly belonged to that State, to which it will be restored.

"Of the Ameers at Bombay, one only, a boy, was not in communication with Meer Shere Mahomed till the day before the battle of the 24th of March, and every one who carried on such communication from within the British camp might have been shot by the laws of war.

"Meer Shahdad, who has been separately confined at Bombay, ordered a Beloochee, who has been executed for the murder of a British officer, to murder every Englishman he could find; and yet your Majesty will hear that at Bombay these treacherous enemies of the British Government are by many represented to be the victims of injustice and oppression; but your Majesty will likewise find that no extent of misrepresentation to which he may be subjected will ever induce Lord Ellenborough to vary in

the slightest degree the measures he may deem it expedient to adopt for the protection of the great interests committed to his charge.

"General Mataban Singh, having returned to Nepaul, has been received with enthusiasm by the soldiery and with apparent favour by the Maharajah. He has used his new power to effect the destruction of the hereditary enemies of his family—men guilty undoubtedly of great crimes deserving of death; but at the same time the indication of a vindictive and violent character which has thus been given by the general, and the new position in which he is placed practically at the head of the Nepaul Government by the favour of a soldiery which delights in war, excite some apprehensions as to the course which, for the purpose of consolidating his authority and gratifying his ambition, he may pursue. His future proceedings will render necessary much watchfulness on the part of the British Government.

"In the Punjab there have been increased indications of a want of confidence between the Maharajah and his minister Dhian Singh. The Maharajah, relying upon the support of General Ventura, seems prepared to circumvent his minister, and the minister, aware of his danger, prepares for a contest, while he evinces outwardly every disposition to gratify the Maharajah on points on which he had before evaded compliance with his wishes, more especially on the point of bringing his brother Gholab Singh to the court.

"The financial difficulties of the Nizam's Government are become very serious, and it may become absolutely necessary to adopt some measure for his relief. Lord Ellenborough would willingly defer any such measure until it might be made the condition of some decided improvement of the relations between the British Government and that of the Nizam, having for its object the improvement of the condition of his Highness's dominions.

"In India generally all is apparently in a state of tranquillity and repose; but our security requires that India should be at all times considered to be in a state of danger, and the Government should evince perpetual vigilance, and be at all times prepared for vigorous and decisive action."

"Allahabad, June 8, 1843

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that he arrived at Allahabad this morning, on his way to Calcutta, where he will rejoin the Council of India about the first week in July.

"Lord Ellenborough has not adopted this measure without great doubts as to its expediency under present circumstances. He apprehends, however, that the measure will be generally approved in England. On his arrival at Cawnpore, Lord Ellenborough made over the government of the North-West Provinces to Mr. Clerk, who has so long been

Governor-General's agent on the Sikh frontier. He fears that this gentleman's health will not enable him to remain in India beyond December; but while he can remain, his high position as lieutenant-governor will give him additional weight with the authorities at Lahore, and tend to maintain things there in their present state. In December, also, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland, the Governor-General's agent in Rajpootana, will leave India. That officer has much influence and ability, and his retirement will tend to weaken the Government in the Rajpoot States.

"Until the 20th of May everything at Gwalior wore a favourable appearance, and the authority of the regent never appeared to have a stronger foundation than the day before the intrigue commenced which has ended in his downfall. The regent had effected a marriage between his niece (a child of six years of age) and the Maharajah, who is nine. The marriage seemed to have been agreeable to the widow of the late Maharajah, the Maharanee—who is herself only twelve—but probably it was represented to her Highness that the regent, having managed this marriage, would, in the name of the minor Maharajah, supersede her authority in the State. Whatever the cause, her Highness gave her whole support to the faction hostile to the regent, and advanced sums for the payment of the troops from the Treasury. After discussions which lasted a fortnight, the regent was dismissed, all the chiefs

having been brought over to the faction hostile to him.

"The British minister at Gwalior has advised the regent to retire from that place in obedience to the Maharanee's orders, but he will afford protection to him should his personal safety be endangered. This measure, hazardous as it is, seemed to be consistent with the character of the British Government to adopt towards an officer lately raised to so high a station with the full consent of the Governor-General, and deposed for no alleged misconduct or even error in his administration.

"These events are very much to be deplored. They may have very injurious results upon the tranquillity of the common frontier of the British territory and that of the Gwalior State. Lord Ellenborough still hopes, however, that no outrage will occur which would render necessary the bringing together of troops for the vindication of the honour of the British Government.

"All has remained quiet in Nepaul.

"The accounts received from Sir C. Napier lead Lord Ellenborough to entertain good hopes that before the end of the year Scinde will be under a regular government, readily acknowledged and acquiesced in by the people; but some further conflicts may take place before the spirit of the barbarous Beloochees is fully subdued.

"Lord Ellenborough has had every reason to be satisfied with all Sir Charles Napier's measures.

"The finances of India appear to be regaining a healthy state. Several measures are in contemplation for affording new facilities to internal trade which Lord Ellenborough hopes he shall be able to bring to maturity soon after he rejoins the Council.

"The authorities at Calcutta venture somewhat sanguinely to expect a surplus revenue in the current year, commencing on the 1st of May, and such an event is not improbable; but the amount of the expenditure must so much depend upon the early settlement of Scinde, and the amount of the revenue will be so materially affected by the receipts from that province that the time is evidently not yet arrived when a surplus can be relied upon with any degree of confidence. Your Majesty, too, will not fail to remember that the receipts from the sale of opium form a very material item in Indian revenue. The receipts from that source this year will probably exceed by seven or eight hundred thousand pounds the receipts of last year; but this is obviously an improvement which cannot be depended upon for the future, when all the variations which may take place in our commercial and political relations, and even in our legislative, are taken into consideration.

"Lord Ellenborough has great satisfaction in sending to your Majesty the postscript to a private letter he has just received from Sir C. Napier, dated the 16th of May: 'Many chiefs are come in and more coming. I have every hope that we shall be quiet. Shere Mahomed is nearly deserted. Ali Morad is here.'

"This last part is important, as some doubts have latterly been thrown upon Ali Morad's fidelity.

"The apprehensions of collision with the Burmese which had arisen out of the misconduct of the late Commissioner, Mr. Blundell, who has been removed, have been nearly done away with since the arrival of his successor, Major Broadfoot, C.B., the officer who so much distinguished himself at Jellalabad."

"Allahabad, June 27, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that he has transmitted to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors a letter giving a connected view of the policy which has dictated the several measures he has adopted with respect to Scinde. To that statement Lord Ellenborough has deemed it necessary to add the observation that neither the measures now in progress and in contemplation in Scinde nor indeed any great measures can be successfully carried on unless the person at the head of the Government of India is understood to have the full support of all the authorities in England; that if, from whatever cause, the opinion should be created and prevail that a change of policy may be expected, consequent upon a change in the person at the head of the Administration in India, from that moment all strength must depart from the Government, and that

is better for the public interests that the anticipated change should at once take place.

"Lord Ellenborough has further observed that for himself it would not be ungrateful to him to be relieved from a government which he has conducted amidst uninterrupted misrepresentation and calumny, although hitherto, by the good favour of Providence through unexampled difficulties, with uninterrupted success; and he has respectfully submitted to the Secret Committee that, inasmuch as he is convinced that the policy he has adopted in Scinde is at once just and expedient, it is impossible for him to carry out measures which shall have any other object than that of permanently maintaining the position in which, he trusts, for the common good of India and of England, victory has now placed us upon the Indus.

"Whatever may have been the decision taken with respect to my measures in Scinde, I feel assured that your Majesty's generosity will have induced your Majesty to place the most favourable interpretation upon the conduct of a Governor-General of India compelled by the necessities of his position, to adopt at once a decisive line of policy, and to consider, not what might be said of his measures in England, but the effect which they would have upon the security and prosperity of the great empire of which your Majesty's most gracious confidence permitted him to undertake the government."

" Allahabad, June 27, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humble acquaints your Majesty that to this day all the accounts received from Scinde are most favourable.

"The people generally receive the British troops with satisfaction. The police and the revenue officers of the British Government are extending themselves into the country. The real benefits derived from the abolition of slavery appear to be greater than had been anticipated. The chiefs are coming in and professing allegiance. Military operations have been almost suspended in consequence of the rising of the Indus and of the extreme heat of the weather; but Meer Shere Mahomed, the refugee chief of Meerpore, was prevented from passing to the right bank of the Indus by the steamers, and on the 8th instant his brother, Meer Shah Mahomed, was taken prisoner at Sehwan by Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts,* with ninety of his men. Meer Shah Mahomed had come down to Sehwan to endeavour to effect Meer Shere Mahomed's escape. The forces of Meer Shere Mahomed are understood to be much diminished.

"On the 9th Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts will have crossed the Indus, near Sehwan, with 1500 men, and on the 10th a force of 400 infantry and the Scinde Horse will have moved from Meerpore against Meer

* Afterwards General Roberts.

Shere Mahomed, who would be pressed on the side of Sukkurenda by Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts's corps. Major-General Sir Charles Napier intended to make a demonstration at the same time from Hyderabad.

"Lord Ellenborough may possibly be enabled to communicate to your Majesty the result of these movements by the present mail.

"Measures have been taken for bringing forward troops from Sukkur and Jessulmere to the edge of the desert as soon as the rains have set in, and thus Meer Shere Mahomed will be surrounded. He is already understood to be willing to come in on terms, and as his has been fair and open war, without treachery — although without legimate grounds— Lord Ellenborough would not, for the sake of peace, refuse to make some provision for him.

"One chief who was in arms at Meeanee has been admitted to terms; but his, too, was open war.

"Preparations are already making for surveying the ancient watercourses and canals which once gave fertility to countries now uncultivated on the borders of the desert and near Cutch, and Lord Ellenborough entertains very sanguine hopes that, by applying European energy and European science to the improvement of the new province, the British Government may, at no distant time, render it a most valuable acquisition to its empire, while the happiness and prosperity of the people of Scinde will be at the same time advanced and secured.

"Your Majesty will learn with pleasure that, on

the commencement of the monsoon, the sickness amongst the troops in Scinde was much diminished.

"The retirement of the late regent from Gwalior has removed all present apprehensions of collision with the troops of Gwalior. The British Resident has, in pursuance of his instructions, removed to his house at Dholepore, about thirty miles from Gwalior, and out of the Gwalior territory.

"The last accounts give reason to expect that the attempt by the successful faction to remove from the palace the brigade which has for some years guarded it may lead to a contest.

"Under all circumstances the most proper position for the British Resident seems to be that which has been taken at Dholepore, whence he will not return to Gwalior without specific instructions, and Lord Ellenborough's present impression is that the Resident should not return until there shall be a government at Gwalior possessing the appearance of good intention and stability, or until the Maharanee and the chiefs shall earnestly desire his aid for the establishment of such a government.

"In Nepaul all is at present tranquil. Lord Ellenborough's expectation is that Matabá Singh, recently returned from exile, will secure for himself predominant authority, be the means what they may; but at present he declines taking the ostensible post of minister.

"The misunderstandings with the Burmese on the Salween river, which have arisen out of the mis-

conduct of the late commissioner, do not appear to be yet entirely overcome by the good sense and ability of his successor, Major Broadfoot; but Lord Ellenborough still hopes that everything will be settled amicably in that quarter.

"Some persons engaged in the insurrection of 1841 and 1842 have proceeded to Berar from Hyderabad in the Deccan, and numerous Arabs are entertained there. The day cannot be distant when it will be absolutely necessary to interfere with the strong arm for the expulsion of the Arabs from the Nizam's dominion, in which they now occupy half the forts; but Lord Ellenborough deems it to be advisable to do one thing at a time, and circumstances do not yet allow of our devoting our force to the permanent pacification of the Deccan.

"Lord Ellenborough embarks this evening, and proceeds to-morrow morning towards Calcutta, where he will arrive on the 13th of July."

"Barrackpore, August 13, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that all is at present tranquil in India. In Scinde the people are everywhere satisfied with the change of their rulers, and the chiefs, despairing of being able to resist further with success, come in to swear allegiance. Shere Mahomed, of Meerpore, who has escaped to the right bank of the Indus, has neither

followers nor money, nor has he yet received any support from the chiefs of the clans on that side.

"The English collectors expect to raise, ultimately, a revenue of a million from Scinde.

"The surveyors of the watercourses, canals, and forests, will commence their operations in October. Should they be attended with success, the opening of the Narra will make the country between that stream and the Indus as fertile as Mesopotamia was when it was well governed.

"Your Majesty will read with much interest the explanations Sir C. Napier has afforded of his conduct at Emam Ghur and before the battle of Meeanee.

"Lord Ellenborough has deemed it right to enclose for your Majesty's perusal a letter from Sir Charles Napier, of a private rather than an official character, which places the whole subject in its true point of view. There are passages in the letter which Lord Ellenborough would have wished not to place before your Majesty, but he was unwilling to send your Majesty an extract only.

"The financial difficulties of the Nizam's Government have led to the resignation of the old minister, and their tendency is to place the whole of his Highness's dominions for a series of years, if not permanently, under British administration in consideration of a loan of a million, which must be advanced for the payment of the troops and of debts to bankers and others. The decision of the Nizam upon the several propositions submitted to his

Highness will be known in a few days. Lord Ellenborough could have desired that this crisis should have been postponed, for the Government of India having ten millions in its treasuries, and the Five per Cent. stock being at a premium of six per cent., measures might have been perhaps adopted, and were already in contemplation, for reducing the interest of the Five per Cent. debt. These measures must now be delayed.

"At Gwalior, the chief of the successful faction which lately expelled the regent, whose appointment had been sanctioned by the British Government, has apparently strengthened himself by paying the arrears of pay due to the troops, and by compelling the retirement, not unattended by violence on the part of the soldiers, of almost all the European and half-blood officers in the service of the State. He has replaced, in situations from which they had been removed by the late Maharajah, on the representation of the British Resident, many persons notorious for their hostility to British interests, and for their connection with plunderers upon our frontier. The example of a successful defiance of British Government a Gwalior has led the weak Holkar to pay less attention to our expressed wishes. Disturbances are expected on the borders of Berar, and it is hardly possible that the vicinity of the ungoverned districts belonging to the Gwalior State should not lead to much di position to plunder along our frontier and that of our allies.

"The new minister at Gwalior appears to exercise a very strict control over the conduct and persons of the widow of the late Maharajah and of the present minor sovereign. He avows that the reports of Lord Ellenborough's approaching return to England and the certainty of the retirement (from ill-health) of Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland and of Mr. Clerk from the North-West Provinces, lead him to think that 'he shall have all his own way.'

"Under these circumstances, the members of the Indian Government have unanimously decided upon the formation of an army at Agra (of about 12,000 men besides artillery), which will be commanded by Sir Hugh Gough; and other measures are in contemplation for the purpose of enabling the Government to concentrate a much larger force. Lord Ellenborough, however, believes that it will not be necessary to move a man beyond the frontier.

"Your Majesty will readily perceive that the continued existence of a hostile Government at Gwalior would be inconsistent with the continuance of our permanent influence in India, by which alone its peace is preserved. It would be inconsistent with the character of our Government in a country wherein, more than any other, character is strength. Its result would be, at no distant time, a combination against us of chiefs and princes impatient of all restraint, and humiliated by our supremacy as now exhibited to them. Lord Ellenborough is fully sensible of all these things; but he is most anxious

to place things in their former position by management and not by actual force, and in this he trusts he may succeed; but it is obvious that the expectation of his return to England must materially impair all his efforts in this direction.

"Affairs in the Punjab and in Nepaul remain in the same state.

"Everywhere there is a prospect of abundant harvests, not in the British territory alone, but in the whole country between the Indus and the Ganges.

"One measure, for the freedom of internal trade upon the North-Western frontier has been already passed. Other measures are in contemplation, and will be soon carried into effect, for the abolition of the transit duties at Madras and of the town duties at Bombay. Compensation for the loss of revenue by these several measures will be found in an increase of the tax on salt. The changes recently made in the distribution of business between the secretaries at Calcutta have been successful in greatly facilitating its transaction.

"There is at present tranquillity in Saugor and Bundelcund; but disturbances in the adjoining districts belonging to Gwalior would defeat all the prospects we are now justified in entertaining, that the recent change of officers engaged in the administration will produce permanent improvement in the disposition and conduct and condition of the people."

"Calcutta, September 19, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that the tranquillity of the province of Scinde remains undisturbed. A wing of the Jodhpore Legion marched from Jodhpore on the 2nd of August, and reached Omerkote on the 24th. The march through the desert was effected without material difficulty, and without loss from sickness. It is of some importance to have thus proved the practicability of this route.

"The Rajah of Jodhpore has been placed in possession of all the country formerly belonging to his ancestors between the frontiers of Jodhpore and Omerkote, and it will now be occupied by his Highness's own troops.

"It has been determined, with a view at once to efficiency and to economy, to garrison Scinde with Bengal troops only. Your Majesty's 13th Regiment and seven battalions of native infantry, with a regiment of regular and one of irregular cavalry, and an ample force of artillery, will in the course of the ensuing cold season move from the North-West Provinces to Scinde, and relieve the Bombay troops, which will return to their own Presidency.

"Corresponding changes will be made in the distribution of the Bombay troops and of the Madras troops, which have the effect of relieving so many of the Bengal regiments as to render the Bengal army as strong upon all important points as it is now.

"The state of affairs at Lahore has been much disturbed. The Maharajah has very nearly brought on a crisis, under the influence of his jealousy of his minister, Dhian Singh, and yet more under the apparent influence of his intemperate habits, which daily gain strength and must ultimately lead to his ruin. For the moment there is a settlement by the restoration of Dhian Singh; but what has passed can neither be forgotten nor forgiven by either party, and it must be the constant object of each to circumvent the other.

"These circumstances may lead to a predatory attack upon the possessions of the Sikh chiefs under our protection, but they are not likely to have as their result any organized attack upon us, until the whole power shall be united in one strong hand.

"In Nepaul there has been no change. Mataban Singh remains practically in possession of authority. He has sacrificed some more of the guilty persecutors of his family. In this he has apparently had general support.

"The Nizam appears to be disposed to advance from his private treasury sums sufficient to discharge the most pressing of the debts of the State. He has given his assent to many suggestions for reform which have been submitted to him by the British Resident; and the person who will probably be invested with the power of chief minister bears a respectable character.

"Orders have been issued for the bringing together

of the army of exercise at Agra, and the Commander-in-Chief has left Calcutta for Cawnpore.

"A timely representation from the British minister to the Ranee of Gwalior had the effect of preventing a hostile movement of Gwalior troops into territory under our protection, for the purpose of obtaining possession of the person of the late regent, the Mama Sahib; and generally there appears latterly to have been a disposition on the part of the Gwalior Durbar to recede from measures justly obnoxious to the British Government, and to do all which their engagements demand; but these measures have their origin only in the apprehension which has been excited by the order given to our troops to be ready to move, and notwithstanding the opposition of the other chiefs, the Dada Khasgee Wala, with whom every measure of an offensive or hostile character originated, still retains his influence over the Ranee, and directs affairs. It would appear that he now conceals from her Highness the real purport of the communications addressed to her by the British minister.

"Upon the whole the state of India requires now, as indeed it always must, the exercise of extreme vigilance on the part of the Government, and constant preparation for the field."

"Calcutta, October 20, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty

that the assassination of the Maharajah Shere Singh, on the 15th of September, and the subsequent deaths of the Minister, Dhian Singh, and of many other chiefs at Lahore, have led to the virtual transfer of all power to the disorganized army there assembled, which power appears to be exercised through committees in the several corps corresponding together and acting in concert.

"Large sums of money have been already exacted from Heera Singh, the son of the late Dhian Singh, who has the title of Vizier to the boy Dhuleep Singh, raised to the throne as the son of Runjeet Singh.

"General Ventura appears to have been acting as the adviser of Heera Singh; but what General Ventura thinks of him, and what he thinks of the present and future state of the Punjab, your Majesty will learn from the general's letter, of which a copy is enclosed for your Majesty's information.

"Gholab Singh, the elder brother of Dhian Singh, still remains at Jummoo, in the hills, and seems to be engaged in securing himself there, and unwilling to trust himself in the plains.

"It is apprehended that Heera Singh will soon be compelled to fly from Lahore to Jummoo. He has possessed himself of the most valuable jewels of the Crown, and relays of horses have been already placed for him on the road to Jummoo. On the flight of Heera Singh a Sikh government will in all probability be formed for a time.

"The tendency of these events is to produce a

separation between the government of the hills and that of the plains, the Sikhs retaining the plains, and the Rajpoots, under Goolab and Heera Singh, the hills.

"It is doubtful whether, under these circumstances, the province of Mooltan, chiefly inhabited by Mussulmans, would remain under the Sikhs.

"The separation between the hills and the plains could hardly take place without some conflict, and Lord Ellenborough is much disposed to take the same view of the ultimate destiny of the territories lately under the rule of Shere Singh which is taken by General Ventura.

"The instructions given to the British agent upon the frontier are entirely in accordance with the policy which has been pursued towards the Sikh State for many years. Every desire is expressed to see that State maintained as it was under Runjeet Singh, and while we protect our own rights nothing will be done to impair the independence of our neighbours—but it is impossible not to perceive that the ultimate tendency of the late events at Lahore is, without any effort on our part, to bring the plains first, and at a somewhat later period the hills, under our direct protection or control.

"Dost Mahomed appears to be so much occupied by the internal affairs of Cabul as to be unable at present to detach any force for the purpose of endeavouring to repossess himself of Peshawur. The concentration at Lahore of a disorganized army of 70,000 men

rendered necessary precautionary measures on our part, and such have been promptly taken.

"It seemed indispensable to arrest the intended march of the Bengal regiments ordered to Scinde to relieve the Bombay troops in that province, as their presence is now temporarily required upon the Sutlej; but your Majesty's 13th Light Infantry will still proceed to Sukkur, and it is to be hoped that two regiments of native infantry may soon be disposable for the same station.

"There has been, and still is, very extensive sickness amongst the troops at Sukkur, and an attack is threatened from the hills to aid Shere Mahomed of Meerpore. It is therefore requisite to strengthen that point.

"Although hopes may still be entertained that the chiefs at Gwalior may themselves expel the hostile minister, the Dada Khasgee Walla, and thus enable our minister to resume his position at the court, yet it has been deemed necessary to bring together a considerable force in Bundelcund and at Agra, for the purpose of supporting such authoritative representations as it may become necessary to make at Gwalior.

"At that place, within a few marches of the capital of the North-West Provinces, is now collected an army of 30,000 men, subject to no real control, or, if to any, to that of the Dada Khasgee Walla, who disposes of the hoarded treasure of the State to secure their temporary support. That person has, by his

acts, evinced a hostile disposition towards the British Government; and it is essential to the interests of our Government that our relations with the State of Gwalior should be of the most friendly character.

"The British territory and that of Gwalior are in contact along the whole frontier of Bundelcund and Saugor, and the dominions of Gwalior are elsewhere very extensively intermixed with those of our allies.

"The most cordial and zealous co-operation on the part of the Gwalior authorities is indispensable for the purpose of preventing plunderers from acting along the whole of our extended frontier. That co-operation has never been fully given, and hence much of the disorder which has arisen. Yet the late Maharajah of Gwalior was most friendly. If for his friendly, however weak, administration he substituted the government of the Dada Khasgee Walla, known to be hostile to our Government, who has already restored to office several chiefs removed formerly on our representation, in consequence of their enmity to us and their encouragement of the ill-disposed and ill-affected, and it is impossible not to foresee as a necessary result much trouble and disorder, interfering with the prosperity of our territories, and hereafter, on the first favourable occasion, active hostility on the part of the assembled army.

"It is impossible for the British Government to permit the continued existence of a state of things which would paralyse all its movements upon the

Sutlej and Indus, and create doubts as to our power in the minds of all native princes and of our own subjects.

"Your Majesty will not have failed to observe in how very different a position the British Government stands in Europe from that in which it is placed in India. In Europe peace is maintained by the balance of power amongst the several States. In India all balance has been overthrown by our preponderance, and to exist we must continue to be supreme. The necessity of our position may often render necessary here measures wholly unsuited to the state of things which prevails in Europe. The least appearance of weakness, or of hesitation, would lead to a general combination of all against a foreign and necessarily an unpopular government.

"Your Majesty must regard India as being at all times in a state of danger, from which it can only be rescued by the constant exercise of vigilance, and by the occasional adoption of measures which may appear extraordinary, but which are practically adapted to the extraordinary position which the British Government occupies in this country. It will ever be Lord Ellenborough's desire, should he be compelled to adopt such measures, to make them as far as possible conformable to European views and principles, but he feels that his first duty is to preserve this empire to your Majesty's Crown, and he will never hesitate to adopt the measures which may appear necessary to secure that object.

31941

" Barrackpore, November 20, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that everything in India appears to be in a safe position.

"The Punjab is practically without a government, and the nominal minister, Heera Singh, will probably soon cease to live or to reside at Lahore. He has no power. The tendency of events is to produce an early separation between the hills and the plains; indeed it already exists, and it is even doubtful whether Gholab Singh, the brother of the late Dhian Singh, will make the effort to support his relations, or to establish himself at Lahore. The Sikh army, intent only on obtaining more pay, has hitherto remained tranquil, and no indication has been given of the least desire to provoke the resentment of the British Government.

"On our side, however, every prudent precaution is taken against the possible inroad of troops or plunderers from the Punjab.

"In Scinde, in the Saugor territory, in Bundelcund, and in the Tenasserim provinces, all remains quiet.

"Reparation has been made by the Government of Oude to that of Nepaul, and the latter Government appears to be much gratified by the part so promptly taken by the British authorities to obtain that just reparation.

"The new sovereigns of Jodhpore and Indore

have been elected and received with unanimity under circumstances which in former times would have led to protracted internal contest.

"At Gwalior the usurping minister has been seized by the chiefs and troops of the party opposed to him; but there is still no appearance of a settlement without the authoritative intervention of the British Government, and seeing the urgent necessity of effecting such settlement in a secure and satisfactory manner, Lord Ellenborough will proceed on the 25th instant to Agra, which he will reach on the 11th of December, and find the army assembled.

"The total force which can be concentrated in a few days at Gwalior will consist of nineteen regiments of infantry and twelve regiments of cavalry, with an ample number of field guns; and fifty pieces of siege artillery are prepared at Agra for eventual movement, should such be necessary; but Lord Ellenborough trusts that this will not be the case, and that everything which is reasonable will be obtained without the actual employment of arms. It is mainly the hope that his presence may lead to this peaceful conclusion that induces Lord Ellenborough to leave Calcutta.

"In Scinde there has been, and still continues, a most unusual sickness pervading the whole population as well as the troops, and extending even to Candahar.

"Lord Ellenborough has enclosed a letter recently addressed to him by Sir Charles Napier on his

receiving the intelligence that your Majesty had been graciously pleased to grant medals to the troops engaged at Meeanee and Hyderabad, under the impression that it would interest your Majesty to know how deeply that act of gracious consideration is felt by the general, and how anxiously it was desired by the troops.

"Your Majesty may be assured that there is no portion of your army more devoted to the Crown, or more sensible of every mark of royal favour, than that which serves in India."

"Camp Dholepore, on the Chumbul, 30 miles from Gwalior, December 19, 1843.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that there is every present prospect of re-establishing friendly relations with the Gwalior State without the use of actual force, and of obtaining every object we have in view with the willing concurrence of the Maharanee and of the chiefs. The hostile minister, the Dada Khasgee Walla, was immediately delivered up upon the receipt by the Maharanee of the letter of which a copy is enclosed for your Majesty's perusal. He is a prisoner in the camp, and will be sent to the Fort of Agra. The only remaining difficulty is apparently that of effecting the disbandment and disarming of a disaffected portion of the Gwalior army.

"In this measure the chiefs would gladly co-operate; but they may not be able to effect it without our active aid, or at least without the support they would derive from the near approach of our army.

"It is a measure of great moment to reduce the strength of the army maintained by the Gwalior State. It has long been the real master of the State. It is in amount wholly disproportioned to its revenues and wants; and it never can be otherwise than a subject of disquietude to have an army of thirty thousand men within a few days' march of Agra.

"The existence of an army of such strength in that position must very seriously embarrass the disposition of troops we might be desirous of making to meet a coming danger from the Sutlej.

"The total force of the army assembled here is about 14,200 men; that of the left wing, which will be united to-morrow at Chandpore, on the Scinde river, is 8600 men. There are 5000 cavalry, 15,600 infantry, 1800 artillery, and 400 sappers in the two corps; 48 field guns and 50 guns in the siege train. The train it is no longer necessary to bring on. The two passages over the Jumna at Etawah and Calpee are secured by sufficient troops, and a regiment is left at Agra. These are not included in the number already mentioned as the amount of the two corps. The total force employed is therefore little short of 25,000 men.

"Your Majesty will be gratified to learn that when your Majesty's 40th Regiment joined the camp at Agra, all the men of the four native regiments then in camp, who had served with the 40th in Afghanistan, turned out to receive them with cheers.

"Your Majesty's 40th Regiment and the 2nd and 16th Regiments of native grenadiers are brigaded together and form the advanced guard. They were all together at Candahar. Their appearance and their movements excite general admiration.

"The late Maharajah of Gwalior had allotted certain revenues for the maintenance of a corps of about 1400 men, to be commanded by British officers, and constantly stationed in the Gwalior territory. This corps has done excellent service, and it is proposed to obtain from the Gwalior State the assignment of further revenues for the purpose of raising very considerably the amount of this useful force.

"It is proposed to procure the consent of the Gwalior State to the placing under British administration the districts of which the revenues will be so assigned to the extent at least of giving to the British Government the power of nominating and removing persons in authority, and thus securing the real co-operation of all for the maintenance of order.

"The districts selected will be such as adjoin our lately disturbed frontiers of Saugor and Bundelcund. This is no new arrangement. It is only he extension of one long established with the ready c ncurrence of the Gwalior State.

"This measure of increasing the force under British officers, which is paid by the Gwalior State, taken in conjunction with that of reducing the number of their own ill-regulated army, will, it is expected, give full future security and permanently place the Gwalior State in the relation towards the British Government in which it was Lord Wellesley's object to place it, and in which he thought he had placed it by the treaties of Sirjee Arjengaum and of Boorhanpore, which were concluded by the Duke of Wellington on the 20th of December, 1803, and the 17th of February, 1804.

"It is Lord Ellenborough's earnest desire to conclude the arrangements with the Gwalior State as soon as possible, and to draw back the army to Agra and Meerut, in order to prevent the Sikhs from entertaining the idea that they may with impunity commit an act of aggression.

"The territories which formed the dominion of Runjeet Singh might be considered as already divided between the Sikhs of the plains and the Rajpoots of the hills. The whole army remains at Lahore, the real master of the Government. Its inaction is only purchased by largesses, but these cannot always be given, nor can the promised rate of pay be disbursed. The revenues are no longer regularly paid, and they would in any case be insufficient. There must be some violent termination to this state of things.

"Your Majesty will not have failed to observe

that there was much danger in the example of two armies, close to our frontier, obtaining payment of arrears and increase of pay by intimidating the Governments they pretended to serve.

"The ground of our proceeding with respect to the Gwalior State will be communicated officially to all the native Powers. A draft of the proposed note, subject to alteration, is sent to England by this mail.

"Lord Ellenborough also recorded a minute upon the subject of our position with respect to Gwalior before he left Calcutta. These several documents will place the whole question before your Majesty, and Lord Ellenborough is not without hopes that your Majesty will approve the course which has been adopted. It has been adopted with extreme reluctance, but from an ultimate conviction of its necessity after full consideration.

"In Nepaul all is tranquil. There has been no interruption of tranquillity on the frontiers of Ava. In Scinde not a man has moved since June. The sickness there has been most unusual and extensive, pervading the whole people. There has, however, been but few fatal cases, and the health of the army will be restored with the cold weather.

"Prince Albert's Regiment of light infantry will be at Sukkur to-day, and that point will be secure.

"Upon the whole there does not appear to be any difficulty in India which vigilance and promptitude may not overcome, but both are necessary."

"Camp, Gwalior, January 22, 1844.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly announces to your Majesty two victories obtained on the same day over two bodies of the Gwalior troops, and the subsequent occupation of the Fort of Gwalior by troops commanded by your Majesty's officers—events followed by the conclusion on the 13th instant of a treaty, whereby every reasonable object of British intervention in the affairs of the Gwalior State was secured.

"Already more than 8000 men of the Gwalior army have been disbanded, and their arms and guns conveyed to the fort; 2500 other troops of that army have taken service in the new battalions of the contingent paid by the Gwalior State and commanded by British officers.

"Eighty-eight guns were taken in the two battles, 129 other guns have been sent to the fort, and in all 300 guns will have been transferred from hostile troops to British possession.

"The new contingent will consist of 7500 men. It will be paid out of the revenues of districts transferred to British management, and those districts adjoin our frontiers.

"The Gwalior army will be reduced to 3000 infantry with 12 guns, 200 artillery with 20 guns, and 6000 cavalry.

"The council of regency appointed to conduct

the government during the Maharajah's minority, which does not terminate till January 1854, is to act according to the advice of the British Resident.

"On the requisition of the Council of Regency, two brigades of British infantry and one of cavalry, with 18 guns, will remain for the next six weeks at Gwalior—that is, until some battalions of the new contingent are fit for service.

"The contingent will preserve order in the Gwalior State.

"When Lord Ellenborough last addressed your Majesty, he hoped that all that was necessary might be effected without the use of force; but the Gwalior troops, partly controlling a Government which, administered in the Maharanee's name, was in fact hostile to the British connection, resolved upon a trial of strength in the field.

"The British troops were opposed on the 29th of December on their march towards Gwalior, and never can your Majesty's infantry have evinced more gloriously their pre-eminent qualities as soldiers.

"It is a subject of deep regret that so severe a loss has been sustained; but the result of the successful conflict is increased security to the British Empire in India.

"Lord Ellenborough has carefully made known to all native Powers the grounds of British intervention in the affairs of Gwalior, and the views of justice and moderation by which the Government has been guided in the moment of victory.

"The state of the Punjab only leads to the expectation that new crimes will be committed there, and that a new conflict may take place for power.

"The victories of Maharajpore and Punniar will probably have removed all present views of hostility, even from the most self-sufficient mind amongst those of the soldiers of Lahore; but it will be obviously necessary never to relax our vigilant observation of the Sikh State and army.

"In Nepaul and in Scinde all has been tranquil. The acquiescence of your Majesty's Government in the measures adopted with respect to Scinde, in March 1843, will probably prevent future danger in that province. The sickness there is not to be considered otherwise than most unusual.

"Lord Ellenborough moves from this camp to-morrow on his return to Calcutta. To-day the young Maharajah was present with his chiefs at a review of the splendid army which is now assembled here for his support. A more magnificent military spectacle could not have been afforded, and it will, together with his visit, under different circumstances to the camp at Duneila, remain for ever on his Highness's mind, and secure his devotion to the British Government.

"Lord Ellenborough deems it right to communicate directly to your Majesty a letter addressed by him to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, in reply to a letter wherein the Committee transmitted to him a resolution condemnatory of the measures

adopted in Scinde, which was passed by the Court in August last.

"Your Majesty will, in Lord Ellenborough's letter, see distinctly stated the true position of the Court and of your Majesty's Commissioners for the affairs of India respectively with regard to the government of India.

"Lord Ellenborough has hitherto had the good fortune to serve your Majesty with success in the administration of this country, which your Majesty permitted him to assume; and your Majesty may be assured that no personal consideration will ever prevent his executing whatever he may believe to be his duty and for your Majesty's service."

"Allahabad, February 16, 1844.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that up to the present time the measures recently adopted with respect to the Gwalior State appear to have been successful.

All the forts which were held against the Gwalior Government by rebellious landholders or by marauders have been surrendered without resistance; and the authority of the Maharajah and that of the British Government will very shortly be fully established in the several districts placed respectively under their management.

"The troops reserved to the Maharajah and those

of the contingent force under British officers have been acting cordially together. The feeling of these reserved troops towards our officers and troops appears to be altogether changed; and the British officers appointed to command the new levies are much pleased with the recruits obtained from the disbanded regiments.

"Two of the newly-formed battalions have already marched from Gwalior.

"All the British troops left temporarily in camp at Gwalior, at the desire of the Maharajah's Government, will have returned to the British provinces before the 13th of March.

"The fort of Gwalior will always remain in charge of one of the battalions of the contingent commanded by British officers.

"The disbandment of the former Gwalior army (with the exception of the 3000 reserved infantry) and the delivery of the guns and muskets belonging to the disbanded troops may now be considered to be completed.

"The new Government of the Maharajah has made several economical reforms, and seems generally disposed to conduct the administration on equitable principles.

"Lord Ellenborough has reason to think that the moderation evinced in the treatment of the Gwalior State after the recent victories has produced a favourable impression upon the minds of the native princes of India, and has conciliated them towards the British

Government; while the victories will, for the present at least, have the effect of putting an end to all ideas of resistance to British power.

"The state of the Punjab exhibits no improvement.

"Rajah Heera Singh remains at Lahore without power over the army. One regiment is already arrived at Lahore from Peshawur against orders, in order to extort more pay, and it remains unpunished. Other regiments at Peshawur threaten to leave it, and it seems doubtful whether this mutinous desertion of Peshawur by the Sikh troops may not enable the Afghans to reoccupy it.

"In the hills, Rajah Gholab Singh is extending his power with his usual unscrupulous disregard of the rights of others and of the supremacy of the State he pretends to serve. This conduct, however, makes him very odious to the Sikhs at Lahore.

"In Nepaul there would appear to be every reason to expect some act of violence and of treachery on the part of the newly-appointed minister Matában Singh against the Rajah and his son.

"The troops seem to support the ministers. The chiefs are represented as leaving Katmandoo. On the other hand the Rajah is as unscrupulous as the minister, and has more cunning; and it may be doubtful whether the minister may not perish through his own treachery in a country generally so loyal to the Royal Family. The maintenance of the Rajah's authority would have a stronger tendency to preserve peace than the establishment of the power

of the minister, in whatever manner that establishment might be effected.

"The troops in Scinde are rapidly recovering their health. Those at Sukkur will be all relieved.

"An invasion from Candahar was at one time expected, but it was never feared.

"Time is required to establish the strength and to perfect the discipline and the equipment of the Indian army. All India wants repose. It is to be hoped that the state of the Punjab may not render necessary in December next an operation beyond the Sutlej; but every prudent preparation will be made with a view to enabling the army to undertake that operation whenever it may become necessary. It must be always viewed as a measure which can only be deferred. Your Majesty may be assured that Lord Ellenborough is fully aware of its magnitude and its importance. He knows that it cannot be devoid of great risk, and that, under all circumstances, it must be of a protracted character. Lord Ellenborough knows your Majesty's earnest desire to maintain peace, and your Majesty may at once rely on his doing everything which can prudently be done to avoid war and at the same time to secure success in a war should it become inevitable.

"It was not until after the departure of the last overland mail that Lord Ellenborough received your Majesty's gracious letter, which had been intercepted by the Gwalior troops, and was sent on unopened after the termination of hostilities.

"Lord Ellenborough will in every respect endeavour to effect your Majesty's beneficent wishes.

"Lord Ellenborough is so far advanced on his return to Calcutta, having thought that his return from the upper provinces would do more than any other measure towards creating in the minds of men generally throughout India some degree of confidence in the continuance of peace."

"Calcutta, March 20, 1844.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly submits to your Majesty the following statement of the circumstances under which some of the native regiments at Ferozepore have refused to march to Sukkur, on the alleged ground of the allowances to troops in Scinde having been reduced.

"The ordinary pay of a native soldier is five rupees and a half a month and an additional rupee and a half under the name of 'half batta,' making together seven rupees. When he is in the field he receives an additional rupee and a half, which, with the other rupee and a half, makes full batta; and his total receipts then are eight rupees and a half a month, out of which he invariably, whether in cantonments or in the field, provides his own rations; but he has a compensation in money when the principal article of food is very high in price.

"When the troops were ordered to Afghanistan

in 1838, it was doubted whether they would be willing to cross the Indus, and in order to induce them to do so they were informed that they would receive, beyond the Indus, the same allowances as were formerly granted in 1824 to troops beyond the Burmah frontier; that is, in addition to the sum of eight rupees and a half already mentioned, a further allowance under the name of 'money rations'—that is, either rations or a payment in money equivalent to their price in the camp market.

"These extra allowances the troops always enjoyed in Afghanistan; but in January 1839 it was considered by Lord Auckland and the Government of India that troops in Scinde, in quiet cantonments, were not entitled to the same allowances as troops making war in Afghanistan, and accordingly from troops in Scinde the extra allowance of money rations was taken away from the 1st of that month, nor was it restored till the 1st of January 1842.

"The additional allowance of a rupee and a half, which in India is a field allowance, was still enjoyed by the troops in Scinde in cantonments, and is still.

"In June 1842 Lord Ellenborough, seeing that the troops in Scinde were again, as it were, in the presence of an enemy, in consequence of the insurrection at Cabul and that great movements had become necessary, restored the extra allowance of money rations from the 1st of January 1842; the circumstances under which it was restored being similar to those under which it was first granted; and

the troops in Upper Scinde enjoyed these allowances till all Scinde seemed again tranquil and no enemy appeared to be in the field, when, by an order dated the 30th of May 1842, they—that is the money rations only—were withdrawn from the 1st of July, the extra batta still being left.

"The Bombay troops submitted without a murmur to this reasonable arrangement. At Sukkur there were Bengal troops, and by some error yet unexplained this withdrawal of money rations was not made known to them till the 14th of October, since which time it has had effect.

"The alleged ground of the refusal of the Bengal troops to march to Scinde now is that money rations have been withdrawn which were given to troops 'beyond the Indus;' but your Majesty will observe that, to be in a quiet cantonment on the right bank of the Indus, and so beyond it, and to ascend the Ghauts and go through the Bolan and Kojuk Passes, in the face of an enemy, to Candahar and Cabul, are very different things, and by no means entitle a soldier to similar allowances.

"The 34th Regiment of native infantry first refused to march on the 9th of February. The officer at Ferozepore took no measures for the purpose of punishing the guilty, and so preventing the spread of a pernicious example.

"As soon as Lord Ellenborough heard of this event he invested the commander-in-chief, who was near Delhi, with all the power of the Government

for the suppression of mutiny, even to the disbandment of a regiment.

"Unfortunately Sir R. Dick, who proceeded to Ferozepore, permitted the 69th, and afterwards the 4th, Regiment to enter that station, from which they were to move to Sukkur, with the example before them of two regiments—the 34th Infantry and the 7th Cavalry, and also of a troop and a company of native artillery—which had refused to obey the order to move to Sukkur, and had refused without punishment.

"The result was, as might have been expected, a similar refusal on the part of the 69th and 4th Regiments.

"These instances of mutiny occur upon the Sutlej, almost in the presence of the Sikh army; and brigades of that army are gradually moved towards Ferozepore and Loodianah, while efforts are made by Sikh emissaries to seduce the native troops from their allegiance.

"Your Majesty will observe that on the 28th of February, the day of Lord Ellenborough's return to Calcutta, a resolution was passed conferring large gratuities on the troops engaged at Meeanee and Hyderabad, Maharajpore and Puniar, and also on all the troops which have been quartered in Scinde, and so may have suffered from sickness during the last year.

"This measure will have conciliated the Bombay army. It will have gratified the 22,000 men who

were at Maharajpore and Puniar, and will have held out to all the troops now unwilling to go to Scinde the prospect of ample compensation should they suffer there from sickness.

"The 6th Regiment of irregular cavalry, which has marched to Sukkur without a murmur, has been highly rewarded and honoured.

"The draft of a proclamation has been transmitted to the commander-in-chief, which will explain to the troops their real position in Scinde, which it was apprehended that his Excellency himself did not clearly understand.

"Finally, a general order has been issued, by which the practice of the past has been established as a rule for the future, and the troops in Scinde having, as now, in cantonments the higher field allowances of Hindostan, will in the field have money rations as a peculiar field allowance.

"The effect of these various measures will, it is hoped, be the restoration of discipline; but it is felt that punishment must be inflicted on the guilty, and the 7th Cavalry and the 34th Infantry will be disbanded.

"The 64th Regiment had been ordered to the lower provinces, and all promotions in the regiments had been stopped in consequence of mutinous petitions, protesting against the injustice of sending the regiment to Scinde, and threatening the lives of the commanding officer and the adjutant.

"That regiment has now volunteered to march to

Scinde, without conditions, in order to remove the stigma from its character; but it is doubted whether it will pass Ferozepore.

"It has been decided necessary to transfer Sir R. Dick from his command on the frontier to the command of the troops at the Presidency, as he seems to be wholly unequal to the difficulties he has met, and may again meet, where he is.

"There have been three instances of insubordination amongst the Madras troops; but these are comparatively unimportant, although much to be deplored, especially at the present time. The insubordination of the troops at Ferozepore, in the immediate vicinity and, as it were, in the presence of the Sikh army, is an evil of the gravest character, and bringing with it, perhaps, the most serious consequences. Your Majesty is aware of the importance which Lord Ellenborough has always attached to the discipline of the Indian army.

"It may be doubtful whether the only alleged cause be really the principal cause of the reluctance of the troops to proceed to Scinde. The principal cause is in all probability the panic created by the late epidemic fever; and the view of a Sikh army on the other side of the Sutlej extorting higher pay by threats from the nominal Government it pretends to serve, may have had much effect upon the minds of our native troops.

"Your Majesty will see how much worse the position of the Government of India would now be

had it to dread the advance of the Gwalior army upon Agra. That danger at least has been removed, and a force, daily increasing, under British officers guards the territories of Gwalior, where tranquillity prevails, and the whole population is grateful for our intervention."

"Calcutta, April 21, 1844.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that all the corps which had once refused to march to Scinde have now proceeded to Sukkur, with the exception of one regiment of native infantry, the 34th, which has been disbanded. In the 4th and 69th Regiments about 300 men were discharged.

"On the 18th of March the Bundelcund Legion, a local corps of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, of 1700 men, volunteered for service in Scinde, and its services have been accepted. It will, in November next, relieve the 64th Native Infantry, the 8th Irregular Cavalry, and the company of artillery which first proceeded to Scinde, and no occasion will occur for two years for calling upon any regular corps to go thither. Before that period has elapsed, all objection to the service will have been removed.

"The sickness amongst the troops in Scinde has disappeared; those returning are in good health and spirits, and those remaining are apparently well satisfied.

"All these results have been obtained by the combination of justice and liberality, with firmness in the vindication of military discipline.

"Another sanguinary event has occurred in the Punjab—the destruction by Rajah Heera Singh of his uncle, Soocheyt Singh, and his followers.

"This event may have had the effect of preserving for a short time longer the life of Heera Singh, which his uncle would have soon taken away, but it has rendered Heera Singh more dependent than ever upon the army, and the army more insolent and extortionate than ever in its demands.

"The extent to which the mutinous disposition of our troops at Ferozepore may have been fostered by Sikh emissaries is not known to us; that such instruments were at work there can be no doubt, and since the march of the troops Heera Singh has been privately entertaining the deserters and discharged Sepoys. He has also received and entertained the relatives of Meer Shere Mahomed of Meerpore, the chief who was defeated at the battle of Hyderabad.

"Heera Singh has, however, dissuaded the Sikh troops near our frontier from making the inroad they proposed. The time is not yet arrived when such a movement can afford him the hope of prolonging his existence for a time by finding some employment for his troops, but whenever the inroad may be apparently necessary for this object, it will be made, at least with his connivance, if not under his direction; and it may be made at an earlier

period by an army desirous of plunder and released from all real control.

"Even were the Sikh army now concentrated at Lahore in the most perfect state of equipment and discipline, and ready at the command of a hostile Government to cross the Sutlej on the first favourable occasion, it would be less dangerous to us than it is in its present position, overawing and dictating to its nominal Government, and extorting increased pay as the condition of permitting it to exist for the perpetration of new crimes.

"The example of successful mutiny in an army near our frontier is more perilous than would be its declared hostility. Lord Ellenborough cannot but feel that the termination of the present state of things in the Punjab is essential to the security of the British power in India; but he will wait, cautiously preparing our strength for a contest he would willingly defer, but which he considers inevitable.

"There has been at Gwalior a weakly contrived conspiracy, apparently confined to a few persons, having for its object the death of the principal minister, Ram Rao Phulheea, and the establishment of a new regency. The leaders have been arrested, and the result must be the strengthening of the government established under the late treaty.

"The ex-Ameers of Scinde (with the exception of Meer Roostum and two of his relatives) may be expected at Calcutta in ten days.

"Scinde is tranquil. 115 chiefs from the right bank of the Indus have made their submission, and both banks of the river are now equally peaceful.

"Great exertions are making for the opening of new watercourses. Sir C. Napier is indefatigable in devising measures of improvement and in carrying them into effect.

"There has been no change in any native State.

"India is generally prosperous."

"Calcutta, May 11, 1844.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that India remains tranquil.

"In the Punjab there are, however, some indications of an approaching attempt on the part of Bhaee Beem Singh, a very influential chief, of reputed sanctity, to endeavour to subvert the authority of Rajah Heera Singh, and the latter, instead of receiving as formerly the cordial advice and support of his uncle, Rajah Gholab Singh, of Jummoo, has everything to dread from his hostility, first occasioned by the destruction of Rajah Soocheyt Singh by Rajah Heera Singh, and now aggravated by disputes respecting the succession to Rajah Soocheyt Singh's immense property. In the meantime the Sutlej is become unfordable, and will continue so till the end of October, so that for the next five or

six months, whatever may be the events in the Punjab, the British territories will probably remain undisturbed. In Scinde, with the exception of a plundering incursion from the hills, which led to the destruction of a British village, all has remained at peace.

"The troops sent to Sukkur from Ferozepore have either arrived at or are near that station. Some are already at the advanced posts towards the hills.

"A conspiracy at Gwalior was, as your Majesty is aware, discovered before it broke out, and the chief conspirators were arrested on the spot, and have been sent as prisoners to the fortress of Nurwur in Bundelcund.

"As it appeared that a chief called the Goorpurrah, the father of the Maharanee of Gwalior and the principal instigator of the measures adopted last year in hostility to the British Government, was concerned in this conspiracy, orders were given for arresting him at Oojein, in Malwah, to which place he had been permitted to retire, and these orders were happily carried into effect without any loss. He will be confined for the present in the fortress of Asseergurh. No other events of any importance have taken place.

"India, generally, is in a state of prosperity.

"The ex-Ameers of Scinde are very well satisfied with the accommodation provided for them near Calcutta and with the manner in which they have been received. They will probably soon proceed to

Hazareebagh, a place more than 200 miles from Calcutta, where they will enjoy the sports of the field, and, being lodged in separate houses, they will then send for their families."

"Calcutta, June 10, 1844.

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that nothing appears at the present moment to threaten the peace of India.

"Your Majesty will have already become acquainted with the issue of the conflict which took place on the right bank of the Sutlej, within a march of Ferozepore, on the 7th of May, between a large body of the troops of Heera Singh and the force which was apparently accompanying Bhaee Beer Singh to Lahore, for the purpose of substituting Uttur Singh for Heera Singh as vizier.

"This Bhaee Beem Singh was deemed a holy man, and regarded with much superstitious reverence by the Sikhs. Uttur Singh was the surviving brother of Ajeet Singh, the murderer of the late Maharajah. He had been a refugee at Thanesir, near the Jumna, in British territory, since the death of his brother, and only joined Bhaee Beem Singh a day or two before the battle.

"Bhaee Beem Singh, Uttur Singh, and Cashmeera Singh (an adopted son of the late Runjeet Singh) were all killed.

"The troops of Heera Singh have been induced to fight under the impression that Uttur Singh was invading the Punjab in alliance with the British Government.

"When they found that there was no appearance of British aid having been given to him, and that they had killed the holy man, they were indignant against their general, Meean Lalh Singh, who was forced to fly, and they expressed the greatest resentment against Heera Singh, nor is it probable that this feeling will soon be removed.

"Papers were taken after the battle which implicated very many of the Sikh chiefs in Uttur Singh's projects. The power of all the Sikh chiefs is at an end; but the danger to the life of Heera Singh has been increased by the death of Bhaee Beem Singh, which has raised a religious feeling against him. In the meantime Heera Singh maintains himself from day to day by new donations to the troops.

"His uncle, Gholab Singh, who was much irritated by the destruction of Soocheyt Singh, has been to some extent conciliated by the concession that his son shall occupy the landed property of Soocheyt Singh in the hills, which was of great value.

"It is not known that they have come to any arrangement respecting Soocheyt Singh's personal property. This was very considerable—a sum of 150,000*l.*, forming part of it, is in British custody at Ferozepore, having been found in British territory.

"Some small bodies of armed men were sent from

the right to the left bank of the Sutlej (against the treaty) to intercept Uttur Singh should he have escaped from the battle. These bodies were immediately withdrawn after the result of the battle was known.

"It is much to be regretted that Uttur Singh should have been permitted to move from Thanesir to the Sutlej with the known object of acting against the Lahore Government. This error of the British agent renders it impossible to protest against the violation of the strict letter of the treaty which was committed by the Sikhs, whose troops were sent to the left bank to intercept Uttur Singh; and, under all the circumstances, it has been deemed expedient to make no representation upon the subject, but to allow the whole matter to be forgotten.

"Under an erroneous impression (arising out of a carelessly worded private letter from the Resident at Indore) that British troops had been directed to take possession of the city of Boorhanpore, belonging to the Gwalior State, even without the consent of the Regency, should they refuse their consent, Sir Richmond Shakespeare thought it expedient to obtain from the Regency an order for the immediate delivery of that city to the British authorities, and possession was accordingly taken before the misapprehension could be removed.

"However desirable it might be that the city of Boorhanpore, which has long been misgoverned and the focus of disorder, should be made over to British

management, it was considered that, under the circumstances, one course alone was open to the Government consistently with its honour — that of immediately intimating to the Regency that no advantage would be taken of what had occurred, and that the city would be restored as soon as a Government in whom trust could be placed should be appointed.

"There has been another conspiracy at Gwalior against the life of the principal regent, Ram Rao Phulkeea; but it was of a very unimportant character, and was at once discovered, the alleged leaders having been seized. It may be doubted whether it ever had an actual existence.

"The Regency appear to proceed steadily with the unpopular work of economical reform, and the chief source of the feeling against them is to be found in the reductions of expenditure they have necessarily made. Their conduct has been very much more in accordance with British ideas of good Government than from anything heretofore known of the Mahrattas it would have been reasonable to expect.

"The season throughout India has hitherto apparently been favourable. There is an increased demand for capital consequent upon the improvement of trade, foreign and internal.

"A recent law has relieved all the territories under the Madras Presidency from transit and town duties, heretofore both vexatious and oppressive.

"It is expected that in a very short time the further information called for from Bombay will

render it possible to proceed to the abolition of the town duties under that Presidency.

"The law passed last year has rendered free, except as regards three articles, the trade of the North-West frontier.

"The engagements entered into with the rulers of Buhawulpore and Bikaneer have given practical freedom to the trade between Delhi and the frontiers of Scinde, within which province your Majesty is aware that the transit duties were abolished immediately after the victory of Meeanee.

"By the combined exertions of the British Government and of the State of Buhawulpore and Bikaneer the ancient commercial road between Delhi and Buhawulpore will be re-established. It is indeed already extensively in use.

"The customs duties in the detached territory of Jaloun (in Bundelcund) have been abolished, and negotiations are to be immediately opened with several of the small States lying between the Jumna and the British territory in Saugor for the purpose of securing to the people the full advantage of the great reductions of duties it is in contemplation to make upon the Saugor frontier.

"In the meantime, while every measure is thus adopted which seems calculated to extend the internal trade of the country, the attention of the Government is constantly directed to the perfecting of its military means, which, in the present uncertain state of the Lahore dominions, it may at any moment be com-

pelled to call forth for the protection of vital interests. These necessary preparations are the source of much expenditure, and it is deeply to be regretted that the expenditure so incurred, in consequence of events in the Punjab over which the British Government had no control, should now exist to interfere with the realisation of the great object of good administration and of enlightened policy—the acquisition of a surplus revenue, disposable for the accomplishment of great works generally beneficial to the people.

"The last accounts Lord Ellenborough has received from Scinde were dated in the evening of the 24th of May, your Majesty's birthday, which auspicious day Sir Charles Napier had selected for receiving the chiefs of Scinde at Hyderabad. They had come in great numbers to 'make their salaam;' that is, to offer their allegiance to the Governor, and all had at that time been quietly and satisfactorily conducted. Every proper military precaution had been taken; but there was no appearance of any design to create disturbance.

"Your Majesty will probably hear from Bombay the final issue of this great meeting in the 'champ de Mai' of the people of the Indus.

"At Calcutta all the ex-Ameers of Scinde were received at the Government House on your Majesty's birthday, and were present at the grand display of fireworks.

"These princes have expressed themselves as very much gratified by the manner in which they have

been treated here. Several of them will proceed in a few days to Hazareebagh, a place 200 miles from Calcutta, where they will have good sporting and be enabled to accommodate their families, which are expected to join them there.

"Meer Nusseer at present declines going without an order, which there is no reason of state for giving to him, and which he desires to have only as a new grievance. He will not be gratified in this particular, and as he really desires to go, he will probably soon follow when he sees it is a matter of indifference whether he does or not.

"He alone, by his influence, detains those of the ex-Ameers who are not now about to proceed to Hazareebagh. He has endeavoured to create a division in the Council by sending a letter to one of the members of it; but there has never been any difference of opinion here with respect to him and the other ex-Ameers of Scinde."

"Barrackpore, July 14, 1844

"Lord Ellenborough, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, humbly acquaints your Majesty that on the 15th of June he received the announcement of his having been removed from the office of Governor-General of India by the Court of Directors. By Lord Ellenborough's advice letters were immediately despatched by express to every important

native Court, to assure the native princes that this change in the person at the head of the Government would effect no change in its policy, and Lord Ellenborough himself wrote in similar terms to the British representatives at the several Courts.

"Before the receipt of these assurances there was much temporary alarm at Gwalior, the enemies of the Regency having circulated a report that the consequence of the recall of the Governor-General would be the immediate return of the Dada Khasgee Walla.

"India is everywhere in a state of the most profound tranquillity and of steadily increasing prosperity.

"There is much less apprehension than there has been at any time since the death of the Maharajah Shere Singh that this tranquillity will be disturbed on the side of the Punjab.

"Some of the old chiefs have been recently grievously offended by Heera Singh. There is an insurrection in the Hills; but the differences between Heera Singh and his uncle, Gholab Singh, have not been arranged. But by far the largest portion of the Sikh army is now on furlough, and on the part of Heera Singh there is no indication of any hostile intention, although his feelings will never become those of the confiding friendliness which guided the councils of Runjeet Singh.

"There is no apparent reason to apprehend any serious inconvenience from the recent temporary

refusal of the 64th Regiment at Sukkur to take the pay and allowances fixed for the troops in Scinde by the general order of the 15th of March. The measure adopted by Major-General Hunter, and approved by Major-General Sir Charles Napier, who has despatched a Bombay regiment to Sukkur, will, it may be expected, prevent any ulterior consequences which might have resulted, had it been otherwise treated (*sic*), from the insubordination of the 64th Regiment.

"It is with extreme regret that Lord Ellenborough intimates to your Majesty his persuasion that the health of Sir C. Napier will not allow of his remaining in Scinde during another summer. He is indeed now ill.

"Lord Ellenborough has deemed it right to await at Calcutta the arrival of his successor, Sir Henry Hardinge, and he has continued to give his advice to the Government upon every matter of any importance which has occurred since his removal from office, which advice has been uniformly acted upon.

"Lord Ellenborough has written a letter to the Earl of Ripon with reference to the reasons alleged by the Court of Directors for his removal from office, to which letter he most humbly solicits your Majesty's favourable and attentive consideration. It treats of matters deeply affecting the good government of India.

"Amidst all the difficulties with which he has had to contend in India, aggravated as they have been by the constant hostility of the Court of Directors,

Lord Ellenborough has ever been sustained by the knowledge that he was serving a most gracious mistress, who would place the most favourable construction upon his conduct, and he now humbly tenders to your Majesty the expression of his gratitude, not only for those marks of royal favour with which it has been intimated to him that it is your Majesty's intention to reward his services, but yet more for that constant support which has animated all his exertions, and has mainly enabled him to place India in the hands of his successor in a state of universal peace, the result of two years of victories, and in a condition of prosperity heretofore unknown."

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LORD ELLENBOROUGH AND THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

[Private.]

"Grosvenor Place, September 20, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"On Thursday I sent a letter to the Queen, as you advised, to explain the grounds upon which we sent to India to suspend the march upon Herat, which our predecessors had ordered, and likewise why we did so without any previous communication with her. I added a memorandum, giving the only important information received from India by the last mail.

"Last night I received the Queen's answer, of which I enclose a copy. I took care to lay before her our financial difficulties in India.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Grosvenor Place, September 21, 1841.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I send you the report on the route from Candahar to Herat, and the other, on the fortifications of Herat, and a copy of the portion of Conolly's 'Travels' which relates to the route.

"In the meantime the information just received from Persia is very satisfactory, and I think we may now be assured that the advance on Herat will not take place.

"Believe me, ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "Ellenborough."

"India Board, September 23, 1841.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I send you the map of the country between Candahar and Herat, to which the report of Captain Sanders refers. I have got it on loan from the India House.

"Believe me, ever most sincerely yours,

"Ellenborough.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

MEMORANDUM BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON THE WAR WITH CHINA.

"September 30, 1841.

"I have looked over the return of the armies in India. There is no distribution for 1841; but I

conclude that the distribution is the same as that for 1840.

"I don't think that it would be prudent to weaken the armies of Bengal and Bombay in King's European troops in order to increase the force in the China Seas, nor to draw even native troops from Bombay. None can be drawn from Bengal for the service in China, except in a state of organisation as volunteers, which will require more time.

"I understand that the following regiments are now in China: the 18th, 26th, 49th, 55th, one battalion of Bengal volunteers, and one regiment of native infantry—Fort St. George; besides artillerymen, sappers and miners, and a company of riflemen from Fort St. George.

"As far as I can judge at this distance of the distribution of the armies in the year 1840, I should think that two complete battalions of native infantry might be drawn from the army at Fort St. George for service in China.

"I should think that it might be desirable to attach to the troops in the China Seas at least as many as four light pieces of ordnance. For a six-pounder, two horses should, if possible, be sent for each gun. There are horse artillery at Fort St. George. But observe that every horse or animal will require nine tons of transport.

"There are, besides, at Fort St. George, gun Lascars attached to the horse artillery and the ordinary artillery in large numbers: I should say as

many as 3000. 500 would be a sufficient number for this service.

"I put down no horses for the ammunition waggons. The Lascars, assisted by seamen from the fleet and soldiers on fatigue, aided by any animals which the country could supply, would draw the ammunition not carried on the limbers.

"Thus the demand upon Fort St. George would be—two regiments of native infantry, four pieces of the lightest horse artillery, light horses, 500 gun Lascars.

"I have looked over the papers, as far as I have been enabled to do since I received them on Wednesday.

"It will be for the Government to determine on what terms they will conclude with China, and in what form the negotiation with the Chinese Government is to be carried on.

"It is not necessary to decide upon these points between this time and Monday.

"It is quite clear that some progress has been made in the negotiation—though not much. It is likewise obvious that, excepting in the Canton river, no real military impression has been made; and it is desirable that orders should be sent out, as soon as possible, to prepare for another campaign in China at an early period in the year 1842. I say an early period, because it is absolutely necessary to avoid all risks of misfortune at sea.

"I will at present consider only of the general

nature of the operations to be performed in order to make an impression upon the Chinese Government at Pekin.

"It is absolutely impossible that an army can be landed with a view to an operation upon the city of Pekin itself, unless in daily communication with, and supported by, the fleet.

"The fleet could not enter any of the rivers by the navigation of which Pekin could be reached.

"But besides an operation direct upon Pekin, it appears that there are others which might affect the position of the Government at Pekin, the subsistence of the inhabitants of that city, the reputation and tranquillity, and even the existence of the Government.

"The subsistence of the people, as well as the trade of the country, depend upon the continued tranquillity of the navigation and access to the city of vessels by the Great Imperial Canal.

"That communication joins the great River Yang-tse-kiang a little above its junction with the sea; and it is understood that the whole fleet might anchor with safety in this river.

"As far as a judgment can be formed from the examination of charts, it would appear that an anchorage in the river is protected from an easterly wind by shoals.

"A fleet and army here placed must command the communication with Pekin by the Great Imperial Canal, and be well placed for operations upon large commercial towns in that part of the country.

"A force in such a position must make a military impression upon the Government of Pekin. I have calculated the force now in China, with the additions proposed to be detached from Fort St. George, as stated in the commencement of this paper, to be sufficient to garrison and invest all the posts which it may be necessary and which it is intended to occupy in the Canton River, and to leave a sufficient number to form an efficient corps in the field, consisting of not less than from 4000 to 5000 men, with field artillery, rockets, &c. Such a body, with the support of the fleet, and its heavy-armed steamers in the rivers, canals, &c., has nothing to fear.

"One of the operations, then, which I contemplate in suggesting the farther reinforcement from India, is this operation in the entrance of the River Yangtse-kiang. Another is to enable the Government to take possession again of the Chusan Island.

"It is obvious that the possession of this island had great influence upon the negotiations in the year 1841, and the Chinese may expect that it will be attacked again, and may be better prepared for its defence.

"It may likewise be deemed desirable by the Government to retain possession of this island.

"There are other objects which it might be desirable to atain, such as an attack upon Amoy Harbour, but of which it will be necessary to consider.

"The troops proposed to be detached to reinforce

the army in China will be applicable to any of these services.

"I recommend that, besides the reinforcements to be ordered from Fort St. George, a part of the rocket troop should be sent from England, with a supply of the shot rockets.

"It is understood that there is an island at the entrance of the River Yangtse-kiang, which it might be desirable to occupy and to fortify with heavy ordnance. Six field twenty-four-pounders, and platforms for them, might be sent, and half a company of artillery from Woolwich; one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun might be sent, in order to avoid the necessity of depriving Her Majesty's ships of their ammunition of that calibre.

"I don't know whether the arsenals in the East Indies are supplied with spherical case-shot for field artillery, particularly of the light calibres.

"Inquiry should be made what the lightest calibres are that are used at Fort St. George, and two hundred rounds of that calibre of spherical case should be sent at the same time with the rockets and the heavy ordnance."

"Grosvenor Place, September 30, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I thought you had been in possession of the China papers printed by the Foreign Office. I send you my copy. The account of the occupation of

Chusan is only to be found in the *Gazette*, and I believe the account of the last operations in the Canton River is only to be found there.

"Chusan was evacuated in execution of the treaty.

"Certainly all that is requisite to be done now is to determine upon what scale the next campaign shall be carried on, and to instruct the Government of India accordingly.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "Ellenborough."

CHINA EXPEDITION.

"London, September 30, 1841.

"My dear Lord Ellenborough,

"I received yesterday your China Papers, and I passed the whole day till midnight in perusing them.

"There is not among them any report upon final operations at Chusan, Amoy, Ningpo, or upon the causes of the evacuation of the first. Yet I see that a second attack upon that island is under consideration. Neither is there anything upon Captain Elliott's negotiations, the original instructions to him, his report of his negotiations to Sir H. Pottinger; yet we are, as I understand, between this day and Tuesday, to decide upon all these points.

"I don't want to interfere in any of them. But if

I am to give an opinion upon the attack of places which have been already attacked, and in which the attacks failed, or upon any detailed operation on an island, or in other places in which operations have been recently carried on, I must see the detailed reports of all that passed, otherwise I ought not to give an opinion.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"P.S.—It appears to me that the orders for the number and description of troops to be prepared and sent, and for the preparation of transports being despatched, there can be no occasion for such haste in ordering the detailed operations and negotiations for the campaign of 1842. We may wait till the despatches which will be sent next, and in the meantime deliberate upon what is to be done."

CAMPAIGN ON THE COAST OF CHINA, 1842.

"The Indian mail leaves London on the 4th of October. Letters sent by it will reach Calcutta in the first week of December.

"It appears to me to be necessary, therefore, to decide at once upon what scale operations shall be carried on in China next year, and to instruct the Indian Government accordingly, that timely preparations may be made.

"Any reinforcements to be sent to China should rendezvous at Singapore in April. The campaign might then begin in May.

"Transports can hardly make a passage up the China Seas before May.

"In order to be at Singapore in April, any ships sent from hence must sail in December.

"Ships sent from Madras or Calcutta must sail in the middle of March, the passage to Singapore at that season being about three weeks.

"There can hardly be a hope of successful operations in China this campaign—even if the force should be much better directed than it was last year—the force employed being not larger, the campaign being commenced before half the force is collected, and a larger number of men being required as well as of ships to protect the points occupied in the Canton river.

"The total force employed in 1840 consisted of about—

2000	Europeans.
800	natives, besides
400	artillery, sappers, &c.
3200	
400	commissioned and non-commissioned officers.
3600	

"The force collected in the Canton River in May *this* year consisted of 1700 men only, and it was then proposed to move an army with 700 men, all

Europeans, leaving 1000 to garrison the points occupied in the Canton River.

"Reinforcements, which would carry the total force to 3600 or 4000 men would not arrive at Canton till July. Of these reinforcements 700 are recruits for the three Queen's regiments in China.

"The naval force employed last year consisted of—

Three 72-gun ships,	Three 18-gun ships,
One 44-gun ship,	Two 16-gun ships,
One 42-gun ship,	One 10-gun ship,
Three 28-gun ships,	Four steamers,
One 26-gun ship,	and
One 20-gun ship,	One 28-gun troop ship.

The force which was at Canton in May consisted of—

Two 72-gun ships,	Four 28-gun ships,
One 44-gun ship,	Six sloops of war, and
One 42-gun ship,	Two steamers.

Of which force only—

One 72-gun ship,	Three sloops,
One 44-gun ship,	and
One 28-gun ship,	One steamer.

were deemed disposable for the expedition to Amoy, which had not sailed on the 20th of May.

"Under these circumstances it cannot be reasonably expected that we shall in this campaign have such decided success as will induce the Chinese Government to submit to the terms at present absolutely required from it by us, and upon which alone the plenipotentiary is authorised to conclude peace.

"We must now consider, therefore, on what scale operations shall be conducted next year.

"On what *plan* they shall be conducted we can, perhaps, hardly decide yet, as the campaign of this year may furnish information calculated to vary the plan which might seem the best according to the information we now have.

"India cannot supply more Queen's troops than are now employed in China, namely four regiments; nor does it seem necessary that more European troops should be employed against so contemptible an enemy. More native troops can be furnished.

"The Duke of Wellington will judge to what extent native troops can be furnished on referring to the papers showing the effective strength and distribution of the army in India.

"It is suggested that it may be expedient (as is recommended by the medical board here) to establish a general hospital at Singapore, and to garrison Penang, Malacca, and Singapore with the depôts of the several European and native regiments employed on the coast of China, thus setting at liberty the two native regiments now stationed in the Straits, and providing the means of refreshing and disciplining recruits, and of keeping the companies on service effective.

"The troops employed in 1840 required 1200 tons, and the difficulty of obtaining transports imposes a certain limit upon the amount of force to be employed.

"By timely orders to that effect, some considerable amount of tonnage might be engaged in Australia, and at a cheap rate.

"Whatever the increase of the military force, it would not be necessary to have a naval force larger than that employed in 1840, with the exception of steamers. These would alone be useful in any operation carried on in the River Yangtse-kiang.

"Native troops only could be added to the military force, and these are much less expensive than Europeans in the article of pay and provisions.

"The expense of tonnage for them would be the same, or nearly so.

"Still the military force of the expedition might be doubled without an increase in anything like that proportion to the expense of the campaign.

"It appears to be most desirable to make one great effort to terminate the war by operations of so decisive a character as may be expected to compel the Chinese Government to accede to our terms.

"If operations of this character should still fail in producing peace, the whole plan must be changed, and we must content ourselves with the occupation of points on the coast and with an illicit trade; but it is worth while to make one great effort to re-establish friendly relations.

"The only point upon which it at present appears that any decisive success can be obtained, without extreme and unjustifiable risk, is in the Yangtse-kiang, by occupying the strong island which lies

opposite the mouth of the Grand Canal, and extending our operations to Nankin and the cities on the Grand Canal on either bank of the river.

"These operations would intercept the whole internal communication of the empire.

"An operation yet more stringent would undoubtedly be that of occupying Tien-sing, the point where the Grand Canal, continued by the Eu-ho River, enters the Pei-ho River; but the objections on the other hand to any such operations are very great. Large vessels cannot anchor in sight of the land.

"Transports could not approach within several miles of the landing-place; there is no good protection for ships at any time, and they cannot remain at all after the beginning of September, nor arrive probably before the end of June.

"The operations must be conducted in the hottest and most unhealthy season, when, even amongst the seamen, there was much serious sickness. The river is very winding and shallow at that season: 500 men were required to track up twenty-two boats containing the mission.

"The distance by water from the sea to Tien-sing is 80 miles, by land only 40; there are no animals to be procured; whatever could not be sent by water the men must carry.

"Whatever force there is in the Chinese empire is near Pekin. Lord Macartney's embassy saw 60,000 men collected not far from Pekin.

"A force from the camp near Pekin could reach

Tien-sing as soon as our army. If we succeeded in occupying the place and in defeating the enemy, still it would be known that we could not remain there.

"Under all these circumstances an operation in the Yangtse-Kiang, where permanent possession might be taken of the island of Kinshan, seems preferable to an attempt to obtain peace by intimidation at Tien-sing.

"One European and one native regiment will probably be sufficient for the occupation of the points we hold in the Canton River.

"There would remain for the expedition to the northward three European regiments; to these might probably be added, notwithstanding the demands elsewhere, six native regiments. There might thus be three brigades, each composed of one Queen's and two native regiments, and these regiments might perhaps be kept up to 600 men each, making altogether an effective force of 5400 men, besides artillery and seamen and marines.

"About 20,000 tons would probably be required for this force.

"The papers attached to this memorandum are,—

"A memorandum by Lord Colchester (who was in China with Lord Amherst), which was transmitted to Lord Palmerston in 1839;

"The China papers printed by the India Board;

"An account of the number and distribution of the Indian army;

"A map of China;

"A chart of the Yangtse-kiang;
"A chart of the Canton River;
"A chart of the Gulf of Pechelee;
"A sketch of the course of the Yangtse-kiang from Kinshan Island to Nankin;
"Extracts from the various accounts of China;
"Extracts from Horsburgh, and
"Letter from Mr. Loch as to monsoons, &c."

[Private.]

"Grosvenor Place, October 6, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"There is a question at the present moment between the Colonial Office and the India Board, respecting the Custom duties in India on the produce of Ceylon.

"If you recollect, a part of your plan in 1830 for the renewal of the charter was to give up Ceylon to the Governor of India. Was that a project founded solely on financial grounds, to relieve the finances of this country, or had you any further views of public convenience and efficient cheap government? If so, this might be a favourable opportunity for opening the subject.

"Believe me, yours, ever most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

[Private.]

"Grosvenor Place, October 8, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I wish to mark in some especial manner the good conduct of the company of the 37th Regiment of Madras Native Infantry which, being separated from the rest of the troops, formed itself into a square and resisted, with bayonets only, some thousands of Chinese until they were rescued by the marines.

"It occurs to me that the company might be made grenadiers—there are none in the Madras Army; and in order to reward officers and men in the manner in which I believe they most like to be rewarded, perhaps it might be expedient to give six months extra batta to the company. Of course, the regiment will have Canton on its colours, and I will write to the officer who commanded the company.

"With respect to the officers generally, would you have the kindness to make a note of the honours you think it would be proper to ask for them from the Crown?

"What may be done in this way should, to produce effect, be done at once.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

[Private.]

"Grosvenor Place, October 8, 1841.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I send you a separate memorandum, which Lord Colchester has written at my request, on the Island of Kinshan and the country in the vicinity.

"Believe me, yours, ever most sincerely,

(Signed) "Ellenborough."

"Walmer Castle, October 14, 1841.

"My dear Lord Ellenborough,

"I came here yesterday afternoon.

"I saw in the papers a statement that you were, or were likely to be, nominated to be Governor-General immediately.

"The Court of Directors were in the habit of giving a dinner, and inviting to it the Ministers, &c., when they nominated a great officer to one of the high stations abroad, to meet that person at dinner. If the Court decide to give such a dinner, and should invite me to it, I will certainly go up to London and attend it, being anxious, above all things, to manifest my concurrence and appreciation in your appointment. In the meantime I will attend closely to any point on which you may wish to have my opinion, and will send me the papers.

"Ever yours most sincerely,

"Wellington."

"Southam, October 14, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I cannot say how much obliged to you I am for your kind offer to come up to London for the dinner which, if my early departure will admit of it, the Court of Directors will give to me. I will inform you of the day as soon as I know it, which I probably shall on Friday next.

"I feel that to me personally and to the Government of India, which I am to administer, the importance is inestimable of its being known that my appointment has your sanction, and that I go possessed of your confidence.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Grosvenor Place, October 15, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I was not aware that you were going out of town so soon, and was much disappointed when I called at Apsley House yesterday and found you were already gone.

"I saw the chairman yesterday and Mr. Hogg, one of the directors, and I had letters from Mr. Tucker and Mr. Loch, and, from the tenor of their communications, I cannot entertain a doubt of my

going to India with the confidence of the Court as well as of the Government.

"I ought if possible to set off on the 1st of November, but as I wish to finish all the letters which must go by the mail on the 4th, I expect to be detained till that day.

"There are three or four matters upon which, before I go, I am very anxious to have your opinion; and, *first*, I wish to have your instructions to the commanders of the expedition to China in 1842, and with them your suggestions as to the command* —in what manner it can be arranged, so as to procure efficiency and unity of direction, and at the same time not give offence to either service.

"At the Admiralty, the Ordnance, the Horse Guards, and the India House everything is done in furtherance of the views of Government with respect to the next campaign.

"When it is decided what the naval and military force shall do, we must consider what we shall demand and insist upon from the Chinese Government—whether any, and if any, what, modification shall be made in the instructions now given to Sir Henry Pottinger.

"It may likewise be for consideration whether any discretionary power shall or can be given to the Governor-General with respect to the terms upon which peace may be concluded. I suppose the general

* See reply by the Duke of Wellington on "Joint-Commands," printed as appendix at the end of volume.

direction of the operations, subject to your instructions, would be left in his hands?

"I shall probably have as one of my aides-de-camp Lieutenant Durand of the Bengal Engineers, one of those who blew open the gates of Ghuzni. He was recommended to me by Lord Fitzroy, and if he should accept the proposal I have made to him, I have requested Lord Fitzroy to employ him at once in obtaining all the information he can with respect to the Punjab, and making a military memorandum upon the country for your consideration. I am most anxious to have your opinion as to the general principles at least upon which a campaign against that country should be conducted.

"Lieutenant Durand will likewise make a memorandum upon the frontier country of Nepaul, and recall to your recollection the circumstances of the war with that State.

"I do not apprehend that we shall be brought into actual collision, however, with Nepaul, nor would it be so serious an affair as before, the people being divided into two hostile factions. The Nepaulese have, however, added very largely of late to their artillery, and a considerable army is kept up.

"I have your memorandum on a war with Ava, thrown by me into the form of a despatch eleven or twelve years ago.

"Peel seems to have been much struck by a Colonel or a Major Beresford, who was aide-de-camp or military secretary to Sir Henry Fane, and perhaps

he might be a good man for me to have as military secretary. Could you give me any information respecting him? I shall see him when I return to London on Tuesday or Wednesday next.

"The short interview I had with Lord Charles Wellesley yesterday only increased my regret that the arrangements already made for him here will prevent his going with me.

"I see by the East India Directory that a son of Sir George Anson's is one of Lord Auckland's aides-de-camp. I think it not improbable that Mr. G. E. Anson will apply to me to continue him. I conclude that I must accede to this.

"Sir C. Bagot has a young son in the 15th Native Infantry, and I think I can certainly have him as one of my aides-de-camp.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"India Board, October 22, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I send you Lieutenant Durand's memoir on the Punjab. If you would wish for further information and personal communication with him, he is entirely at your disposal, and will go down to Walmer by the mail one night and return by it the next.

"The Court have fixed the 3rd of November for

their entertainment to me, and I hope I shall be able to leave London for India on the 4th. I think I shall have Captain Somerset (Lord Fitzroy's son) as military secretary, and I have Sir Charles Colville's son and Mr. Herries's son as two of my aides-de-camp. The rest I shall select in India.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever very sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Walmer Castle, October 23, 1841.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 22nd and enclosures, which I will peruse, and will write to the general as soon as I shall be prepared to converse with him.

"In the meantime I am prepared to go to London at a moment's notice, to attend the important affair likely to take place at Buckingham Palace. I shall certainly be at the entertainment to be given by the Court of Directors to you if I should be invited.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"To Lord Ellenborough."

"Grosvenor Place, October 26, 1841.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I trust that the necessity will not arise while I am in India of making war either on the Punjab

or on Nepaul; but I wished, before I left England, to have your general opinion as to the plan upon which any such war, if necessary, should be conducted, in the same manner in which I obtained many years ago, for the future use of the Government of India, your opinion as to the plan upon which any new war with the Burmese should be conducted.

"The Punjab has been in a very disturbed state since the death of Runjeet Singh. The real authority is no longer in the hands of the nominal sovereign. The country is, in fact, ruled by a very violent man, Rajah Dhian Singh; and his brother, Rajah Gholab Singh, has great influence on the side of Cashmere. The army is mutinous. The immediate danger of collision arises from the necessity, annually recurring, of our exacting a passage through the country for our regiments going to relieve others at Cabul, and for the convoys. Whenever Dhian Singh feels himself strong enough he will refuse permission for the passage of these regiments and convoys, or, what I most fear, he will attack and destroy some one of them on its march.

"We might thus be obliged to act immediately. At present about 12,000 men are collected near Ferozepore to watch the Sikhs, and act if necessary.

"What I desired, therefore, was your opinion, founded, as far as it could be upon the imperfect geographical information which can be given to you, as to the best mode of attacking the Punjab. The Sikh Army is generally collected about Lahore.

They have, however, a force of 8000 or 10,000 men, very mutinous and lately coerced by Afghans, in and about Peshawur.

"With respect to Nepaul, I do not expect any attack from that side, unless we should be occupied with the Punjab. The Court and the people are divided. Still an army is maintained, and great efforts are made to increase the number of their guns. They have a great force of light artillery. I wish to know whether, in the event of its being necessary to resent any injury done to us by Nepaul, you would recommmend a different course of proceeding from that adopted by Lord Hastings. He attacked the country in four distant columns, and of these two failed. It was a war of two campaigns.

"As to the withdrawing of our army from Afghanistan, it appears to me that however desirable that object may be on financial grounds, for the occupation of that country adds a million and a quarter to our deficit, still that until our differences with Persia, the ostensible reason for our crossing the Indus, are entirely settled, we could not contemplate the return of the army; but looking forward to the settlement of those differences at an early period, and thinking that it will be possible to maintain Shah Shoojah by troops nominally his own but officered by us, I am anxious to know in what manner the troops should be withdrawn—my impression being that, before they are withdrawn to any extent, it would be desirable first to try whether Shah Shoojah cannot main-

tain himself with his own troops only, so officered, at Cabul, our army being withdrawn to Candahar. The advantage of this step would be that the passage of reliefs and convoys through the Punjab would be rendered unnecessary, and our army, or a large portion of it, being at Candahar would control Yar Mahomed of Herat. Then, in the following season, more troops having been formed for Shah Shoojah at Candahar, that position too might be evacuated and the army withdrawn within the Pass of Bolan.

"If the Shah's own troops were found sufficient to maintain him at Cabul and Candahar, the next season might see them on the left bank of the Indus, according to the pledge given by Lord Auckland when they first moved from the Sutlej. This is my general idea of the manner in which the army might be withdrawn, should the settlement of our remaining difference with Persia enable us to withdraw with honour.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, November 6, 1841, 5 P.M.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I send you the memorandum which I delivered to you yesterday evening, with a word or two inserted, which had been accidentally omitted. It is now quite correct.

"You may rely upon hearing from me if I should have anything to communicate requiring your attention. God bless you.

"Ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

MEMORANDUM.

"November 1, 1841.

"I have been anxious to suggest some plan of detailed operations for the naval and military forces when collected at, and in possession of, the Island of Chusan.

"The first thing to be attended to upon obtaining possession of the island must be to strengthen it by works, so that it may be left in charge of a small garrison, aided by the ships which would remain there, and in security.

"It must be observed that whatever may be the strength given to the island by works, the waters between the island and the mainland may be exposed to the fire of the artillery on one or other bank of the river.

"The only shelter from fire for the ships may be above the island up the stream, or below the island down the stream, or possibly under the bank of the river at one side or the other.

"It will be observed that little provision is made for storing the ammunition even of four pieces of

cannon. None for ammunition or for the rocket troop.

"I understand that there are excellent horses in China, and arrangements should be made immediately for hiring or purchasing horses for the equipment of the ordnance carriages above adverted to.

"Of the gun Lascars sent from India, those selected from the horse artillery may be trained as drivers. They should be so employed. The gunners of the Royal British Artillery are all drivers as well as gunners, and if the Lascars should not have been trained to drive horses, the Royal British Artillery must be so employed.

"In this case either the troops of the line on the Island of Chusan must be trained to the service of the heavy ordnance, or seamen must be landed to perform that service, or the gun Lascars must perform the service of the batteries, while gunners of the Royal Artillery will perform the duty of drivers of the carriages of the field equipment for the horse artillery and rockets. Thus, then, this small field train will be complete.

"I should recommend that carriages should be hired in the country with their horses and drivers to draw a few days' provisions for the troops, and of forage corn for the horses of the artillery, and the light baggage of the officers of the army.

"The army being thus equipped for movement, it will remain for the officers on the spot to consider of the operations which can be performed.

"It might be desirable to move up the Yangtse-kiang or on the Imperial Canal, and I suggest for consideration the expediency of fitting up at an early period some of the numerous junks which will fall into the hands of our forces, either as barracks for the troops or as stables for the horses. These might be taken in tow by the steamers, and the whole might move with their naval defence and means of co-operation without difficulty, and be landed at any point in a complete state for service. But it is desirable that the arrangement for fitting up the junks should be made at an early period, in order that no time may be lost in making the movement, if such a one should be determined upon.

"As I have above stated, I have not sufficient information to state in what direction a movement should be made. All that I have done is to suggest the means of rendering the force movable and disposable and efficient.

"The commanders by sea and land will recollect that the object in sending them to Chusan is to make the Emperor and Government of China feel the inconvenience and disgrace of the war, and that they should carry on such expeditions from Chusan as will be felt in Pekin."

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S SPEECH, BEFORE DEPARTING FOR INDIA,

AT

THE DINNER GIVEN IN HIS HONOUR BY THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY, NOVEMBER 3, 1841.

"GENTLEMEN, I thank you for the proof you have afforded that your good wishes will attend me in the discharge of the important trust which has this day been placed in my hands.

"To you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Court of Directors, I desire to offer my grateful acknowledgements of the confidence you have reposed in me. I rejoice that your confidence has been accompanied by that of a large majority of those who are acquainted with India; that there has been indeed something approaching a general acquiescence in the appointment you have thought fit to make. I rejoice in this, not, believe me, on account of any personal feeling which such indications of public confidence might be supposed to gratify, but solely because I know that the assurance thus afforded to me of support here will give efficiency to my government in India. I shall have need of that support. I have much to do, much to undergo, and I know that I shall not succeed

in effecting the great objects I have in view if I should not retain that which I now have—the confidence of the Court, of the Government, and of the Crown. Be assured, however, that whatever may be the confidence now reposed in me, it does not create in my mind the slightest delusion with respect to myself. I know all the difficulties with which I shall have to contend. I know that however well intended or well directed my efforts to serve the people of India, they must yet be inadequate to effect half the good I desire. If there be anything, however, which gives to me advantages over other men in the prosecution of that sole object of a good government—the conferring of benefits upon the people, it is that, placed thirteen years ago at the head of the India Board by the noble duke near me [the Duke of Wellington], I have from that time to the present communicated confidentially with him upon all great questions relating to India, and I have endeavoured to make myself acquainted with the general views and principles according to which he thought those questions should be decided. Happy indeed would it be for India if, while I have informed myself of those views and imbued myself with those principles, I should have imbibed any portion of that intuitive judgment and practical wisdom which my noble friend ever brings to the consideration and decision of questions of public policy. It is my greatest satisfaction—it is my highest pride, that I proceed to take upon myself the government of India in the possession of his

confidence. It is the best support that government could receive.

"I know I shall succeed a very able administrator too; and on personal as well as public grounds—for I was formerly connected with the Earl of Auckland by the ties of private friendship—it is to me most gratifying to have this occasion of bearing my testimony to the extensive knowledge, the indefatigable industry, the great ability which he has brought to the conduct of public affairs—but I have yet much to do.

"Deeply impressed with a sense of the high moral responsibility which Providence imposed upon us when it subjected to our control the destinies of a great and distant empire, I shall earnestly endeavour so to conduct my administration as to prove that we are not unworthy of the station in which we have been placed; nor am I altogether without the hope that the entire devotion which I now make of myself may be productive of some benefit to the public service. I go to India without having made a single promise—free to appoint, and resolved to appoint, to every office the person who may appear to me to be best qualified to perform its duties. The Government of India shall be exercised not for a party, but for the people. Thus pursuing great and worthy objects by great and worthy means, I humbly trust that some portion of the blessing of Providence may attend my constant endeavour to promote the united interests of England and of India—of my native and my adopted country.

"To terminate the war with China by a peace honourable to the Crown and desirable in its provisions—to establish tranquillity on both banks of the Indus—in a word, *to restore peace to Asia*, and with peace, that sense of entire security, without which peace itself is almost valueless; from that peace, so secured, to draw the means of creating a surplus revenue, the best guarantee of public improvement, and of liberal even of *honest* government—in possession of that surplus revenue, to emulate the magnificent beneficence of the Mahometan Emperors, in their great works of public utility, to perfect and extend the canals of irrigation (the only certain source of fertility in the East, and more powerful than those emperors in the possession of all the acquirements of European civilization)—gradually, I say gradually, and cautiously, and with due circumspection and regard for the feelings and even the prejudices of the natives of India, to impart to them whatever of useful knowledge we have ourselves inherited or acquired, and thus to elevate the character and extend the happiness of that great and faithful people. These are my objects; the *sole* objects which induce me to take upon myself the government which the confidence of the Court has offered to me and the confidence of the Crown has confirmed; and it is a subject of the deepest satisfaction to me, feeling as I do that *henceforth my first duty is to the people of India*, that there is no one capable of taking an enlarged view of the interests of the people of England, who

must not be convinced that it is by effecting these objects—by enriching India, not by impoverishing it—by assisting the development of all its vast resources, and thus facilitating the means of the necessary remittances to England, and more especially by encouraging the cultivation of cotton, the materials of our most important manufacture, that I shall perform the best service to my own country while I am conferring benefits upon the people whose interests it is my first duty to consult.

"Sir, it is one of the advantages I derive from having those times held the office of President of the Board of Control, first through the confidence of my noble friend and since twice through the confidence of my right honourable friend Sir Robert Peel, that I proceed to India with some knowledge, and therefore with no ungenerous distrust, of those I am appointed to govern. I go with the most unbounded confidence in the army and in the people; convinced that in the army I shall ever find unimpaired those high qualities of enterprise, of valour and fidelity, which have given to it a foremost place amongst the armies of the world; and trusting to the uncontrollable power of inflexible justice—a power even greater amongst nations imperfectly civilized than in those which have made the greatest progress in improvement—to obtain for me, and secure to me, the willing obedience of a grateful people."

LETTERS AND MEMORANDA ON LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA.

[Secret and Confidential.]

"Kingston House, Knightsbridge, July 4, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD,

"No less powerful cause than severe and repeated illness would have prevented me from sooner obeying your Lordship's very flattering commands, so obligingly communicated to me, 'to give you my opinion on the present condition of the great empire now happily committed to your Lordship's charge, and so long entrusted to my hands.'

"Your Lordship is so well acquainted with the general affairs of India that it would be presumption to suppose that I can add anything to that knowledge (so little the study of most British statesmen). But I can explain the principles on which I acted, the causes of my success, or failure wherever I failed, and I can thence devise some rules of conduct which may be found useful for the consideration of my successor; these statements I now submit to your Lordship in the enclosed paper, with the most sincere good wishes for the prosperity and glory of your

Lordship's government, and with the most confident expectation of your final and triumphant success.

"Ever, my dear Lord,

"Your faithful and obliged friend and servant,

(Signed) "WELLESLEY.

"The Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough,
Governor-General of India, &c."

MEMORANDUM BY LORD WELLESLEY.

"WHEN I took leave of Mr. Pitt at a great dinner which he gave to all our friends—Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Hy. Dundas (afterwards Lord Melville) were present—in the month of November 1797, Lord Cornwallis assured me that I should have no trouble; that *he had settled everything*; that I had nothing more to do than to send for Barlow (now Sir George, then secretary to the Government), and to follow his advice in everything. I could not resist the temptation to ask what I was to do if Barlow were dead, or sick and gone to Europe for health. The question produced a general laugh, which greatly discomposed old Cornwallis, then tottering on the brink of the grave. Before I arrived in India, at the Cape of Good Hope I had the good fortune to meet Colonel Kirkpatrick, a most able military servant of the Company, who prepared me, by his knowledge of the real state of the native Powers and of our military situation, for what I was to encounter, and how

vain and idle was poor old Cornwallis's reliance on the good faith (!) of Tippoo and on the strength to be derived from the treaties with the Mahrattahs and the Nizam, both being already under the influence of France, with a French army ruling the State at Hyderabad, in the Deccan and in Hindostan, Delhi, and Agra, &c.

"I had not been a fortnight at Calcutta when I received the account of Tippoo's treachery with the French and all the native Powers, and also with the Afghan Power, then in the hands of Zeemaun Shah.

"I called out the army immediately, with the universal resistance of every authority in India. I was told from Madras that not a man nor a gun could be moved sooner than in six or *twelve* months. But I persevered, and I was nobly supported by the Government at home (then in the hands of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas), who, on the very day that I issued my order in India, signed a despatch to me, directing me to do what I had actually done—namely, to put the army into a state of preparation for action.

"The present condition of our Indian empire is certainly not so perilous as it was in that crisis in 1797. Treachery and bad faith on the part of our enemies and native allies, combined with weakness and imbecility in our own councils, had exposed us to the greatest dangers on all sides, without any adequate means of meeting them. Now we have a great and adequate force at our disposal, and the

dreadful blows which have been inflicted on the spirit and discipline of that part of our army employed at Cabul, have not been felt in other quarters to any extent, and it may be considered certain, that the noble army now on its way, and arriving, from England will arrive untainted, with its usual superiority to any foe that may attempt to meet it.

"From what has been already stated, it is evident that I did not arrive at the Cape, on my way to India, imbued with a spirit of conquest and an ambitious desire of extending our territorial possessions by violence and war. I arrived in the full hope and expectation of finding and of preserving, not merely peace in India, but permanent security, and with a general disposition to preserve tranquillity and good-will among the native Powers. What I had began to fear from Colonel Kirkpatrick's statements was sadly confirmed by the event, and no war ever was more strictly necessary and just than the war with Tippoo Sultan in 1799.

"Although I never evinced a warlike policy in India as suitable to our condition or calculated either for our safety or our glory, I was not ignorant that our tenure of India originally rested on a military basis, and must be preserved by the maintenance of our military strength.

"The condition in which I found our army was therefore a total departure from the first necessary principles of our existence among the Powers of

India, and I proceeded instantly to correct that vital defect.

"This is the first object which must be brought under the consideration of the Governor-General of India. Your Lordship, however, is under no difficulty in this respect.

"I need not, to your Lordship, observe that an army, unequipped with all the necessaries for its prompt movement, is no instrument of war, but a mere useless burthen. At all times, therefore, the British power in India should possess, and maintain in activity and discipline, an adequate army (as it was termed in my time) '*in the field.*'

"The principal stations of the army should be on our northern and western frontiers.

"My brother Arthur has communicated to me, with his usual kindness, some very able papers, addressed to your Lordship and to Lord Fitzgerald, in the whole of which I entirely concur. In these papers he points out the proper stations and distribution of our forces, availing himself, most judiciously, of Lord Lake's conquest of Agra, Delhi, &c., by which such strength was added to our frontier in that quarter. No further extension of our territory is even desirable in India, even if war for conquest could be justified, or were legal, as the law most wisely now stands.

"Your Lordship, I am satisfied, would reject Afghanistan and Cabul, with their rocks, sands, deserts, ice, and snow, even if Shah Shoojah had bequeathed them as a peace offering to England; although perhaps

the ends of criminal justice may require the presence of a British force there for some time. I hope this point will be left entirely to your discretion.

"In a case somewhat similar I was enabled to bring the murderers of Mr. C. Zerry and other officers to justice. If your Lordship can do the same by the murderers of Sir W. Macnaghten, I shall rejoice."

[Copy.] "Calcutta, March 21, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I arrived here on the 28th of February, and immediately, by Lord Auckland's desire, assumed the government. He remained, however, till the 12th, and I had much communication with him. I first heard of the disasters at Cabul when I was in Madras Roads on the 21st and 22nd. Peel will have shown you my letter to him from thence.

"I found these very serious questions pressing upon the Government at once :—

"1. The war with China ;

"2. The policy and measures to be now pursued in Afghanistan ;

"3. And the supposed unwillingness of the two Madras regiments to embark for China, as well as the mutinous disposition manifested at Hyderabad, on account of recent changes in the allowances of the troops.

"As to the first question I had no doubt. It seemed to me to be required by a regard for our character and our interests, that we should not relax in our endeavours to bring the Chinese war to a successful and early conclusion; I therefore not only did not diminish the amount of force I found prepared, but I added to it two native regiments, to be taken from Moulmein and the Straits. I have made arrangements for sending another native regiment to Moulmein after the rains, should it be required; but I do not think it will. The Straits can do without one.

"I enclose copies of the instructions I have given Sir Hugh Gough, and of the letter of advice I have sent Sir Henry Pottinger, the Plenipotentiary. In China nothing has been hitherto done towards the termination of the war, if war it can be properly called which is carried on in the midst of the transactions of commerce. My only fear is that the pressure of our force will lead to the overthrow of the Government. I shall by the next ship caution the commanders against affording any countenance to insurrection, and against doing anything which can lead to territorial acquisition on the mainland.

"As regards Afghanistan, where no great event has occurred since the despatch of the last mail, I thought it advisable, as soon as I could take a clear view of our position, to communicate to the Commander-in Chief in one letter the political and military views entertained by the Government. That letter is enclosed, and likewise another letter of the 19th,

informing the Commander-in-Chief that the whole military force in Scinde as well as in Afghanistan was placed under General Nott, who commands at Candahar; that he would control all the political authorities and take such measures as he thought necessary for procuring a perfect equipment for his army. The purport of the letter of the 15th is, that the conduct of Shah Shoojah, and the manifest aversion to his Government, absolved us from all obligation to remain the sole observers of the Tripartite Treaty, while they removed the grounds upon which it rested; that our conduct was to be guided by military considerations alone, and should have for its object the security of our troops from further disaster and the re-establishment of our military character.

"I look to the collection, under the head of the Commander-in-Chief, of a large, well equipped, and well composed force upon, or near, the Sutlej, for keeping all quiet in India; and my present idea is, that about October I ought to go up as far as Agra. My greatest difficulty has been in dealing with the question of the allowances to the Madras troops.

"The Government there was in a state of great apprehension. All the military men I saw were. At Hyderabad, although the Resident put down the mutiny, he took the part of the mutineers—he and all his officers—that is, in feeling and in the expression of that feeling. He embarrassed the Government exceedingly by marching off in one body 730

prisoners belonging to three different regiments under the charge, first of some European companies, afterwards of a native regiment. The mutiny consisted in refusing to receive pay without batta; and, on the part of the regiment of cavalry, this refusal was accompanied by some insult to the officers.

"The advice given by Lord Auckland and me, was that the cavalry regiments, in which almost all mutinied, should be disbanded; that the men of the other regiments should rejoin them, and those regiments be moved to new quarters distant from each other, their place at Hyderabad being occupied by two regiments of the Nizam's. I doubt whether the advice will be altogether taken. The ringleaders of all the three regiments were to be tried and punished; those of the 32nd Infantry have been tried and sentenced to some long imprisonment, I believe; but we have no official knowledge of this yet. All is at present quiet. All the regiments have taken their pay without batta, but they have done this in the expectation that the batta would be restored, and this expectation was encouraged and engendered by the Resident, and especially by the appointment of a committee of officers to inquire how far the complaints of these men were well founded. Upon this point I send you a letter that I addressed on the 17th instant to General Fraser, the Resident. I enclose, too, the letters of the Madras Government to this Government of the 1st of March, recommending the restora-

tion of the old rate of pensions to the heirs of soldiers dying on service, and our reply.

"I send you likewise the letter from Madras of the 8th communicating the letter of the general commanding the forces, which raised in the troops about to be embarked the expectation that their wishes would be complied with. The 2nd Regiment is embarked, I believe, and probably all will embark without objection. The embarkation of the 2nd Regiment began on the 11th.

"You will see that the commander of the forces mentions one *addressed* to the commanding officers of regiments. I enclose one of them as a sample; the other two were of the same character. I mentioned them to Peel, and I have since sent him copies of all the three letters.

"For the time, therefore—but only for the time—all seems quiet at Madras and Hyderabad. The 6th Madras Native Infantry, which is now here, and is to embark immediately, has shown no indisposition to go to China; nor do I believe the regiments at Madras would have done so, had not their Government there and the chief officers been irresolute. I must admit, however, that the presence in Madras of the families of the men who were drowned in the 'Golconda,' which went down in the first expedition to China with the headquarters and nearly 300 men of the 37th Regiment, and of the families too of the many other men who have fallen, had a natural tendency to create a fear of the service, and a strong

feeling too on the subject of 'pensions to heirs,' as the reduced sum is said to be really insufficient at Madras to go far towards their maintenance.

"You will observe, by-the-bye, that we have considered the case of the men drowned in the 'Golconda' to have been overlooked by the Government at home, and have extended the grant of batta to their representatives.

"Had I been the independent Government of this country, I should certainly, as a measure of State policy, have granted the desired restoration of the higher pension to the heirs of soldiers dying in China, before any indication had taken place of the claims of the men. I would have given the boon, not a very expensive one, to make the service popular and, at this particular moment, to gratify the army.

"The conduct of the authorities at Madras creates a difficulty and destroys the grace of the boon, and indeed I would not have given the very same pension, with all its conditions, which was reduced in 1833, but something equivalent and different in detail.

"The batta question at Hyderabad is a different one. It was imprudent to begin changes in the allowances of the Sepoy. I believe the making of this change was for several years postponed by Lord Auckland under the impression of its impolicy; but this is a question to be decided at home now, as it was before; and if you can find time to look into it, you will decide it best. To me it was quite new—I

had never heard of it. Indeed, at Hyderabad it came lately for the first time into operation.

"The Bengal Volunteers go away willingly—any number might have been obtained.

"I find I have all the sources of revenue flourishing, but an immense expenditure, which seems to have been suffered to increase without an attempt at control. A large portion relates to pay and allowances; every man is for himself and his friend, and hardly one man, if anyone, for the people. Military officers have been taught too much to look to civil and political employments as better paid, and think it a hardship to be left with their regiments. The number of officers permanently with their regiments is small. All are recalled for service in the field, but those who are recalled neither know their men nor their men them; and luxurious *politicals*, as they are termed, do not make hardy soldiers. I hear some complaints that it is more difficult than it used to be to procure recruits, the advantages of the service being reduced. An inferior man is obtained for the cavalry; that is for the regular cavalry. The irregular cavalry are said to be very fine: in that the men generally find their own horses.

"I have made Azeem Khan, the officer I mentioned to you as distinguished in the war in Afghanistan, one of my aides-de-camp. He is now employed in raising a new regiment at Bareilly. I have made a rule that the subahdar of the infantry guard at Government House shall be an aide-de-camp for the

month he is on duty. He attends levées, durbars, &c. This is I believe popular. The other appointment will do much good up above.

"The business of the Government is conducted on a bad system; there is no central control over expenditure. The most trifling things come before the Governor-General in Council and occupy the time while the empire may be in danger. There are few men of business. Lord Auckland told me I should find a great want of *instruments:* I could find them more easily in the army than in the civil service. I must, as soon as I can, create a minister of finance; but I am not quite satisfied with the only man I can take. The accountant-general is quite hopeless: he is a mere clerk, and a bad one; his only good assistant is just going away on sick leave. There is no secrecy. The 'secret' despatch informing the Government here of the intended disposition of every company to be kept in Scinde, where a brigade was moved up the Pass to relieve Candahar, was, together with the details of that brigade, published substantially in the Bombay newspapers two days before it was received here, and in time for every particular of the information it contained being known in Scinde before the movement could take place. Our letter from England of the 4th October, giving conditional orders for this campaign, was similarly made known. An officer in the civil service has published in a newspaper a letter to himself from Sir William Macnaghten of the 7th December, reflecting upon

the 'cowardice' of the troops. I have taken such measures as I can for the prevention of such things in future.

"I have to thank you for your letter by General Churchill. It will be of infinite value to me. I know that you will continue to give me your advice with your usual kindness. I require it very much, for, in the midst of difficulties, I am alone. However, while my health lasts, I feel no uneasiness; but I sadly want instruments, and I must take them wherever I can find them.

"I trust that your health will be preserved long, and that you will live to watch over us all; I pray to God that you may.

"Believe me, ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

[Copy.] "Calcutta, April 6, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I have to thank you very much for your letters and memoranda with respect to the change proposed in the plan of campaign against China. Immediately on the receipt of those memoranda, and of Lord Stanley's letter to the Admiralty, which suggested a movement upon Pekin, I wrote to Sir Hugh Gough the letter of which I annex a copy. I sent him in a private letter, copies of your letter and memoranda

and of an extract from a letter I received from Lord Fitzgerald, in order that he might have before him all the materials of which I was myself in possession. You will see that in the public letter I expressed very strongly my opinion of the extreme danger to the troops of the projected march upon Pekin, and told him that if he agreed with me upon that point, and was in want of the aid of my authority, I directed him not to move upon the Peiho. I trust he will not. The troops from Madras, two regiments and the artillery, were all under sail by the 13th ultimo; and I conclude that, before the monsoon will prevent the movement of the transports from Singapore, there will be collected there at least 4000 men, including the troops from England.

"The 6th Madras Native Infantry and the Bengal Volunteer Regiment are all embarked and gone, or going, down the Hooghly; and every transport, even the one most injured by the accident which occurred to four of them which broke adrift, will have left Calcutta before I leave it to-morrow.

"I have instructed the commanders of the naval and military forces not to give their countenance to insurrection against the Chinese Government, and not to adopt measures tending to territorial acquisition upon the continent of China; and I have further given it as my opinion that there is nothing in the war with China which should lead us to exercise the rights of war more severely than we do in Europe. Of all these letters I send you copies. Having thus

disposed of the expedition to China, there were but two considerations which made me hesitate as to proceeding at once to the North-West Provinces: first, the state of the Madras Army; second, the state of the Council I must leave.

"As to the first point, I thought that the measures adopted by the Madras Government, however imprudent they may have been, had at least had the effect of producing a lull at Hyderabad, and the two Madras regiments were actually embarked. Besides, we are so far from Madras, that they cannot receive an answer in less than sixteen or eighteen days.

"I enclose a copy of a letter which was sent on the 3rd instant, in reply to a reference from them with respect to the measures to be pursued as to the prisoners of the three mutinous regiments.

"The Government of Madras should not be left in the state in which it is. If you leave Lord Elphinstone, send Lushington and Bird out of the Council, and give him the two best councillors Madras can furnish. In any case, if you send a new governor, let him be a very firm man, a soldier if you can find one, and make him provisional successor to me. This is the advice I gave you before I left England.

"Secondly, as to the Council here. The members of it are well-meaning men. Mr. Prinsep is a clever man, and full of local information; Sir William Casement is an honest soldier, with much knowledge of the army, but little of anything else; and Mr. Bird, the senior member, with some knowledge, is very weak

indeed. He and Sir William Casement too are so very strongly prejudiced against the Madras army, that I rather dread their indiscretion. The question was—should I, on going to the North-West Provinces, propose that, according to the usual course, the senior member, Mr. Bird, should be made President and Deputy-Governor of Bengal? or should I propose the division of the offices, giving Bengal to Mr. Prinsep? or should I propose him for Bengal and Sir William Casement as President?

"I found I must leave things to take their usual course, and allow the whole authority to devolve upon Mr. Bird, for *all* the other members of Council were apparently opposed to any deviation from the usual course.

"On the 26th I circulated a minute, of which I enclose a copy. All the Council concurred. The necessary law was passed on the 28th, and to-morrow I proceed to Barrackpore, on the highway to Benares and Allahabad, by dâk. The establishment will not join me there for a fortnight after my arrival.

"You will be able to appreciate the advantage of my being so much nearer the scene of action, close to the army and in the middle of the native States, and within the reach of the Commander-in-Chief.

"I shall probably go on to Kurnaul as soon as the rains have fallen.

"The day before yesterday (the 4th) we published, in an extraordinary gazette, a letter from the officer commanding at Ghuzni, announcing his having

entered into terms for the surrender of the citadel on the 1st of March. He had before evacuated the town. He had provisions. His fire commanded the well, which was within a new work, close under the wall of the citadel, which he calls a 'detached work.' It was only part of the original enceinte. Besides, there was snow on the ground. He admits that by capitulating he did not secure the safety of his troops. His surrender at that time was necessarily most injurious to the army at Jellalabad and to that at Candahar, still more, morally, to the whole army and to our power. The order to evacuate he received was one all other officers had disregarded, and he knew they had. I therefore thought it right to announce in the same gazette that he would be tried by court martial. It was necessary at the same time to announce that Major-General Elphinstone would be tried in the same manner, and that there would be a strict and full inquiry into the conduct of the political agents.

"I had much pleasure in publishing the next day a letter from Sir Robert Sale, giving an account of a well-executed reconnaissance from Jellalabad. I send both gazettes.

"I do not expect that Major-General Pollock will be joined before 8th of this month by the whole brigade (the 1st Reserve Brigade), and he will hardly move before he is so joined. He has apprehensions that Sir Robert Sale will hardly be able to hold out so long. I think he will, for he has now some money,

and can promise food for animals as well as men. I take up with me to Allahabad the chief secretary (Maddock), the military secretary (Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart), and the deputy accountant-general (Mansel), who is the ablest man in matters of finance. I shall find there Thomason of the Revenue service, the best man in that line, and in fact have a much more efficient Cabinet there than I have here. I feel quite satisfied that I am doing right in going, and even in going by dâk, as I arrive a fortnight sooner, and I am never out of reach, as I should be on the river. I am not unaware of the risk to health, but I think it right to incur it.

"Brigadier England was induced by Major Outram (one of the political agents) to ascend the Bolan Pass on the 7th of March without half his intended force. I am anxious to hear from him. The 19th Regiment of Native Infantry moved on the 21st from Ferozepore; one wing marching to Buhawulpore, and the other by water. Both were to go by water from Buhawulpore. This movement was made against the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, who was absent, and of the Government here, by an order, or requisition, from another political agent (Mr. Clark). We are inquiring into it.

"Believe me, ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Very faithfully yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Benares, April 20, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"General Pollock has carried the Khyber Pass, and his troops behaved beautifully. He seems to be charmed with them. They have recovered their spirits now they are well led. He had 6000 effective; the enemy 10,000. Ali Musjid was evacuated. This was on the 6th.

"A successful sortie on the 1st placed 500 sheep in Sir R. Sale's hands, and will enable him to feed his people till he is relieved.

"The Sikhs behaved well, and in the gazette I have praised them.

"General Nott was led a wild-goose chase by the enemy, and left open Candahar, which was attacked and nearly taken. The enemy were within one gate. However, they were repulsed with heavy loss. This was on the 10th of last month (March). So all would have gone on well, had not Brigadier England, who had, against his own judgment, gone up to Quetta with half his brigade (the remainder being in the Bolan Pass), then gone, without reason, into the Valley of Pishru, where he was attacked unexpectedly by numbers, fought to some disadvantage on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and was left seemingly uncertain of being able to effect his retreat on Quetta on the 29th.

"The remainder of his brigade will probably be attacked in the Bolan Pass; and these two small corps

had with them all the ammunition, treasure, and medicines which were essential to General Nott's corps. This event has quite changed the aspect our affairs near Candahar seemed about to assume.

"I have requested Mr. Waterfield to copy for you all my letters to the Commander-in-Chief, General Nott, and the Secret Committee, from this place, where I arrived yesterday.

"I set off for Allahabad on the 22nd, and shall arrive there early on the 23rd.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Yours ever most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"April 21st.

"I have just received despatches from Sir Robert Sale and Brigadier England. Sir Robert Sale has thoroughly beaten the Afghan army and raised the blockade by his own good conduct and courage. This was on the 7th. Brigadier England effected his retreat on Quetta without more loss, and he has been joined by the remainder of his brigade; but he considered it unadvisable for him to advance, even with his united brigade.

"These events do not at all change my previous views. I have made the most of the Jellalabad success with the army.

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Allahabad, May 17, 1842.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I was in hopes that before the express left this place to-day to overtake the overland mail. I should have received from England the instructions of the Government consequent upon the receipt of the despatches which left Bombay on the 1st of March, and communicated all our disasters. And this may yet be the case; but it is so late that I must now write to you.

"General Pollock reached Jellalabad, without further opposition, on the 16th of April, and he now occupies that place, and the pass behind him, with a force of about 10,000 men, besides some irregulars. The Sikhs are not further in the pass than Ali Musjid, and that little fort is held by us. When General Pollock reached Jellalabad the force had half rations for eight days and hardly any carriage. Since, provisions beyond the daily consumption have come in, but the means of movement are still wanting; and to advance to Cabul, where our captured guns defend the Bala-Hissar, would be wild—the general thinks so. He has been ordered to retire; but I am apprehensive that partly necessary considerations for the health of the troops, and the influence of the *entourage* at Jellalabad, will make him linger there, in the hopes of making some arrangements for the release of the prisoners. I enclose the instructions which he has upon that point. I desired him not to

encourage any pretender to the throne vacant by the murder of Shah Shoojah. The country is now divided; our recognition of anyone would unite it against him and us. My expectation is that General Pollock will advance three marches to Gundamuk, where he will have a good climate, and that we shall have him out of the Pass in October, and on the Sutlej in November. There are no troops between him and the Sutlej. The Commander-in-Chief tells me that he can collect 15,000 men on the Sutlej after the rains. My impression is that it should be done, and bruited about at once.

"General England is gone on with 2500 men (on the 26th of April), with treasure, ammunition, and medicines, to join General Nott. He is to be met by a similar force on the other side of the Kojuk. I do not think that he will make this march without loss. He has a long string of camels, and I fear he is not competent to make good dispositions. He has entirely lost the confidence of his army. There are dissensions there between political agents and military men, and Queen's and Company's officers. I have sent Lieutenant Hammersly, the political agent, to his regiment. I have ordered up Major Outram to Quetta, and have directed the Bombay Government to send a general officer, second only to General Nott, to command their troops. Thus Brigadier England will be superseded. General Nott, when joined by Brigadier England, will have, with his garrison, 13,000 men. There will be 1100 men left at

Quetta, soon to be reinforced by a regiment and some cavalry. There will be 2500 men there in a few days after General England's leaving it. Shikarpore, Sukkur, Dadur, and Kurachee are all fully occupied and provisioned. But General Nott has no means of movement, and he will be unable to procure such means in sufficient quantity, even when he receives the treasure. And he has really no communication with India but such as can be kept up by letters sent in quills. When I had reason to suppose that General England's troops were lost in his first unsuccessful march at the end of March, I directed General Nott to draw off his garrisons and retire, and I have seen no reason to alter my view of what it is expedient to do with his corps, which should be withdrawn, as soon as the season will permit, into a position in which they may have easy and certain communication with India. In the Saugor district the plunderers are beaten whenever they are caught, but there is a good deal of burning and 'looting' as they call it; and I cannot but think there is connection between that outbreak and the absurd attitude of the Ranees of Oorcha about the custody of the person of a young rajah, where they have it all their own way. There is an ample force to beat the plunderers, and the Oorcha people too, if they moved; and the rains are at hand. I arrested the movement of a regiment ordered from Cawnpore by the Lieutenant-Governor. It would have excited alarm everywhere, and would have led to an insurrection

at Bareilly, and perhaps to a Nepaul war. With Nepaul we have some unpleasant discussion arising out of the pusillanimity and strangeness of the Resident more than out of a settled design against us. I have directed the Resident to join me as soon as he can, to report, and I have no present intention of letting him go back.

"At Hyderabad and in Scinde, as well as at Nepaul and in the Saugor district and in Bundelcund, I see the indication of the change with respect to our power which the disasters at Cabul have created in all men's opinions, and this makes me more anxious to get back the army from Afghanistan. I have made the most of the victory of Jellalabad. I have issued general orders a little in the French style; but they have their effect. I have given honours and rewards with a large hand; and my old colleague, Sir W. Casement, tells me that the general order I enclose is worth 10,000 men. I do all I can to gratify the officers and soldiers, and I really think I may depende a[illegible] the most zealous support of the whole army. and

"The Sikh Ra[illegible]ve behaved beautifully hitherto. I mean to have [illegible] interview with the Maharajah in November, [illegible]iffic I hope to be able to take him and the Jummoould[illegible]jah with me in the policy of leaving the Afghantain their own divisions. In the midst of all these [illegible]ulties I do not mean to act otherwise than I [illegible] do if we had unquestioned power. I will ma[illegible] the dignity of the Government and

adhere to the same principles. I send you a copy of my circular instruction to the Ministers at foreign Courts. But I must tell you that in not ordering on the army to Ghuzni and Cabul without the means of movement and supply, and in giving up the irrational schemes of extending our dominions to the westward, I stand alone, and have to contend especially against the whole monstrous body of political agents, scattered everywhere and depending upon continued existence upon perseverance in the policy which called them into life. I have acted altogether in all I have done upon my own judgment. I trust that what I have done will be approved at home by the Government. Be that as it may, as long as I hold power, I will use it as I think best.

"I fear the troopships from England to China must have had a very bad passage to the Cape. We do not know of their arrival there yet. All my troops will have reached Singapore, and perhaps have left it, before the recruits and the 98th [illegible]pers here. I give the 2nd, 6th, 14th, 39th, and 41st [illegible]oped ents Madras Native Infantry, and a volunteer day alion from Bengal, besides ample artillery, sap[illegible]enin[illegible]nd miners, and gun Lascars, all perfectly equip the land provisioned. General Pollock, the other to F wrote for rockets. Some had arrived the very eve be r on which I got his letter at Allahabad. I went tay be rt myself the next morning, and had a dâk laic [illegible]erozepore and thence to Peshawur; and, if thei [illegible]ot some unexpected difficulty, those rockets m [illegible]used in

action against Afghan cavalry in three weeks from the day on which they left Allahabad—and even sooner. If they had been sent by hackeries they would not have arrived in three or four months. I sent other rockets in the same way to Ferozepore, to be forwarded to General Nott.

"I should tell you that, in order to preserve secrecy, I have been obliged to have every order to the generals, and every important instruction to the political agents, copied only by my private secretary and aide-de-camp; and even the Council in Calcutta does not yet know the orders given. Nothing is secret in that place. Everything is divulged by folly or sold by treachery. It is the same at Bombay. There a correspondence between General England and Major Outram, showing the intended plans of the general as to the movement and disposition of his force, was published in the newspapers two days before it was received in Calcutta. Yet it was in the *secret department*, and of the utmost consequence that it should be secret. I trust you will have the goodness to post the letters I transmit from hence to the Secret Committee, with which Fitzgerald can provide you. "Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

"Strathfieldsaye, December 29, 1841.

"My dear Lord Ellenborough,

"I wrote you two or three letters after your departure from London, but you had sailed from Plymouth before they arrived there. They told you nothing that was important. I have since been a good deal employed in affairs domestic and foreign and colonial. But I have not made much progress in those which are not important, I mean those relating to the last. But, as you will see from the letter, I have not been inattentive to them.

"The Cabinet met about a fortnight ago to consider of our affairs for the Session. We did not make much progress. Indeed, no more than to determine that which the world well knew that we could not do otherwise than determine. That is that we would take into consideration the Corn Laws, with a view to their revision; and likewise that we would consider the state of the revenue and expenditure of the country, with a view to render the existing revenue equal to defray the interest of the debt and the ordinary expenditure. The details upon both subjects have been postponed till the Cabinet will meet on the 11th of January to consider them, and to prepare schemes for the consideration of Parliament.

"When I was in London I saw the statements of the renewal of hostilities in the dominions of the Burmese, and a report that Lord Auckland had detained, for service in the Rangoon River, two of the steam vessels which had been destined for the service in China.

"I immediately wrote a minute to the Admiralty —in the box which brought the information from Captain Halsted, I think it was; and stated that I knew that the success of the operations in China, destined to be carried into execution in the campaign of 1842, depended upon the strength of the means of navigation by steam.

"That it was certainly true that armed steamers would be of great advantage in the war in the Burmese dominions, and with a view to the success of the operations which circumstances rendered it necessary to carry on in both, I earnestly urged that the Lords of the Admiralty should, without loss of time, make every exertion in their power to increase Her Majesty's naval force in the Eastern seas in steam navigation.

"This new Burmese war is a misfortune, but unavoidable at present.

"You must make the greatest exertion in your power to carry on the operations with success. Fortunately we have plenty of troops in the Presidency of Fort St. George, and I hope that you will not be deficient in naval force.

"If you should draw more troops from the estab-

lishment of Fort St. George, you will have to place under arms the subsidiary forces of the Nizam, the Peishwah, and the force in Mysore, and the districts ceded by the Nizam in 1800-1801. I would not throw them too forward. But their being in readiness will keep quiet many a little rebel.

"You must have a corps of observation on the northern frontier of the province of Bahar and Benares, to observe the Nepaulese. I would recommend you to keep everything as quiet as you can and your troops in readiness, but in hand, on the North-West frontier towards and about the Indus.

"By the adoption of this course you will be secure, while you will be making the greatest possible exertion to bring to a termination the Chinese and the Burmese wars. I am convinced that even the British power in India is not equal to more than these exertions at one moment.

"I earnestly recommend to you not to hint the notion, which was a favourite one of ours heretofore, that is, the retrocession of the Tenasserim provinces. Any Power in Europe or America, each of which is looking out for colonies in any part of the world, would consider the possession of these provinces a colonial fortune; and the Burmese would be too happy to purchase European, or what is nearly the same thing American, assistance against us by the cession of these or any other provinces.

"I would earnestly recommend, therefore, the retention of these provinces, and the defence of them,

as far at least as our means will enable us to defend them. Wherever Europeans or Americans will go to the Eastward they will introduce all the improvements in the service of ordnance and artillery practice and in navigation by steam. This would not be desirable for us even in peace. But, above all, not in the operations of such systems of war as those we are to carry on in the campaign of 1842.

"I am almost ashamed of sending you this letter, as it says but little more than 'Don't enter into military operations on more theatres of war at the same time than is absolutely necessary, till you will have brought to a conclusion those which are absolutely necessary, as in China and in the Burmese dominions, in which you are in truth on the defensive.' It is true that I state generally my notion of your defensive position for the rest, and have pointed out the danger of acting upon our former notion of restoring the Tenasserim provinces.

"Ever, my dear Lord Ellenborough,

"Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON."

"His Excellency Lord Ellenborough,
Governor General."

"London, January 19, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"Since I wrote to you by Colonel Churchill in the end of last month, a letter of which I send a

duplicate by this occasion, we have received accounts here from the China Seas up to the beginning of September 1841, relating to the capture of Amoy and the preparations for and commencement of departure from thence to attack Ningpo, and to obtain possession of the island of Chusan. I do not think there is any further intelligence of the state of affairs, either in the Burmese empire or in the Peninsula, than we had when I wrote to you at that period.

"Although a blockade of the mouth of the Great Canal is adverted to in the newspapers, I do not see in the despatches or letters any trace of such a design, or of its immediate execution. I hope, therefore, that you will find everything as it was expected you would when you quitted London.

"I have seen an interesting private letter from Sir Henry Pottinger, who appears to contemplate a march upon Pekin, founded upon an operation upon Tientsin. I do not think that he appears aware of the difficulties of the establishment of a fleet of men-of-war and transports in the Peiho. I judge from what passes in conversation that others think of such an operation.

"I strongly recommend to you not to lose sight of the two principles on which we have founded all our designs for operations in China.

"First, not to expose our fleets of men-of-war and transports to the risks of navigation and anchorage upon the coast of China in the unfavourable seasons

of the year. Secondly, to undertake no enterprise in the execution of which we cannot employ conjointly army and fleet.

"I recommend you not to relieve the general officer and the admiral by any relaxation of these principles. Keeping these principles in view, give them as much discretion as you may think proper.

"I have had some conversation with Mr. Barrow of the Admiralty, principally in relation to the last memorandum which I gave you, in relation to the measures for equipping the troops for further movements from the Island of Chusan. He has not always been of opinion that we could take a fleet up to Kinshan. He now thinks that we can. I think that he is apprehensive that the Chinese on the two banks of the river may be unwilling to supply our armament with provisions, and that we may be distressed. You will have observed that I more than once have stated in the papers which I have given you, that the sea must be our magazine for stores, ammunition, and provisions; that we must keep our communication with the sea, go where we may, and draw from the sea what we may require.

"Mr. Barrow strongly recommends that we should secure all the junks which we can capture in the river and in the entrances of the canal from thence. He says that by sinking junks in the river the Chinese might so narrow the passage up the river as to render it more difficult, and, moreover, tedious.

"He informed me of a fact of which I was not

aware, viz., that the junks which navigate the river generally will not answer for the navigation of the canal, whether to the northward or to the southward, and that the execution of the plan which I had in contemplation for the means of movement on the canals would require the seizure and equipment as proposed of canal junks as well as of river junks. I mention this here as a note and farther explanation upon the subject of this equipment for movement by the land.

"Mr. Barrow has described to me the manner of raising and lowering the boats from one level of their canals to another.

"It appears that a strong beam or beams of wood are fixed in masonry from one side of the canal to the other on the level of the water. A flat-bottomed junk comes to be removed from the higher to the lower level, she is lodged upon the rounds of timber and is gradually lowered upon large stones or pavement laid from the summit at the beam or round to the lower level of the canal. If a vessel to ascend from the lower to the higher level, she is dragged up by windlasses erected on the banks of the canal, over the paved glacis to the beam or round at the upper level.

"The enclosed rough sketch will show you what my understanding is of the nature of these machines. But we must never lose sight of the chance that these means of navigating on these canals may easily be destroyed. It would be necessary that a corps

destined to carry on its operations by the canal should be able to land and march on both banks, in order to secure as many of these locks, as we may call them, as may be necessary to use in the operations or movements of a given period.

"My opinion is, as already stated, that the possession of Kinshan and the entrance of the canal will settle the business for us, particularly if no disaster occurs. But if it should not, and we cannot discover the means of approaching the capital, Pekin, with army and fleet in co-operation with each other, it might then be considered whether an operation upon Hang-choo Foo might not be undertaken from Kinshan. This would be considered in China a most severe blow, and must have the effect of giving us peace, if our position at Kinshan should not.

"This city might, it appears, be reached by the Grand Canal. It is at no great distance from the course of the Yangtse-kiang. The possession of Ningpo might give other facilities for the shipping to approach it, and the distance is not great from the Island of Chusan.

"If once in possession of Kinshan and the navigation of the Yangtse-kiang, we might possibly be able to land a sufficiently strong and well-equipped force on the nearest point of this large town, on the right bank of the river; and detach from the river a sufficient naval force to co-operate with a land force to proceed towards Hang-choo Foo; or a sufficient force being kept at Kinshan to maintain that posses-

sion, the great body of the fleet and army should be moved from Yangtse-kiang upon Ningpo, and thence to the attack of the town of Hang-choo Foo.

"I suggest this plan for consideration by the officers in command, in case it should be found that the position at Kinshan does not give us peace and a march upon Pekin supported by the naval force is impracticable.

"The weather is so dark, and the maps and plans of the country so imperfect, and the topographical accounts of the country so scanty, that I cannot venture to do more from hence than suggest for consideration this plan, in case it should be found that the adoption of the other will not attain our true object.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON."

MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 1, 1842.

"It appears, in conversation with Admiral Sir George Cockburn, that it is possible to find secure anchorage for a large fleet of men-of-war and transports at no great distance from the mouth of the river Peiho on the coast of China—that is to say, secure from the storms which may be expected in any season of the year.

"It likewise appears to be possible to carry into

and up the Peiho (that is to say, across the bar of that river and up the stream) that part of the fleet propelled by steam and the men-of-war of the fleet having the least draught of water; and that this part of the fleet, and the army on board, might take possession of Peiho River, keeping its communication with the large ships and transports anchored as above described.

"The two principles adverted to in my former memoranda, and particularly adverted to in my letter of the 19th of January to Lord Ellenborough, of which I recommended to him therein not to lose sight nor to relax them, would not, in my opinion, be departed from by taking for the fleet an anchorage, professionally pronounced to be secure, on any part of the coast; nor in employing the army, or a sufficient detachment thereof (in conjunction with or aided by a detachment from the fleet, consisting of the force propelled by steam and the vessels having the lightest draught of water), on any river or inlet to which the ingress and from which the egress can be calculated upon as certain, and of which the course can be kept possession for communication of the army and fleet so employed, with the fleet of large ships anchored, as supposed in security, in the offing.

"These are points upon which the officers commanding upon the spot must be best judges.

"What I insist upon is—

"1. That the fleet shall not be exposed at

anchor, or even under weigh, on the coast of China, to the chances of the weather in the unfavourable season.

"2. That the army shall not be exposed to act alone in the interior of the country unsupported as a military body by a sufficient military force of the fleet.

"3. That the army and fleet thus in a state of operation shall not lose its communication with the sea and the great body of the fleet."

MEMORANDUM BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, FEBRUARY 2, 1842.

"It is impossible for me to judge what a small naval force can do in the Yangtse-kiang River, or whether two frigates could seize and keep the Island of Kinshan. I had thought that the Chinese Government would make a great effort to keep that important point, and, if lost, to regain possession of it. I therefore considered it desirable to make the attack upon it with our whole disposable force of fleet and army, to fortify the island, and to arm and equip it for defence, for which means have been sent from England and India. I thought that Government were of the same opinion, and that our headquarters should be established there for a trial, at least, whether or not we could proceed with our

negotiations for peace with a view to bring them to a favourable termination.

"In the meantime I had suggested to the Governor-General, in a memorandum dated the 19th January 1842, that advantage should be taken of our position at Kinshan to endeavour to equip our army for movement in these essentials, without which it could not move, such as horses, &c., complete for its artillery and ammunition, to fit up junks for them as stables to attend the movements of the army in the rivers and by the canals, which would be required whether the operation is to be by one river or by the other.

"If two frigates and a small detachment can take and keep possession of the Island of Kinshan, upon which I should not have thought it reasonable to reckon, I am certain that the attack and occupation of the island by such a force will not have the effect of giving a fair experiment to the attempt at negotiation.

"If, however, such reliance can be placed on the proposed anchorage at or near the mouth of the Peiho, and upon the certainty of the entrance of that river by the smaller classes of men-of-war propelled by steam and others, and transports, and of egress from that river so as to rely upon that as our main operation for the campaign, I should say, make the attack upon Kinshan with a force as small as may be barely sufficient to obtain and keep possession of it, and employ the whole of the

disposable military force in the operations on the Peiho.

"I beg that it may be observed that out of the 9000 or 10,000 men of which the whole force is composed, garrisons are required for Hong Kong, Amoy, and possibly one at Ningpo, on the Island of Chusan, and on the Island of Kinshan in the Yang-tse-kiang.

"It will therefore be seen that there are not too many for this service, and I entreat that the principles on which it was determined to act when first these operations were discussed in September and October last may not be relaxed in a greater degree than is stated in my memorandum of the 1st inst."

"London, February 2, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I was in hopes that I had done with the operations in China till after the campaign of 1842. Lord Fitzgerald promised to send you copies of my letters to you by Churchill and some by the overland mail of to-morrow or next day, as well as by the sea conveyance, which will afford an opportunity shortly.

"I now send per overland two memorandums which I have written and sent to Lord Stanley; the first upon a conversation which I had with him and Sir George Cockburn yesterday.

"The other contains a draft of his instructions from the Admiralty upon the new scheme of opera-

tions connected with an anchorage of the Peiho. You will see what I think of this plan.

"It would no doubt be the plan if such an anchorage is practicable and the ingress to and egress from the Peiho certain. But I think that in order to effect this operation we are about to give up a probability of success for a probable failure.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"You have here seen me at work upon this subject since the end of last September. Despatches with memorandums and suggestions of mine were sent to India on the 4th October, 4th November, 4th December, 4th January; and now we are beginning over again for the mail of the 4th of this month.

"Lord Ellenborough." "W.

[COPY.]

"St. James's Square, February 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE,

"In consequence of your second memorandum, which I read to Peel last night, I propose to *add* the enclosed to the instructions of which I sent you a draft yesterday. I believe, and hope, it will answer your views, by which, I need not say, we are most anxious to be guided.

"I propose to send the instruction through the Admiralty to Sir W. Parker, sending a copy to Sir H. Gough, and another to Lord Ellenborough, to

whom I will write a private letter by this mail, and, with your permission, enclose him a private copy of your memoranda.

(Signed) "STANLEY.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

[COPY.]

"London, February 3, 1842, 3 P.M.

"MY DEAR LORD STANLEY,

"The enclosed paper was put into my hands two hours ago, when I was going to the House of Lords to attend the Queen and carry the Sword of State.

"The instruction will now be safe if we can trust to the discretion of the officers of the navy and army in command. At all events, we can upon that of Lord Ellenborough. There can be no doubt that the line of attack by the Peiho is the preferable one, if with the principles on which we originally determined to act, or any reasonable modification of them such as is now proposed; and I do not doubt that that line would have been adopted in September instead of that by Yangtse-kiang, if we had then had the information of anchorage facilities, of ingress and egress from the Peiho, which we have at present. Indeed, I cannot tell how it happened that we had it not. It is unfortunate that we had not. I at least should have been spared a good deal of labour.

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"The Lord Stanley."

ENCLOSURE IN THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S LETTER PRECEDING.

[Memorandum.] January 27, 1842.

"The purser of the 'Conway' states that when he left China in July last there were at least forty transports employed. Sir W. Parker appears to have had twenty-eight with him on the expedition against Amoy. The above forty transports, if averaging 500 tons each, would amount to 20,000 tons. 20,000 tons at 35*s.* per ton per month would be at the rate per annum of £420,000.

"If they had been at 20*s.* per ton per month, like those sent from England, the cost per annum would have been at the rate per annum of £240,000, making the loss per annum £180,000.

"If the 5729 tons sent from England replace 5729 tons of the above at 35*s.* per ton per month ..	£120,339
Say 5729 tons at 20*s.* per ton per month	68,748
The saving per annum would be	£51,591

"The transports taken up in India, it is understood, are all under an engagement to be discharged at Calcutta.

"The 'Jupiter' and 'Rattlesnake' troop ships were already on the station with the above forty transports. In addition to the 5729 tons of transports sent out, which the admiral has the power of substituting for the ships taken up at a high rate in India, there have been also sent out the following troop

ships from England, which ought to replace transports taken up in India to the extent of their capacity. The 'Belleisle,' 'Sapphire' and 'Apollo,' but a large tonnage of the India ships will still remain in pay unless the service is finished. All the transports engaged in India, whether taken up by the East India Company or the naval commander-in-chief, are understood to have been taken up at the *new* instead of the *old* tonnage, being an increase of from one-third to one-fourth of tonnage against the public."

[Private.]

"St. James's Square, February 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR ELLENBOROUGH,

"I had almost despaired of being able to find a moment's time to write to you, and yet on the very opening of Parliament I have been almost exclusively occupied with your affairs. Fortunately, the passing of our Address, without amendment and almost without comment, gives me an unhoped-for evening, just as the mail is going out, to tell you the modification which our views have undergone as to the affairs of China. Sir George Cockburn called upon me, and Sir John Barrow wrote to me, both of them in great perturbation as to our intended plans. They have no reason to doubt the practicability of the Yangtse-kiang; but, on the other hand, there are seventy miles of it of which we know nothing, and it is *possible* that our whole force

directed thither might meet with some unexpected obstruction, which would render nugatory the whole year's operations. It is possible also that even if successful the operations on the Yangtse-kiang might not have the effect which we anticipate. Chinese obstinacy goes a long way, and it is quite possible that in a country possessed of such a multitude of superabundant labour, and under a completely despotic government, means might be found, though no doubt at great inconvenience, of carrying the commerce of the country in such a manner as to turn our position at Kinshan, and (we being at 600 miles from the capital) leave us in the possession of an undisputed but unprofitable sovereignty over a rocky island. It appears also from charts which I inspected very minutely with Sir George Cockburn at the Admiralty, with the assistance of Captain Beaufort, that there is a very secure anchorage for large vessels in the Gulf of Pechelee, and much nearer the mouth of the Peiho than we had any idea that ships of any size could lie. It appears also, that although neither our line-of-battle ships nor our heavy frigates could cross the bar, our steamers, and even smaller ships-of-war (such for instance as the 'Modeste') could pass in and out without much difficulty; and it is quite apparent that if we can advance upon Tien-sing, where the head waters of the Great Canal enter into the Peiho, which passes up to Pekin, we have in point of fact not only exercised the influence of well-grounded alarm upon

the capital itself, but have established an effective blockade by the stoppage (so near to the *heart*) of the main current of supplies. Under this impression, and having satisfied my own mind on the subject, I called on the Duke of Wellington with Sir George Cockburn, having previously seen Fitzgerald in company with the latter. The new point about the safe anchorage produced the greatest effect on the Duke, who at once said that he adopted Kinshan only as a *pis aller*, on the supposition that the Peiho was impracticable. After I left him, and before he received my letter, the Duke sent me the enclosed memorandum No. 1, which he desired to be sent to you in explanation of his letter of the 19th ult., which he sent off by the 1st of this month, but which in point of fact will arrive together with this letter. My draft despatch crossed his memorandum, and I received yesterday memorandum No. 2, which I send you also, in order that you may see the whole working of his mind. In consequence of this memorandum, I added (without alteration of what had gone before) a supplementary instruction, commencing with the words, 'From what has been above stated.' In answer to which I received from him to-day the letter in No. 3, which carries our correspondence down to the latest possible period. You will observe that we leave a large discretion to Parker and Gough, but liable to be contracted by you, who are left, in point of fact, absolutely to control our proceedings. I do not know that in point

of argument I can add much to my official despatch to the Admiralty, copy of which will be sent to Sir Hugh Gough. That despatch, with the private commentary furnished by the Duke's notes, will put you in possession of all the reasonings which we can form, founded on very limited information. We know nothing yet beyond the attack on Amoy; and unfortunately our mails from India generally arrive about two or three days after the setting out of the mail thither. I hope you will have been able to send us six or seven regiments from India; you will see I assume a force of 9000 to 10,000 men, of whom we have four British regiments at 800 each, and one (six service companies) at 120 men each company, reaching a strength of 720—in all, hard upon 4000 bayonets, besides our artillery. We ought not to fritter away our force, and I am all for trusting the defence of Ko-ling-soo, and even of Hong Kong, to a very small naval force, if we want the others for any great object. Chusan must be kept as a main point; and if from thence, *pour passer le temps*, we could make a *raid* upon Hang-choo Foo, I believe it would pay; but we have no information as to the soundings of the estuary which leads up to the latter great town. It is weak and wealthy, and would suit an undertaking of rather a buccaneering tendency. We have sent out instructions that Hong Kong must be considered merely as a temporary possession, liable to be given up should we come to an agreement with China; but this was necessary

to prevent speculations on the part of our merchants and others, and also to prevent Chinese subjects encumbering us by taking refuge with us on the supposition of a permanent possession, and being afterwards abandoned to no doubtful fate; but I think it possible, and even probable, that all the efforts even of this year may fail; and in that case, and in the absence of any treaty, we may be compelled to establish ourselves in Hong Kong, and not only so, but to keep permanent possession of our acquisitions on the coast of China, and, establishing three or four ports, to carry on an essentially smuggling trade with the empire. We must be prepared for all these contingencies.

"Before I leave the subject of Chinese affairs I must call your attention to statements which have been made to me upon the subject of the charges made for transport service by the Indian Government, which, I am told, if sanctioned by the Treasury, will entail on us an additional charge, up to this time, of not less than £180,000 per annum. I send you a copy of the statement which has been made to me, of which I shall probably have to take official notice, and I should therefore be obliged to you to inquire into it.

"Our Session opened to-day very favourably. No amendment in either House—immense crowds in the streets, and all in high good humour—a very large attendance on both sides in both Houses, and, I should say, a general feeling in favour of the

Government. The Duke of Buckingham's secession has of course produced some effect, but I am inclined to think as much one way as the other. March moving the Address (which he did very well) was a great thing for us. You see we take the bull by the horns on Wednesday next, and I shall be disappointed if we have not a triumphant Session. Do not delay the Mauritius case, as soon as you have power to act.

"I write in great haste, and am only happy to have had an unexpected opportunity of writing at all. "Ever yours, most sincerely,

"STANLEY.

"The Lord Ellenborough."

[Secret and Confidential.]

"Bombay, October 27, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"On the receipt of your letter of the 28th of September, marked 'secret and confidential,' I lost no time in confidentially communicating with Captain Oliver on the subject of trying some experiments as to the possibility of conveying empty 'puckalls' and 'mussucks' by sea to Suez in such a state as to be capable of holding water when they arrive.

"The result of the trials, the first of which I have directed Captain Oliver to make by the steamer of the 1st of November, shall be communicated to

you, and I think your Lordship may rely on Captain Oliver so selecting his agents that the experiment shall neither itself attract observation nor its results be 'recorded in the newspapers.'

"It occurs to me that the vessels in which water is conveyed from the town of Aden to 'Steamer Point' and the 'Turkish Wall' are, probably, constructed on the plan and of the materials which experience has shown to be best adapted for carrying water in that climate. Any number of them might be prepared and *proved* there without exciting suspicion of any intention beyond possibly a design to make a descent on some town in the interior. I will direct that half-a-dozen of these vessels be sent to Bombay that I may see exactly what they are.

"Might it not be worth while to try the experiment of having 'mussucks' made of waterproof cloth in England? They might be large enough to contain three or four gallons, and covered with a strong light net to relieve unequal pressure on the seams—with a sling by which, in case of necessity, they could be carried on the soldier's back. If coloured white, they could probably stand exposure to the sun uninjured—especially, if the manufacturer were told that they were to be subjected to an Indian climate and his ingenuity taxed to prepare them accordingly. I have served in Egypt myself, and can answer for it that the nights are so comparatively cool, except in the month of May, you may make long marches with a moderate supply of water.

"With regard to the other point on which your Lordship is desirous of information—the means of obtaining water on both shores of the Red Sea and before it is entered—I have thrown all the information I could collect without attracting attention into the accompanying memorandum. Hereafter, should you require more minute and detailed statements, I shall have no difficulty in obtaining them, as we have many officers in the Company's naval service who have great experience and are very intelligent men. I made the passage down the Red Sea with one of them—Lieutenant Barker—a very clever person. An hydrographer's office here is more needed than at any naval station out of England.

"I will forward with this, by bhangy dâk, a copy of Captain Moresby's 'Survey of the Red Sea,' in case you should not have it by you and require it for reference.

"In the Red Sea, especially if the ships to be watered are large, the anchorage becomes a consideration hardly secondary to the quantity and quality of the waters.

"I do not anticipate that there would be much difficulty in procuring tonnage, regarding which you express a doubt at the conclusion of your letter. Captain Oliver has frequently mentioned to me that he considers one of our first-class steamers, with a transport in tow, would carry a regiment 1000 strong, complete in every way. For the Red Sea, however, the transports ought not to be over large,

nor of heavy draught of water; and as store and horse boats for that service, Captain Oliver, I find, would prefer the large class of native buggalas, by which so much of the trade of this coast with Scinde, Cutch, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea is carried on—and tonnage of this description could always be procured in abundance.

"The most certain mode of simultaneously landing a large body of troops in any part of the Red Sea would be to rendezvous at Aden, where all the available steamers should be prepared to assist in towing the transports—for, from the prevalence of northerly winds during the greater part of the year, especially in the Sea of Suez, the progress of an expedition *sailing up* the Red Sea would otherwise be very uncertain.

"The period of the strong north-westers is nearly coincident with that of our south-west monsoon—from June to September—which is, from various other considerations, the least eligible for such an expedition. When the wind is southerly in the lower sea, it is generally northerly in the upper—so that you may fairly calculate on a leading wind during part of the voyage up. This would in some degree lessen the labour of towing; but, even under the most favourable circumstances, without the aid of steamers, it would be very difficult to get a large fleet of transports up so narrow a sea with any approach to certainty or punctuality.

"The employment of steamers to any great extent

in such a service would render necessary a very large addition to the stock of coal at Aden; it might be sent as ballast in the transports.

"Tanks and water-casks must also be prepared and kept filled at Aden ready for use.

"Torr, there can be doubt, would be an excellent point at which to rendezvous, and fill up all supplies of waters previously to making for Suez.

"I shall be most happy, quietly and without attracting any public attention, whenever you desire it, to gather strength for the coming event, so that your power may be felt suddenly.

"I have the honour to remain, your Lordship's

"Most obedient and faithfully obliged,

"GEO. ARTHUR.

"His Excellency the Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough."

[Memorandum.—Confidential.]

ON THE MEANS OF OBTAINING WATER IN THE RED SEA AND ON ITS SHORES.

"Vessels bound up the Red Sea may water, before entering it, either at Maculla (on the Arabian coast) or at the Tayarah Wells (on the African coast), nearly opposite Aden.

"The country round Tayarah is a low sandy [illegible] rt. When [illegible] Lieutenant Barker, of the [illegible] an Navy, in the Euphrates,' fourteen tons of water were taken in from wells not sixty yards from the beach. They are sunk about four feet through

sand, and about two more through the subjacent rock, when a fine spring is found, which would apparently supply any quantity. These wells are kept covered over by the natives. Perhaps it would be desirable to cause them to be examined.

"Aden itself cannot well furnish a large supply of water *at present*, owing to the state of the wells and reservoirs, and their distance from the landing-place. This defect may, however, be remedied hereafter by clearing out the old wells and sinking new ones, and directions have been given on the subject.

"At Camaran Island there are deep wells, with good water, a mile from the shore. The anchorage is good.

"At Jedda, water of unpleasant but wholesome quality may be procured without difficulty.

"At Wedge there is anchorage ground and good water.

"Water, in any quantity and of good quality, may be procured at Torr (in the Sea of Suez, on the western side of the peninsula of Mount Sinai), from wells near the beach.* The anchorage is good.

"Fresh water is obtainable near the sea and surface, more frequently than is generally supposed, in such localities as Tayarah, Aboukir, and the islands of Bassein and Bombay, where the coast is a sandy flat; and good water is often found at the depth of a few feet a very [illegible]tance from water mark.

"It might be worth while to supply vessels [illegible] iron cylinders in lengths, instead of casks, with a

view to making experiments on the coasts of the Red Sea. In Captain Moresby's 'Survey' of this sea many places are laid down as affording good water, but not always in great quantity or in the neighbourhood of good anchorage."

"London, February 4, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I sent you a letter by the India House this morning, with some papers which I had sent to Lord Stanley yesterday respecting the proposed instruction and the alteration of the plan for operations in 1842, which papers will give you an epitome of the history of the transaction. Since I wrote to you I have received the instruction, which Lord Stanley will send you by this messenger, with a note of which I enclose a copy, and I likewise enclose the copy of my answer: from all these papers you will see what I think of this scheme. We should have adopted it in September–October if we had had, and had believed, the facts of the anchorage, &c.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"I send this to Mr. Melville, in hopes that it may be in time to go with my other letter sent to him this morning. "Ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"London, March 16, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD FITZGERALD,

"I perused last night all the papers in the box which you sent me. There is one thing quite clear. No man in this country can tell what was the real state of affairs north of Peshawur on or about the 15th of January.

"In respect to the question which you asked me, my opinion is, that you ought to send by sea, at as early a period as you can between the 1st of April and 1st of July, all the troops that are or may be disposable from hence under the Government of the East Indies.

"Each detachment of them should go into the Cape.

"The Governor-General should be informed of the date of departure of each detachment or regiment from England, and the probable date of its arrival at the Cape; and he should be desired to take care that each detachment or regiment should there have orders to proceed thence to Bombay, or to Fort St. George, or to Fort William, or to Singapore—observing always that ships must not be ordered to Fort St. George to arrive there after the 1st of October.

"I mention this, as the month of October is the period at which Lord Auckland states that it would be desirable that the troops should arrive in India.

"I calculate that the whole voyage, including the

stoppage at the Cape, to either side of the peninsula, to Fort William or Singapore, would take from three to six months, if the number of ships sailing together is small, two, three, or four.

"The Governor-General can be communicated with from hence in six weeks.

"He can reckon on his orders reaching the Cape in the same length of time, and it is best that he should order the reinforcements to the spot at which they should be required.

"I do not believe that the upper part of the Indus, or any of its tributary streams, is practicable as the communication for an army.

"But there must be more information upon that point in your office than I can have. At all events, I would not give one pin for the assistance of a body of troops just landed from its ships, on any part of the Indus or its tributary streams.

"To render an army effective, or even otherwise than an useless burthen, it must be able to move, and must have means of conveyance for its provisions, stores, and equipments, such as camels, horses, mules, bullocks, or carts drawn by any of the three latter. See Sir Robert Sale's difficulties at Jellalabad. He was strong enough to hold his front, but he could not march to the assistance of Cabul; he had no conveyance. Indeed, the distress at Cabul was owing to the loss of all their means of conveyance, want of forage, and consequent inability to move.

"Then see upon what their means of conveyance

depend: not upon having the animals alone, but there must likewise be people to take care of and drive them.

"At Peshawur, it appears by the papers which I read last night that they have camels, but no sowars or drivers.

"The owners would not let them on hire with their drivers. To buy them would have been useless, as the public departments had not people to take care of and drive them.

"All this is unintelligible in a country like this, in which fortunately the difference between an army and a fleet is not very accurately known and felt.

"But this is the case; and the knowledge that it is so will point out the difficulty of settling here to what point in the East Indies these reinforcements ought to be sent.

"Wherever each detachment of them goes it must be to join other corps, and to perform certain fixed operations by movement, for which previous preparation must be made by having for them means of conveyance, &c.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON."

"Strathfieldsaye, March 30, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"The time is approaching for the despatch of the April overland despatch, by which you will

expect to hear from me. But up to this moment we have not a line of official intelligence, or, indeed, of any upon which any man can rely, from the seat of the war upon the North-West frontier, so as to be able to make up his mind and form a judgment of the state of affairs in the commencement of the month of January.

"The Cabinet have determined to send to India a large reinforcement of European troops, and Lord Fitzgerald will probably have sent you a copy of a letter which I wrote to him some time ago, in which I recommended a course of measures to be adopted in relation to these reinforcements which would leave to your option to have them arrive either on the west or on the east coast of the peninsula of India, or at Singapore, according as you might consider it most convenient to reinforce the Presidency of Bombay, or that of Fort St. George, or that of Fort William, or the troops in the China Seas.

"I have, besides, written to Lord Fitzgerald a long letter upon reinforcements of the native armies at each of the three Presidencies in European officers as well as in men, of which he will, of course, send you a copy by the overland despatch. You will see that I have suggested that the details of the execution of these measures should be left to yourself.

"Although I cannot form an exact judgment of what was the state of affairs at the seat of the war in January, I am convinced that it was very disastrous, and that our moral force and our political power and

influence will have received a blow, from the effects of which we shall not recover for some time.

"There is not a Moslem heart in Asia, from Pekin to Constantinople, which will not vibrate when reflecting upon the fact that the European ladies and other females attached to the troops at Cabul were made over to the tender mercies of the Moslem chief who, with his own hand, murdered Sir William Macnaghten, the representative of the British Government at the Court of the Sovereign of Afghanistan.

"It is impossible that that fact should not produce a moral effect injurious to British influence and power throughout the whole extent of Asia, and particularly among the Moslem population of the British dominions in the peninsula of India and the dependencies thereof, such as Arcot, the Nizam's dominions, the kingdom of Oude, Delhi and Agra and their dependencies, Allahabad, Rohilcund—in short, wherever there remains established a Moslem population, as at Vellore, Seringapatam, &c.

"It must likewise be expected that the military events of Afghanistan and the North-West of India, in the last months of the year 1841, must affect the military spirit and discipline of the troops and their military efficiency, more particularly those of the Moslem persuasion, of which class, in general, I believe that the native regular cavalry of each of the three Presidencies is composed, as well as nearly all the irregular cavalry.

"As far as it is possible to form any judgment from the perusal of the accounts hitherto received, it appears that but little reliance could be placed already in the efficiency of the irregular cavalry, and that the exertions of the cavalry of the Moslem persuasion in the service of the Sikh Government could be as little relied upon as those of the cavalry of the same class in the service of the East India Company or its dependent States.

"It is impossible that the feelings, opinions, and conduct of this class of men should not be influenced in some degree by the general Moslem feeling throughout India, and I must add, all Asia, of the state of our political influence and power.

"It is impossible for me to reflect upon this melancholy state of affairs in the East without expressing my apprehensions that it has in part been occasioned by the misconduct, in a military view, of the troops, particularly at and in the neighbourhood of Cabul. It is true that we have not distinct reports of anything that has occurred, much less of any operations. But what I have seen has left an impression upon my mind that a little more vigour in the exercise of the limited command over the operations of the troops at Cabul, which the commanding officer had, and greater activity and energy, would have preserved the superiority which has always been the portion of the troops of the East India Company in Asia—would have been attended by the consequence of affording supplies of forage and provisions for the

troops, and would have prevented the extermination, distress, and loss which have been the consequence of the daily increasing want of such necessary supplies, and the final recourse to negotiation and capitulation after the troops had shown that their military qualities had become greatly deteriorated.

"It is impossible not to see and feel for these circumstances, and to consider them well in discussing the measures to be adopted hereafter. It is for this reason that I have adverted to them so particularly. It is true that we shall have in India an European army as well disciplined and more numerous than ever, and measures have been suggested for reinforcing the European officers in the native regiments and battalions of all the armies, who are the foundation and instruments of their discipline and the soul of their military spirit and efficiency. It may be hoped that in time these may be restored. But in the meantime we have great difficulties to contend with.

"It is impossible for me to form a judgment of what ought to be the political object to be attained in the North-West of India after the termination of this campaign, and of the season for all operations. I cannot tell in what state affairs will have been left in Afghanistan. I confess that I am ignorant. I have never had an opportunity of knowing what was the exact state of our engagements towards Shah Shoojah, and of the state of his execution of the counterpart thereof, at the period at which the

insurrection broke out in the neighbourhood of Cabul in October–November 1841. The circumstances attending the breaking out of that rebellion, as stated by Sir W. Macnaghten in a despatch to the late Governor-General, proved the existence of the grossest treachery on the part of the native officers of the Shah's Government at Cabul, and, if not treachery, the most lamentable weakness in the character of the Shah himself, and their immediately removing him.

"It will remain for the British Government in India to determine what course it will take in relation to its engagements in Central Asia.

"Whether we are to act offensively, and enter the country again, or to carry on our operations with more caution, I earnestly recommend that we should consider maturely our main position in Hindostan. That should be effectually secured without loss of time as the first step to be taken, not only for our permanent security, but to restore our military reputation and the political influence and power resulting from it—the discipline, the efficiency, the military spirit and confidence of our native army, and the advantages which a long course of wisdom in council, activity, energy, and gallantry in action had given us, and which have been lost, I hope only for a short period of time, if we adopt wise measures to provide for our permanent security.

"Looking at our position in the North-West, I see upon the river Sutlej a short line of defence, covered

by the Punjab and its rivers, with the Government of which country we are in alliance. It is true that the Sikh Government is in an unsettled state, and not what it was when governed by Runjeet Sing at the commencement of the war in Afghanistan. But the weakness of the government, or the absence of all government, in the Punjab, and the possibility of hostility in that part of the Sikh State, would be an additional inducement to the British Government to attend to the defences of our own weakest frontier, even if the consequences of the state of confusion in the government of the Punjab should eventually require the active interference of the British Government in order to settle the government of a country where tranquillity is so essential to its own protection and safety.

"The attention of the British Government has long and frequently been called to the state and means of defence of the cities of Delhi and Agra. Both are too extensive ever to become what would be termed good fortresses.

"But large sums of money have been laid out upon Delhi, which was closed in some years ago by a bastioned enceinte in good repair, and it required only to be properly armed with ordnance of sufficient calibre, with serviceable carriages, and to be supplied with stores for the defence of the place, as well as for the supply of an army to be employed in its front, in order to render all the service which could be expected from such a place.

"The extent and nature of the population of the place—Delhi being the seat of the Court of the Mogul, still existing there, and there being there many Moslem families of antiquity and rank in the empire—would require a large garrison. But I should think but ill of the British engineers if they could not place a work in the centre of the buildings of the town in such a position as to render hopeless all attempts at insurrection in the city.

"Considering the nature of the misfortunes which have recently occurred, and the possibility of a general Moslem reaction throughout the peninsula of India, I should be of opinion that no single measure that could be adopted would appear to be so appropriate as to secure the possession and the utility of the city of Delhi. It happens, likewise, that there is none for which there would be such facility. All that is required is to send officers to the spot, with a corps of pioneers and authority to hire workmen to complete what has been commenced (and, as I understand, well, from the perusal of the documents sent to me), and fill the place with the ordnance and stores and ordnance carriages necessary for its defence, and to enable the general commanding all the North-West frontier to depend upon the fortress of Delhi for the depôt of his ammunition and stores. Considering that there is a communication by water between Fort William and Delhi, there can be no difficulty in attaining these objects.

"I have not so much information about Agra as I

have about Delhi; but, judging from the accounts which I have, I should say that there is at Agra of fortification only a castle. That ought to be put in a complete state of defence, and well armed with ordnance of large calibres and serviceable carriages, and provided with stores for its defence. If the works should entirely command the buildings of the town, this measure would be more important.

"Storehouses should then be constructed, either inside or outside of the works of the castle, particularly if the fire from the works of the castle could protect them; which, when completed, should be filled with ordnance and stores, as an additional temporary depôt to be used by the general officer commanding on the frontier, in the rear of his left.

"Besides these measures at Agra, for the execution and completion of which there would be the same facilities as I have above described to exist for the execution of what is required at Delhi, viz., water communication with Fort William.

"In addition to these, I would earnestly recommend that the state of the fortress of Allahabad, at the confluence of the Jumna and Ganges, should be examined, and that its works and buildings should be put in repair, and measures adopted to fill its magazines with ordnance and stores, so as to render that fortress likewise of utility in the general defence of the frontier in case of attack from the North-West, and in case of the necessity for operations in Bundelcund or towards Gwalior or Hindostan.

"While these measures should be in the course of execution, it would be necessary that an army should be assembled towards the Sutlej.

"The right of this army should rest upon the Himalaya mountains, the possession of which should be secured by being occupied by troops as far to the westward as possible, at least to Nagpore.

"It has been recommended to fortify the castle of Ferozepore on the Sutlej. But this measure was recommended principally with a view to render that town a commercial depôt and bazaar in relation with the commercial navigation of the Indus. Whatever may be the views of the Government in that respect, I would recommend, as a measure of military precaution, the construction of a secure work on the site of the castle of Ferozepore. This, with a barrack or cantonment at Loodianah, secured by a good redoubt, would be all that would be necessary in the way of work on that part of the position.

"Good lines of road should, however, be marked out, and bridges constructed over the rivers and rivulets crossing the same, from Allahabad and Agra to the Sutlej.

"An army in this position might maintain itself. It might move forward into the Punjab, whether as an offensive movement, with a view to conquest, or as one defensive, with a view to attack its enemy at the passage of some of the rivers in that country, or to threaten the communications of an enemy advancing from the north-west.

"The countries of the protected Sikh chieftains would be in the rear of the army; and, as they are highly cultivated and fertile, would afford supplies of provisions and forage during any length of time during which it might be necessary to detain the army in that position.

"These Sikh chieftains, the Rajah of Pattialah and others, ought to be conciliated, and their light cavalry taken into the service of the army. They will thus feel an additional interest in the defence of that frontier.

"Care must be taken to secure the island of Bukkur, on the Indus, near the junction of the Sutlej and Ghara, and on the communication with Shikarpore; and there should be a *tête-du-pont* on each bank of the Indus, so as to secure the bridges at that important point, and at all times the communication.

"These measures once adopted, and the discipline, spirit, and confidence of the army restored, we might look with security to the defence of our North-West frontier against any enemy, however formidable, from the westward. Our army upon the Sutlej, supported by the fortresses of Delhi, Agra, and Allahabad, and having the protected Sikh States behind it, could not be forced in its front or turned by its right.

"An enemy, to attack by its left, must get into the sandy deserts, where neither provisions, water, nor forage can be found.

"While these measures will be in the course of execution on the North-West frontier, it will be necessary to attend to the kingdom of Oude, to the province of Rohilcund, and wherever else in the provinces under the government of Fort William and its dependencies there should be any collection of inhabitants of the Moslem persuasion.

"It might possibly be desirable to place the regiments of the army generally in camps, and to keep them in movement through the country, in separate columns, even though forming part of corps of observation. The advantages of these measures would not be confined to the preservation of the peace of the country. They would tend to revive and confirm the discipline, subordination, and military spirit of the native army, and to restore confidence in the power and resources of the British Government.

"Before I turn away from the Bengal provinces and the security of the North-West frontier, I wish to advert to the advantages which may be derived from that object from the positions of the Bombay army on the Lower Indus and in Scinde.

"I have already recommended that the island of Bukkur, in the Indus, at the junction of the Sutlej and Ghara, should be secured by works, and that there should be a *tête-du-pont* on each bank of the Indus, for the security of the communication with each.

"Hyderabad ought to be maintained, and such other parts in Scinde, particularly on the left bank

of the Indus, as will tend to secure that possession. The Government of Bombay ought, besides, at all times, to have gunboats and others propelled by steam in that river, so as to command its navigation and to prevent the passage of freebooters from the right to the left bank. The security of Scinde, which will be promoted by the possession of the passage by the island of Bukkur, will tend to give further security to the left flank of the army on the Sutlej, which might be considered to be in a position not to be attacked by any force which could be brought against it from Central Asia. An army in this position could be attacked only in front; and we need not be apprehensive of such attacks by any numbers which Central Asia can produce, even supported by the Sikhs of the Punjab, if our measures should be effectual in restoring the discipline, subordination, military spirit, and confidence of our native army.

"But I should not perform my duty to my satisfaction, either by you or towards the public, if I did not point out to you an evil, the existence of which has been the cause of much of the disaster which has occurred, and of the existing state of affairs.

"I mean the great military powers with which it has been the practice of all the Governments in India to extend the Political Residents with the several native Powers, and even what are called the Agents of the Governor-General, whether resident within the British territories or beyond the frontier.

"It is reasonable enough that where the Sovereign pays a subsidy to the British Government for the service of a body of British troops stationed within his territory, the diplomatic agent of the British Government should have a control over the operations of the troops, and that these should not be involved in military operations for the service of the subsidising Sovereign without the knowledge and even the requisition of the Resident. But there should be limits to these powers given to Political Agents. They should be required not to make such requisitions without previous conference and concert with the commanding officer of the troops; a perfect knowledge on his part of what it is desired that he should do; his satisfaction that the means at his disposition are sufficient to attain the object in view; and that he will be supported as he ought to be by all the power of the State, civil as well as military, in order to provide for his supplies, for his communications, and the security of his return to his original position with honour.

"These communications between political agents and commanding officers were the common practice in old times. Nay, it is the practice in Europe. When I commanded the Army of Occupation, as it was called, in France, I was in constant, almost daily, correspondence with a conference of diplomatic agents at Paris, who kept me informed of all that passed; and I could receive and act upon no communication of importance from the French

Government excepting through the channel of this conference.

"But the position filled by Sir William Macnaghten was by no means similar to that of the Residents at the Courts of the native States in India which paid subsidies for the service of troops, or to that of the Conference of Ministers at Paris after the Peace of 1815.

"He directed all the operations of the troops, not immediately by communication from himself to the general commanding-in-chief, or to the commanding officer of a detachment from the army, but by order of his inferior political agent or deputy posted with such detachment.

"Thus, when orders were sent from Cabul to General Sale, to march from Jellalabad to Cabul, to support the troops at Cabul, they were not sent by General Elphinstone, commanding the troops at Cabul, to General Sale, commanding the troops at Jellalabad, but by Sir William Macnaghten, the Resident at the Court of Shah Shoojah, to Captain Macgregor, his deputy, with General Sale's division at Jellalabad.

"In the same manner General Nott, who commanded a corps of five thousand men at Candahar. He had with him a political agent, named Rawlinson, employed by Sir William Macnaghten in correspondence with natives of all classes and parties at Herat, in and out of Candahar.

"I have lately had before me, sent from Bombay,

a correspondence between the commanding officer of the troops, General Nott, and this gentleman, in which the latter requires the former to march out of Candahar, and to attack a body of rebels assembling at a place called Dehla, at the distance of some miles from Candahar. This operation must have been preceded by others, to force the Dooranies resident in Candahar to quit the place, or to destroy them if they should refuse. And, after all, the risk of the operation was aggravated by that of the loss of the place. While it should be in the course of being carried on, General Nott stood firm, and did not attend to this requisition.

"But the reason for which I have drawn your attention so particularly to the existing system is, that it is a novelty and an abuse of modern times, arising out of jealousy of the power of military officers. But the consequence of its existence is, that the general and superior officers of the army—who, after all, must command and be responsible for the operations of the troops in action against the enemy —will undertake nothing, be responsible for nothing, except to obey the orders which the political agent or his deputies think proper to give them. A consideration of this state of things will show clearly the cause of the losses in Afghanistan in the last five months of 1841, and particularly of the want of energy and enterprise at Cabul during the period which elapsed from the commencement of the insurrection of the Ghilzies in October 1841 to January 1842.

"In a former letter I pointed out to you the measures which I recommended for your consideration, in case you should find it necessary to carry on operations in the Ava territories, as well as in China, and likewise to hold in readiness a corps of observation in the provinces of Bahar and Benares, in order to provide against any attack by the Nepaulese. These measures referred principally to the state of affairs in the Deccan. I recommended that the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, as well as troops in Mysore, and those in the countries ceded by the Nizam to the East India Company at the commencement of the century, and those in the province of Arcot and in the territories under the Government of Fort St. George, should be put under arms, and collected in the field in readiness to be moved to any quarter in which an inclination should be manifested on the part of any class to take advantage of the difficulties of the moment to oppose in arms the authority of the Government of the East India Company.

"The events referred to in this letter are more likely to make an impression calculated to be followed by consequences injurious to the Government than those at that time in my contemplation. And I earnestly recommend to you to adopt measures which will give to your Government the advantage of appearing to be, and of being, in readiness to maintain the British government and power in India. These, with the other measures recommended in this letter, will all tend to the same object—that of relieving your

Government from the consequences of the impression produced by the recent disasters north of the Indus.

"Your position is an unfortunate one, and it is painful to consider of it. But I think that I have suggested to you the measures best calculated to restore our strength, to secure our position, to acquire the confidence of our subjects, our dependents, and our allies, and particularly of our army, by the re-establishment of its discipline and subordination, the restoration of its military spirit and confidence.

"If you should succeed in these measures you will save the British nation from the ruin and disgrace of the loss of this great empire, and you will acquire throughout the world the reputation and respect which you deserve.

"It is impossible to impress upon you too strongly the notion of the importance of the restoration of our reputation in the East. Our enemies—in France, the United States, and wherever found—are now rejoicing in triumph upon our disasters and degradation. You will teach them that their triumph is premature.

"If anything else should occur to me you shall hear from me.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

"Strathfieldsaye, April 2, 1842.

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"As I have another day, it appears to me that I may as well advert in more detail to the position of

your army towards the Sutlej. My notion would be to place the right of your army at or about Sirhind, occupying with light troops the mountainous range, particularly on the Upper Sutlej, and on your right and your left extending towards or to Ferozepore. You should have posts in front of your army towards the Sutlej at Ranagepole, and other advantageous parts, to enable the general in command to know what is passing on the river in his front.

"This position would be an excellent defensive one, from which you could with facility move on an offensive plan. I would recommend you to add to the equipment of the army pontoons for the formation of a bridge. I see that when the armies were lately on the Sutlej there was a difficulty in procuring boats, particularly for the formation of the bridges at the Island of Bukkur. It might be desirable to pass the river on a defensive plan of operations at short notice; and it would be very desirable to avoid the delay of collecting boats to form a bridge.

"If the protected Sikh States could be organised on a defensive system, they would afford you the assistance of an excellent light cavalry, and some matchlock men, who would be of use.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough,
"Governor-General, Fort William, Bengal."

"London, April 6, 1842, 10 A.M.

"MY DEAR LORD FITZGERALD,

"I received last night the papers in the box which you sent me yesterday evening. I have nothing to add to my letters recently written to Lord Ellenborough.

"The course of his policy, whether or not to maintain a military position, will have been decided long before the despatch of this night can reach him, and the state of the season will have enabled him to withdraw his troops from all the parts still occupied west of the Indus, if he should have determined to withdraw, or to support them adequately if he should have determined to maintain them.

"I am very glad to see such good accounts of the state of the Sikh Government. It must be very desirable to maintain its existence in the Punjab. But this I must say, if we are to maintain our positions in Afghanistan, we ought to have Peshawur, the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad, and the passes between that post and Cabul.

"But I would prefer to leave the Sikhs in possession of their Punjab. If we push to the west at all, it ought to be in the hills towards the sources of the rivers by which the Punjab is watered and defended, that is to say Cashmere.

"I have always entertained this opinion; but I would prefer to leave the Sikhs as they are, and if possible to maintain peace.

"There are some points in these papers upon which it will be desirable that Lord Ellenborough should have the opinion of the Court of Directors, as they contain matters of organisation, and therefore I trouble you upon them.

"One of these is the formation of invalid corps of Sepoys to be employed in garrisons. No European officers are to be employed with these corps. Against this system I protest.

"It is neither more nor less than localising still further the native army. No local army can be trusted, excepting that of the East India Company. The cause of the distinction between that and the other local armies is, that its officers are English gentlemen, each of whom looks to his return to his own country after the period of his service, and his retirement with honour and in comfort. Nobody could trust a native battalion, or even company, excepting detached from a battalion commanded by European officers, in any garrison such as Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Ferozepore.

"Putting out of the question the example and military spirit of the European officer, nobody could trust the native officer in the moment of difficulty or danger, or even crisis.

"Who could trust a Moslem in command at any of the places above-mentioned at this period? A Hindoo native officer would not be obeyed in such critical times by the Sepoys of the Moslem persuasion.

"Another point requiring attention is the reorganisation of the regiments, of which I take officers and men have been destroyed in the late disastrous operations.

"These regiments must be filled up by men; and the officers still alive, whether European or native, should continue to be the officers thereof; each in his rank and with his pretensions. But it must be obvious that no regulation can be carried into execution in a manner and to a degree to occasion an absurdity.

"For instance, an ensign or a lieutenant has been a year in the country, and has, or has not, served one campaign. He is to be placed in this regiment newly formed, with his rank and *pretensions*. These last might bring him to be first for promotion to be a captain, or even to be a captain, and to command possibly the battalion in the absence of the field officers. This must be an absurdity.

"In my opinion the pretension to promotion in these extraordinary times should be founded on at least two years' service present with the regiment. In case such foundation should not exist, I would then submit that advantage should be taken to promote to be captain a lieutenant of another regiment, who should have served, and have been distinguished, and for whom no opportunity of promotion should exist in his own regiment.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"The Right Honourable Lord Fitzgerald and Vesci."

"Allahabad, June 7, 1842.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I cannot say how deeply indebted I am to you for the full communication of your opinion upon the position in which the late reverses in Afghanistan have placed us, and upon the measures to be adopted. I really believe that we have now nothing to fear as regards the spirit of the army. The late successes in Upper Afghanistan have been carefully made known to all the troops and treated as a great victory; and the admirable conduct of the garrison of Jellalabad has been noticed and rewarded in a manner which Sir Robert Sale tells me has gone straight to the heart of good soldiers. The whole army, officers and men, feel that they serve under a Government which can appreciate good service and will always do justice to them. Recruits—very fine recruits—come rapidly in, and we shall soon have an army sufficiently strong for any purpose; that is, when we get back the troops from the Indus; but certainly at present we are much pressed. There is just now a plundering expedition of Bondelas in Rohilcund, which makes it necessary, even at this season, to send regular troops from Banda and Cawnpore to protect Calpee and Hammeerpore. Ruth has been plundered, and they are marching on Koouch—about 1200 strong at Ruth, but probably stronger now.

"I think it will be necessary to have, as soon as

the rains are over, a movable camp in Bundelcund, which would first be formed at Jhansi, near which, at Tehree, there has been for some time a very unnecessary assemblage of a body of 10,000 or 12,000 armed men on the occasion of a disputed guardianship to a young rajah. Two regular regiments of infantry and a regiment of irregular cavalry, added to the Bundelcund legion (1500 strong), and Scindiah's contingent of nearly the same force, would be sufficient for this purpose.

"There have been disturbances for a considerable time in the northern part of the Nizam's dominions, and there is a disposition to revive Pindaree habits along the Nerbudda. I shall therefore bring together, after the rains, a movable force upon the Taptee and Nerbudda, and I at present think of placing it under the command of General Charles Napier.

"I have written to the Commander-in-Chief requesting him to suggest the details of these arrangements.

"I have, after communicating with the Commander-in-Chief, issued an order for the assembling of an army of reserve in the division of Sirhind (that is, either at Kurnaul or Ferozepore) in November. It will consist of twelve regiments of infantry, of which four will be European, of five regiments of regular cavalry (including the 16th Lancers), and of two regiments of irregular cavalry. There will be four troops of horse artillery and three batteries

of foot artillery. The total force will be 15,000 men.

"I trust that these measures will render unnecessary the formation of any movable camp on the Nepaul frontier; but possibly this may be required too.

"I go into camp on the 15th of October at Cawnpore. I shall join the army of reserve in December, and have an interview probably with the Lahore chief.

"On the side of Afghanistan General England passed the Kojuk range without difficulty, having easily, with 2500 men, overcome the same resistance by which he was before repulsed. I think it probable that the enemy had collected all his strength against Kelat-i-Ghilzie, while a brigade of Major-General Nott's was assisting General England's march over the Kojuk Pass. I regret to say that in Major-General Nott I do not entertain the smallest confidence as an officer. He is a brave man; but his own troops do not respect him as a general. There is such a real madness in some military men, and in all political men, with respect to Afghanistan, that I am convinced every pretext will be sought to remain there, without an attainable object as regards the army at Candahar, without adequate means of movement, and without communication.

"Every possible effort is making to procure camels below the Passes, and I think that by the beginning of the cold weather this army will be able to

move as a tolerably well equipped army to Quetta, and thence to the Indus.

"Major-General Pollock's army is yet more destitute of the means of movement than that of Major-General Nott's. The camels (2400) were hired only to Jellalabad. Some drivers would not go beyond Peshawur. Of the Government camels (1600) many have been stolen and lost. There is a difficulty there, too, arising out of the season, not insurmountable however. A greater difficulty exists in the influence of the political agents, the men anxious for revenge, and the others naturally clinging to the hope of relieving the prisoners. All these, since his arrival at Jellalabad, have got round Major-General Pollock; have led him to misunderstand the plainest instructions, to miscalculate the value of objects, and to act upon the passion of others, not upon his own reason.

"He, too, will hardly now move before October.

"At Cabul, Mohammed Akbar is about to get possession of the Bala-Hissar, and the Thalis money and our guns, unless indeed some gallant Arabs who are there should succeed in beating him; but they can hardly hold out long.

"As there is now no Government in Afghanistan capable of executing the Tripartite Treaty, and as the object of that treaty is now obviously unattainable, I have directed Mr. Clerk to propose to the Government of Lahore that the Tripartite Treaty should be declared to be at an end; all such articles

of it being however revived as stipulate the recognition of certain territories as belonging to Lahore, and as declare the independence of the Ameers of Scinde of the future kings of Cabul; I have added a provision that Lahore shall not recognise any new King of Cabul who shall not have been previously recognised by the British Government.

"I have not heard—indeed I could not yet have heard—how this proposition has been received.

"I have already, as you are aware, said what I could to dissuade the Sikhs (or rather Dhian Singh and Gholab Singh, the Jumnoo Rajahs) from their wild views of conquest beyond the Himalayas. They appear to have been anticipated and beaten there, which will teach them reason better than I could. I have at the same time not discouraged another folly of theirs—that of advancing their frontier towards Cabul. I have not objected to their moving forward on the left bank of the Cabul River, and I have acquiesced in their wish to occupy Jellalabad when we leave it. If they accede to this arrangement, and endeavour to carry it out, we shall have placed an irreconcilable enemy to the Afghans between them and us, and hold that enemy to the Afghans, occupied as he must be in defending himself against them, in entire subjection to us by our position upon the Sutlej, within a few marches of Umritsir and Lahore. Such I wish to make our position on our North-Western frontier. I have written for more information than I have as to the

Island of Bukkur and the town of Sukkur. That town of Sukkur must be our *tête-du-pont* upon the right bank of the Indus and the island a citadel. I have asked the Court to send me six more steamers for the Indus. I have ordered round to the Indus the two in the Euphrates, and there are now, I think, two, if not three, there, with from seven to ten iron steamers. I can command the river from its mouth to Ferozepore. I do not intend to give up Kurachee. Thus I shall be able to throw troops from Bombay upon the right bank of the Indus, and Kurachee being our port, I hope the day will come when our iron steamers from that place will take officers arriving from Aden and Suez up at once to the Sutlej.

"Immediately on the receipt of your letter of the 30th of March I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the engineer officer, as to Delhi and Agra. I transmit their replies, which I only received to-day. I shall, as privately as I can, manage that such measures as can be taken shall be adopted for the security of the magazine at Delhi. The transfer of the palace, which the Commander-in-Chief calls the citadel, has always been with me a very great object. It is now become much greater than it was; but I cannot venture to entrust the Lieut.-Governor and his manager at Delhi, Mr. Metcalfe, with the negotiation of so very delicate a matter, and I must postpone the affair till I am there myself in the beginning of November, when I can manage to have 5000

troops. I think it must be done; but we must pay for it.

"Allahabad is in a very good state. There is an extensive magazine of stores in it. I do not think the powder magazine very safe however.

"I am going to give something of military dress and discipline to the police, and to make it as good as our English police, or as the Irish rather. This will alleviate the escort duties of the army, and make it possible too to put down plunderers before they assume the magnitude of corps of Pindarees. The number of the police is very great; they are hardly less numerous than the army. They have done very well even without organization and discipline.

"I am in great hopes of seeing Hardinge here soon, and then I can make over military matters to one who understands them.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"To His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Allahabad, July 6, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"As I hear that some of my packets of letters sent by the last overland mail reached Bombay in a mutilated state, I send you a copy of my last letter. I send you likewise two plans of the fortress and cantonment, and of the magazine and presidency, at

Delhi, with reference to the memorandum upon that subject, which I sent by the last mail.

"On consideration, I think that anything to be done there should be deferred till after the return of the armies; and before then I can receive the intimation of your opinion.

"You will see, on referring to my letter to Major-General Pollock, of the 1st of June, that, finding he could not return before October, I told him he should not be quite inactive in the meantime, but make his force felt. He sent a strong brigade against Pish Bolah, on the 17th, accordingly; and when that returns, he will, I think, go on to Gundamuk. He has 14,000 effective men; but his carriage is no more than sufficient for half his force. There is such a terror amongst the camel-drivers, that they run off with the camels; 319 out of 350 ran away the other day from Attok. I send you a copy of a letter from Captain Abbott, who commanded the artillery at the blockade of Jellalabad. He gives a bad picture of the state of the army. I am doing all I possibly can to send on to it camels and mules; but I cannot make a general, and it wants that more than anything else. Had he had any real energy, he would not have allowed the camels he took with him to be sent back. If he had any real mind, he would not be in the hands of the boys about him.

"Mahomed Akbar has got into the Bala-Hissar; but Futteh Jung is there still, with some Hindostanee troops. Mahomed Akbar calls him Shah, and is to

be vizier over him; but Mahomed Zemaun calls himself Shah, too, and has a party and some troops, and there may be a fight yet between them; but just as probable another murder.

"Had Major-General Pollock advanced half or a third of his force to Gundamuk, he might have saved the Bala-Hissar and made the contest at Cabul last much longer.

"General Nott, at Candahar, has been reinforced by 3000 camels since he received 2000 with Major-General England's brigade in the beginning of May. I think he must now have 7000 camels, and I should judge that he had about 10,000 effective men; but he has sent no return. A brigade under Colonel Wymer lately relieved the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzie and destroyed the works there; and while it was away General Nott, with 1600 men, thoroughly beat 6000 or 8000 Afghans, who had taken up a position near Candahar. General Nott has thoroughly established amongst his troops the feeling of superiority. His enemy is disheartened, and his army very fine and in high spirits; under all these new circumstances, I have thought it right to place in General Nott's hands the decision whether he shall retire by Quetta and Sukkur or by Ghuzni and Cabul. You will see by my letter, which is enclosed, that I have placed before him all the dangers of a march by Ghuzni, and the certain and easy retirement of his army by Quetta. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that all we desire would be

effected by the success of a march by Ghuzni and Cabul; and that the two armies would be disheartened, and our enemies everywhere encouraged by their quick retreat. The case is one in which, at this distance, I could not direct an advance, but, at the same time, I should hardly be justified in continuing to prohibit it. It is entirely a question of commissariat.

"If General Nott should move towards Ghuzni, General C. Napier will be sent to Scinde to take the command there, and bring all the troops down to Sukkur. I have had copies made of the letters for you.

"I forgot to mention that General Pollock has got the 4500 Sikhs to cross to the left bank of the Cabul river, opposite Jellalabad, so there is no collision, and his road to the river is clear. General Pollock has five companies and three guns at Ali Musjid, besides irregulars, and a regiment and five companies at Dakha, with five guns and 100 irregular cavalry; and he can place a regiment at Lundi Khana. The Sikhs he is advising to build towers at certain places, and to place a corps in one of the valleys opening into the pass.

"My idea is that, after providing for the perfect security of his communications, General Pollock could move 6000 men to Cabul, to give a hand to General Nott, who would arrive with a force of the same amount.

"I have, I hope, at least given some zeal and

energy to the commissariat; and I believe all will be done to complete General Pollock's equipment, and to lay in supplies from Jellalabad to Ali Musjid for 22,000 men, which will be the amount of the united forces of Generals Nott and Pollock.

"The Rajah of Nepaul has amply apologised for his unbecoming conduct to the Resident, and I have received his messenger with presents. All my plans as regards troops for Bundelcund and the Saugor district remain as they were. The troubles in both those districts are now at an end, and the ablest and most energetic man we have, Major Sleeman, who has put down the Thugs, is in the middle of Bundelcund. On the Taptee we have got possession of the persons of the two leaders, the pretended Appa Sahib and another.

"There ought to be by this day a whole regiment in Asseerghur, with three months' provisions, and the means of moving 400 men; and I do not think it will be now necessary to have more than an additional regiment of infantry and half a regiment of cavalry in that vicinity; but wherever we have been bearded we should appear in force.

"Everything has hitherto favoured the expedition to China. The Queen's troops left Singapore on the 17th and 19th of May. All the Indian troops, except 450, had gone on before. These, with all the followers, &c., had left the port by the 28th; one only, the last, sailed on the 5th of June. Six steamers and ten men-of-war passed through the Straits, for China,

between the 1st of April and the 28th of May. Sir Hugh Gough was to go to destroy the works at Chapoo on the 1st of May, and thence to the Yangtse-kiang, where he hoped to have got the Golden Island, and even Nankin, before the arrival of the reinforcements. But he did not know how early they would be there; and I do hope some of the native troops will be engaged there. He had left orders for detaining the largest number of the recruits at Hong Kong, and would therefore only have the 98th, in addition to his British force; the 98th will hardly have reached Chusan before the 1st of July, nor could the troops reach the Peiho so as to be on shore before the 12th of August, and they could not safely remain after the middle of September; and this the emperor would well know. As the Chinese have collected a great army at Hang-chow-foo, nothing will be more convenient than the occupation of the Golden Islands and the river which cuts them off from Pekin. Sir Hugh Gough has got thirty Chinese ponies, which draw light guns beautifully. Thirty horses went from Madras.

"I have instituted a finance committee, which frightens people very much, and will do good thereby, as well as by its reductions.

"I should be very much obliged to you if you would consider the question as to the rate of exchange in the conversion of British currency into rupees, brought forward by the Adjutant-General Queen's troops. I hope some decision has been

come to, under your advice, with respect to the open questions in the Madras army.

"I have desired that amongst other papers may be put up for you my letter of the 14th of May, to the Commander-in-Chief, about the formation of an army of reserve. I thought it had been sent before.

"Believe me, ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, May 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"The overland mail will be despatched in the usual course; but we have no information here of the state of affairs whether in China or in the north-west of the East India Company's dominions to enable me to write you even a line which can be of any use to you.

"You will learn that reinforcements in Queen's regiments are going out to you as fast as possible.

"You will see that we are getting on well in Parliament. The Corn Bill has become a law. The Income-Tax Bill, at least its important clauses, have been passed through the Committee of the House of Commons, and it is certain that the Bill itself will pass.

"People are becoming more quiet about the Tariff. We hear that Lord Ashburton had arrived

at Washington; but there is no account from him. "Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough,
"Fort William, Bengal."

MEMORANDUM ON THE "BATTA" QUESTION.

May 25, 1842.

"I have perused these papers regarding the batta question at Fort St. George.

"It appears that the Governor-General in Council at Fort William gave orders, in the year 1835, that the troops at Fort St. George should be deprived of this allowance at certain stations. Since which period—seven years—the dissatisfaction of the troops with this decision has frequently been manifested, and the orders respecting it have been altered more than a dozen times.

"When the Sepoys on the establishment of Fort St. George march they take with them their families, or they leave their families behind them each with a family certificate. The expense of either mode of proceeding is about the same; and the Sepoy who has to move his family has to hire means of transport for them, to feed them at greater expense in the field than in garrison or cantonments within the provinces; or, leaving them behind, has to provide the means of defraying the charge on the family certificate, and requires the batta in order to enable him to pay the expense.

"As long as he is marching, the regulations have allowed him the batta.

"It is equally allowed when halted at Hyderabad, and certain other places, but not in all. For instance, a detachment marches from Hyderabad to Sholapore, equally in the Nizam's dominions: while at Hyderabad, and on the march, the Sepoy has the batta—once arrived at Sholapore, it is stopped.

"I'll suppose that he leaves his family behind him at Hyderabad; he equally requires the batta to support the family at the increased rate of expense while engaged in operations, or left behind, to be provided for in separation from him in the cantonment at Hyderabad.

"It is not astonishing that a regulation so capricious in its operation and effects should excite dissatisfaction and even resistance, and that authority should more than ten times have found itself under the necessity of making concession and of altering the regulation.

"There is nothing which soldiers, particularly the natives of India, bear so unwillingly as injustice, or those hasty and changeable decisions regarding their pay which have the appearance thereof. I'll suppose the case of a Sepoy stationed at Hyderabad marched to Sholapore, and having left his family with a certificate in the provinces. As long as he is at Hyderabad, or on march to Sholapore, he receives batta. But arrived at Sholapore, and employed on the service there, he loses it. But he still has to provide for the

charge of the certificate of the family left in the provinces.

"Then it appears as if it was intended to render this batta affair still more likely to create dissatisfaction by mixing it up with another, the nature of which must create dissatisfaction and disturbance in every detached body of troops.

"The circulating coin throughout India is probably a more intricate subject of discussion there than it is in any other part of the world.

"The pay of the troops is calculated in rupees (a silver coin) under the Governments of Fort William and Bombay; in pagodas (a gold coin) under the Government of Fort St. George. But this gold coin is converted into rupees—a silver coin—at a certain rate. But as the exercise of the right of coinage is not limited to the British Government, whether in gold or silver, the troops can scarcely move from province to province without finding coins in circulation of an intrinsic value different from that of the coin of the same denomination issued by the British Government, in which their pay is calculated.

"The practice is prevalent throughout the East, not particularly in India, of carrying on all transactions of buying and selling by the aid of money-changers, sitting in the common bazaar, even in camps, with their heaps of money before them. These prevent and remedy the inconvenience of the circulation of a variety of coins of the same denomination but of different intrinsic value—of course, to

their own profit and advantage, but to the loss of the troops, who can purchase nothing without the intervention of the money-changer. These persons act as a combination. Accordingly, when the troops are paid in gold, silver becomes more difficult to be obtained, and dear in the bazaar. They acquire profit, likewise, by the adjustment of the values of the different descriptions of rupees, or other coin in circulation, and always by the variation in the relative value of each with others, to the loss and great annoyance of the troops.

"In some of the countries in which the troops are stationed, rupees are coined of the same denomination, but of inferior intrinsic value to the rupees coined at Fort William, Bombay, and Fort St. George, in which the pay of the Sepoys is calculated and issued when at the Presidencies. The paymaster at Hyderabad receives these bad rupees into his treasury, and issues them to the troops; and the Government, having calculated the difference of value of these bad rupees, at ten per cent.—upon what datum does not appear—give to the Sepoy ten per cent. in addition to his pay, calculated in Company's rupees, and consider that they have, by that allowance, given him compensation for the loss of batta.

"In fairness, the first question upon this transaction would be,—What is the difference in intrinsic value between the Hyderabad rupee and that coined by the East India Company? That difference ought to be clearly made known to the troops, and paid to them.

Even then they are liable to the inconvenience of receiving their money in a base coin, and of defraying the charges thereupon of the money-changers in all their transactions in the bazaar.

"But it is too much to add to this inconvenience and loss the further loss of the deprivation of their batta, leaving them liable to the charge of the family certificate. It is impossible that they should be made to understand the relation between this compensation for a loss sustained by being paid in a base coin and the deprivation of their batta. The union of these questions was calculated to occasion, and to increase, dissatisfaction.

"I have stated what I recollect and know of the necessity of batta for the troops, the Sepoys, serving under the Government of Fort St. George.

"I am not so certain of the necessity for the same allowance for those serving under the Governments of Fort William and Bombay.

"When I was in the field, the troops of Bombay, at least, did not serve at such long distances from the Presidency as those under the Government of Fort St. George. If they did, they were not stationary—they were on march, and received batta according to all, even the modern, regulations. The Bombay troops served in Guzerat, but they were transported to Surat, or elsewhere on the coast, by sea. The rivers gave them water communication with the port of disembarkation.

"The troops under the Presidency of Fort William

had the advantage of water communication by the Ganges and Jumna; and when they came to march, they received batta.

"I can understand that such allowance might not be required by them when stationary, while such might be required by the troops under the Government of Fort St. George.

"Of this I am certain, that nothing can be so unwise as to establish regulations for the issue of rates of pay and allowances to troops, of which alterations become necessary not less than a dozen times in seven years.

"I do not advert to those papers in the box which refer to measures to be taken by the Government in consequence of the misconduct of the troops upon this occasion. Wherever the leaders of mutiny, insubordination, and resistance to orders can be discovered, they should be tried and punished. Large bodies, such as a whole or half a regiment or battalion, could be punished individually. The regiment or battalion should be disbanded, with as much of disgrace as may be possible, and the men sent about their business, or placed to serve in other regiments, according as it may be desirable to them or not to continue in the service.

"To add to the disgrace, it might be desirable to erase from the list of regiments of the army, the number or title of the offending regiment, such as that of the 4th Regiment of Cavalry—a regiment eminently distinguished for its conduct

in my time and before it, and under my command. This would be a sad disgrace—so important that I only throw out this idea for consideration."

"London, June 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"It is reported that there are accounts in London of the arrival at Marseilles of an Indian mail. But the Government know nothing; nor can I hear of any positive intelligence.

"Since I wrote to you last I have perused all the papers which I could get on the batta question at Fort St. George, and I wrote a memorandum on the subject some days ago, which I gave to Lord Fitzgerald, a copy of which he promised to send to you. As it appeared to me to be necessary that the Court of Directors should send for directions for any alterations or authority to deal with the subject as you might think proper, I thought this the best mode of proceeding. Lord Fitzgerald will, of course, have communicated with the governing committee of the Directors, will have shown them my paper, and will have advised the course which he may have thought it expedient that you should follow; and will have taken care that you should be instructed and authorised accordingly.

"You might have been involved in difficulties if I had sent direct to you the memorandum.

"There is nothing new. We have in the House

of Lords the Property Tax Bill, which will be read a second time on July 10th. Matters are in an unpleasant state in France. The animosity against the very name of England appears to increase daily. There is a prospect of Lord Ashburton's settling our American questions. But Jonathan is looking to France and French alliance; and, strange to say, France looking to Jonathan. Each is endeavouring to beat the other upon the question of search. Upon which, in reality, we have no question with either.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General,
"Fort William, Bengal, East Indies.

"London, July 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I am under the necessity of going to Cambridge, and I can write to you only on receipt of the accounts from India received by the French telegraph. They are nearly exactly as I expected. Sale and Pollock are safely united at Jellalabad, and General England and Colonel Nott at Candahâr.

"I had always suspected that Ghuzni was still safe. I never believed that a garrison snowed up could be in want of water, or that Sepoys could be defeated by Glázis, the former having ammunition, and muskets and bayonets in thousands, and moreover supplied with provisions.

"If the corps of Pollock and England at Jellala-

bad and Candahar are at all equipped for movement and supplied, as all armies ought to be, you will have had an opportunity of carrying off your garrison which had not surrendered, and you will thus have the honour of making a triumphant evacuation of Afghanistan. This may be a transient dream, but I cannot lose the hope of its reality.

"We are going on well here. We shall pass the Tariff Bill in the House of Lords, I hope, without much difficulty. There will remain in both Houses the Poor Law, which some appear to despair of. But I hope that there is a sufficiency of good sense in both Houses to enable us to pass it."

"Ever, my dear Lord Ellenborough,

"Yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"P.S.—I will write again if I should see the despatches from India before the overland will be despatched."

"London, July 6, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I returned from Cambridge yesterday morning; received your letter and enclosures, and I have since seen your despatch at the Secret Committee, and I heard, as well as I could, some of its enclosures read to the Cabinet by Sir Robert Peel. I heard yesterday that the overland despatch was detained till this day, and I write you a line. When I wrote you I

thought it possible that Ghuzni might not have fallen. I see now that it has.

"It is obvious to me that your armies are not equipped with means of movement and supplied in a manner to be enabled to carry on any active operations. At all events, I confess that, Ghuzni being lost, Kelat-i-Ghilzie is, I believe, evacuated, and Quetta safe, and in a state to be evacuated, and the garrison safe at any moment, we have nothing of moment to look after.

"It appears that you do not intend to exercise any influence over the choice of the future Government of Afghanistan, the persons who are to exercise its powers, or the details of their management. There remains, then, but one reason for which any man could wish that any forces of ours should remain on the right of the Indus one moment longer than suits their own convenience, and that is the influence which their presence must give the general, or whoever should be charged with the negotiations, or other measures, adopted for the release or exchange of the prisoners. This appears to me now to be the only reason for leaving a British soldier in Afghanistan.

"I think that your instructions to General Pollock, in respect of the exchange or release of the prisoners, are quite correct and judicious. You have left the whole affair to the general, and in case he should agree to a general exchange of all for all, you have agreed to give up all. But if it is to be a special

exchange, you have desired that Dost Mahommed Khan, and I should add his family, might not be given up without your consent.

"You have likewise declined to give your consent to pass Russian individuals. All this is quite right; and I entertain no doubt that Lord Fitzgerald will write you the approbation of the Cabinet of all that you will have reported to the Secret Committee, and their intention of supporting any measures you may adopt in future.

"Great interest is felt in this country for the fate of these prisoners, particularly for the ladies; and I would incur some risk and some expense to save them, if any such prospect or opportunity should offer. But it must never be lost sight of, that even a successful operation—an attack upon the point of succeeding even upon the castle in which they may be in confinement, the surrounding the village or town in which they should be residing, supposing them to be in such locality—would not of necessity give you possession of their persons. On the contrary, such a course might compel those who keep them as prisoners immediately to put them to death. In the course of my life I have witnessed scenes of this description, and I would not recommend an operation of this kind in order to obtain possession of the persons of the prisoners. But it does not follow that because the army in Afghanistan ought not to undertake any active operation with a view to obtain possession of the persons of

the prisoners, its presence in the country may not produce a moral effect and greatly influence the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners and the surrender of the British prisoners by our general. And I must say that, Ghuzni being lost, you will quit Afghanistan with honour if you can bring away the prisoners. But, on the other hand, there must be limits to the expense and risk of such an operation.

"The right of your army under General Pollock must not be exposed to the consequences of passing another winter beyond the Khyber Pass nor the left beyond the Bolan Pass, particularly after the latter will have given up Candahar, Quetta, &c. This is all that occurs to me on your position and operations. But of course, Lord Fitzgerald will give you the opinion of the Government upon these points, upon which I write you only my own.

"I have perused with concern the accounts of the want of means of conveyance in your armies. It is a complaint common to all armies, particularly in the East. These means are elephants, camels, horses, mules, and bullocks, the three last, and even camels will draw, as well as carry on their backs. Sir Hugh Gough had a brigade of 9-pounders drawn by camels in his army, of whose performances I have a report.

"They are to be procured by hire and contract, in which case the driver must be in the service of the public, trained and organised in a department. All this is matter of local arrangement; so much so, that

what answers in Bengal will not suit the Deccan, and *vice versâ*. But active and intelligent heads of departments, men who will do justice by all, are necessary, one at least for this department in each of your armies.

"I will add no more to this long letter. Indeed, I have no time, as I am obliged to go to the Court to inquire into another feat of a fellow who shot at the Queen on Sunday last. Luckily the pistol missed fire. "Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"The Lord Ellenborough."

"Allahabad, August 16, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I am very much gratified by your general approval of the instructions, military and political, which I had given to Generals Pollock and Nott to the 17th of May. I am less confident of your approving of the option of retiring upon General Pollock by Ghuzni and Cabul, which I gave to General Nott on the 4th ult. I do not yet know whether he will avail himself of it; but he received my letter on the 22nd ult., and I may hear from him again before the mail leaves Allahabad to-morrow. You will be glad to hear that on the 28th ult. 500 camels, all that General Nott required in addition to those he had, were sent up to him from Quetta, in consequence of orders which, to save time, I sent

from hence on the 6th ult, and I likewise took the precaution of ordering up to him all the treasure at Quetta—five or six lacs.

"On the other side, the efforts made to procure camels, bullocks, and mules for General Pollock have been successful. The main difficulty is to find men to drive them beyond the Sutlej. On the 2nd inst. 3000 mules and 500 ponies were on their march to Ferozepore, and 1400 more mules would follow in ten days. General Pollock depended upon being able to have 6000 bullocks at Peshawur. He wanted that number, and all the camels said to be *wanting* were on march, from Sukkur, on the Punjab or our Sikh provinces, on the 2nd, so I trust that army will be perfectly movable before the 1st of October.

"I have told the commissary-general that the thing *must* be done. I have sent him up to Ferozepore himself from Calcutta. I have placed in communication with him General Baltine, a very active officer commanding at Ferozepore, and Mr. Clerk, the agent of the Governor-General on the frontier, a very able man of great influence amongst the Sikhs. I have sent on fifteen or twenty lacs more of treasure to Peshawur, so that there will be money enough.

"You will be glad to hear that the Jellalabad force has three months' supply of otta and wheat, and about a month's supply of everything else; but the commissary there relies upon being able to complete the order I have given for providing supplies

for 7500 men more than General Pollock now has, without drawing on Peshawur, and Peshawur is itself fully supplied.

"General Pollock has 14,000 effectives, besides 2000 irregulars, and, after providing for the Khyber and Jellalabad, he will be able to move with 10,000 men, and probably reach Cabul with 7000, where General Nott will join him, probably with nearly as many.

"I send you enclosed a copy of the instructions to General Pollock. You will see that the principle is the same upon which I have acted from the first.

"If he acts according to his instructions, the army will be safe; but there are many foolish, hair-brained young men with him, who may again mislead him. I gave one of them (Macgregor) a strong hint that orders were to be obeyed, not misinterpreted and evaded, by depriving him of the political appointment he held.

"My expectation is that we shall get back guns and prisoners, and withdraw the armies after having shown ourselves in triumph at Ghuzni and Cabul; but I may be too sanguine. General Pollock is now in negotiation about the exchange of prisoners, but it will come to nothing without a forward movement. He will probably be to-day at Futtehabad, fifteen miles in advance of Jellalabad.

"If General Nott moves, I think he will move to-day.

"We have much fears for the harvest above Allyghur—a drought might oblige me to countermand the assembling of the army of reserve. The state of affairs in the Punjab is so uncertain that I should be sorry not to have that army at Ferozepore until the operations in Afghanistan are completed.

"Mr. Clerk, the agent on the North-West frontier, evidently thinks the Maharajah will not be able to hold his ground long.

"I could not consent to the amendments the Maharajah proposed to make in the declaration treaty of four articles I proposed to him. He rather fears taking Jellalabad when we retire, unless we will engage to support him there, which is out of the question, and he declines binding himself not to recognise any sovereign of Cabul whom we may not have previously recognised; so I have told Mr. Clerk I will not give up Jellalabad to the Maharajah in its present state, if he does not agree to this last condition, and I have further told him not to press the matter on the Sikhs. I agreed to it at their desire, when there was no hope of having anything like a united government at Cabul. It is a measure of such unmitigated hostility as to be irreconcilable with any terms of peace with the Afghan people; and as we now stand we had better be free to take our own course.

"Things look better in India. The one regiment I now have in Asseerghur will, in connection with

the Ellechpore division of the Nizam's army, be enough now to preserve tranquillity in Berar.

"Saugor and Bundelcund will be reinforced; the first by a regiment of native infantry and one of cavalry and three guns from Nagpore (where the troops taken away will be supplied from Madras) and half a regiment of irregular cavalry.

"Bundelcund will have two regiments of infantry and one of irregular cavalry besides guns, in addition to its usual force; but I have now an active, able, and judicious political officer, Major Sleeman, the same who has suppressed Thuggee, and I rely upon his measures as much as upon his strength.

"I endeavour to keep things quiet everywhere till the operations in Afghanistan are finished, and I hope I may succeed.

"I go towards Simlah on the 20th, to see Mr. Clerk, who is retiring from ill health. I want to gain from him a perfect knowledge of the Sikhs. He is all-powerful amongst them. There too I shall meet the Commander-in-Chief.

"I pass three days at each of the stations of Cawnpore, Meerut, and Kurnaul, and I ought to be at Simlah by the 10th of September.

"I at present intend joining the army towards the end of November. I cannot say more than it deserves of the army—I am charmed with it. In November it will be very strong. Every regiment complete with selected recruits. The Queen's regiments are arriving rapidly and in fine order.

"All *seems* to look well at present except the harvest; but the price of grain is still unaffected.

"Believe me, ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Allahabad, August 17, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I have heard from General Nott. He resolves to retire a portion of his army by the route of Ghuzni and Cabul, and calculates upon reaching Jellalabad by the first week in October.

"He takes with him the 40th Queen's, four Bengal regiments, and the late Shah's regiment, which was in Kelat-i-Ghilzie, about 4500 or 5000 excellent infantry. He will have 800 or 1000 cavalry, and two troops of horse artillery, and one 9-pounder foot battery.

"He would willingly have taken with him Her Majesty's 41st; but he is obliged to send this regiment with Major-General England, and the Bombay troops and the remainder of the late Shah's troops, which retire upon Quetta, as Major-General England has so unfortunate a want of confidence in native troops.

"By my previous arrangement Sir C. Napier immediately proceeds to Sukkur to take the command of the army below the Passes.

"Major-General Nott writes with a full sense of

the difficulties before him; but he thinks them worth incurring for the advantages to be derived from a successful march, and he looks at the whole measure with a grave and prudent resolution, which affords the best omen.

"By withdrawing Major-General England, the second in command becomes a good officer, Lieut.-Colonel Wymer, and the third is Lieut.-Colonel Stacy, who, I am told, is likewise a good officer,

"Believe me, ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Simlah, September 16, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"The operation of the armies has had a prosperous beginning—Major-General England having reached Quetta on the 26th of August, with an immense convoy, having lost only ten men on the march.

"He left Candahar with about 3500 men (including 300 cavalry) and 13 guns, on the 7th; reached the foot of the Kojuk Pass, after a march of 24 miles, on the morning of the 16th; found the heights unoccupied, and immediately pushed forward two battalions to take possession of them; in this he succeeded, and by the evening of the 18th he had passed the mountains, the enemy coming in from all sides, but too late. He had with him all the invalids

and useless followers of the army, and Prince Timour, with all persons quitting Candahar from fear, and altogether there were from 9000 to 10,000 animals with his column.

"He intends to move his force, which, after gathering to it the troops at Killa Abdoola and Quetta, must amount to about 6000 men, in three divisions, to Dadur—the first moves on the 16th instant and the last on the 2nd of October. The Major-General will accompany the last.

"I think there must be 500 or 600 irregular horse in the Bolan Pass, under Lieutenant Jacob, and I have no apprehension that the column will suffer any material loss in their descent.

"Sir C. Napier will have sailed for Kurachee in the first week of this month, with 200 of the 28th Queen's, the rest of the regiment follows. Sir Maurice O'Connell, hearing of the Cabul disasters, engaged the Governor of Sydney to allow this regiment to proceed to Bombay without waiting for the arrival of the whole of the 99th, which was to relieve it, and it arrived most unexpectedly the other day.

"As the columns descending into Scinde have no European troops with them, Sir C. Napier will take on to Sukkur the remainder of the 22nd Queen's, now at Kurachee; and as the cavalry in Scinde is weak and indifferent, I despatch from Ferozepore the 9th light cavalry as soon as the roads are passable. These measures will, I have no doubt, prevent any

hostile *acts* on the part of the Ameers of Hyderabad —that they have been entertaining hostile intentions there can be but little doubt.

"Major-General Nott moved out of Candahar on the 10th of August, with six regiments of native infantry—excellent troops—and the 40th and 41st Queen's, about 1000 cavalry—not very good—and, I think, two batteries of horse artillery, one of 9-pounders and four 18-pounders. He had not originally intended to take the 18-pounders; and the letter in which he must have informed me that he had changed his intention upon that point has not reached me. I have no reason to doubt that he has the 18-pounders with him.

"His calculation was that, allowing for a halt at Ghuzni, he should reach Cabul between the 15th and 20th of September. He was to take with him forty days' provisions. It is impossible to have a finer corps of infantry than that he has with him. The two Queen's regiments are full 1200 strong, and the native troops must make the whole force of infantry 6000 men.

"On the side of General Pollock there has been a successful chapow in the Himmarnie Valley, and a smart attack by his advanced guard upon the enemy in position at Mamoo Khail, near Gundamuk.

"The three brigades intended to move upon Cabul, Tulloch's, Sale's, and Monteith's, including the 9th, 13th, and 31st Queen's, and the 3rd Dragoons, with the sappers and miners under Broadfoot, some

irregulars, and altogether about 2000 cavalry, would have been assembled at Gundámuk on the 4th, and were to advance on the 5th or 6th to Cabul.

"General Pollock only knew of General Nott's intention to move—he had not heard from him since July last. On the 1st of this month Prince Futteh Jung, having escaped from Mahommed Akbar, joined General Pollock's camp, and moves with him upon Cabul, much as Louis XVIII. did with you, or, rather, *after* you, upon Paris, in 1815; but I reserve myself altogether as to the acknowledgment of a King of Cabul, and have desired Futteh Jung may be informed that I consider the death of Shah Shoojah, and the events which have occurred, to have practically abrogated the Tripartite Treaty.

"I can hardly expect to hear what has taken place at Ghuzni before the mail leaves this place. The bazaar reports are that it is ours. I have requested Lieutenant Fitzgerald to communicate to you copies of all my letters connected with this operation in Afghanistan.

"The efforts which have been made for furnishing General Pollock's army with carriage have really been great. In the ten weeks ending on the 8th of this month there have been purchased,—

Camels	7653
Mules and Ponies	5026
	12,679

and there have been hired,—

Camels	1000
Bullocks	1565
	14,934

and a larger number of bullocks will be hired, I hope, at Peshawur. I understood then 2000 had been so, which would make an addition of 1500 to the numbers above mentioned, and raise the total number of animals obtained in ten weeks to 16,400.

"I have however, again employed the same machinery for the purchase of mules in our provinces, and every mule fit for service will be procured for the use of the armies on their return.

"In addition to the 9500 animals which descended the Kojuk Pass, there are, I believe, 5000 camels in Scinde, and General Nott had ample means of movement for his force.

"You see, therefore, that great efforts have been made, and you will be satisfied that, before such efforts were made, to move these armies was impossible. I found them in an almost destitute and desperate condition.

"General Pollock carries with him 10 lacs. I have sent him 20 lacs more. General Nott has, I think, 10 lacs, but he did not receive all the treasure he should have had. There are nearly 10 lacs in the treasury at Sukkur, for the use of the troops coming down.

"I am hard pressed for money to meet current expenses during the next three months. but we shall

just keep the Treasury solvent. I have got the King of Oude to lend 10 lacs more; 20 lacs are coming up from Calcutta, and 20 lacs have been sent for from Madras.

"All my minor arrangements are complete. I shall have, in addition to the ordinary garrisons, a movable force of three regiments of native infantry and one of irregular cavalry, with a small battering train in Bundelcund.

"Saugor will be reinforced by a regiment of native infantry and one of cavalry, with three guns, and I have already sent thither half a regiment of irregular cavalry.

"Kamptee will, in addition to the usual force there, have restored it a regiment of European infantry—the Queen's 4th.

"Asseerghur has a whole regiment, with three months' provisions, and the means of moving 400 men.

"I have asked the Council to send up one of the newly-arrived Queen's regiments to Ghazipore; having another at Dinapore, and three native regiments, and the means of drawing a regiment of cavalry from Benares, and two or three native regiments from other places, I can make head against the Nepaulese defensively, should they move, but I have no expectation that they will.

"For Moulmein there are two Queen's regiments and three native regiments. The 'Siren' sloop and three steamers are ample force, but I have not much

apprehension that anything will occur there, although the King of Ava is said to be coming down to Rangoon without his wives, under the pretence of casting a bell.

"The army of reserve will be less strong by two and a half regiments of cavalry than I expected, but there will be enough.

"In a month there will be beyond the Indus, and in India 55,000 men in motion. It is really a great exertion for us to make, while we have six regiments of native infantry in China.

"You will see that Sir H. Gough and Sir W. Parker concurred in thinking the movement on Pekin, as ordered on the 2nd of February, unadvisable, and adhered to the instructions originally given, which were in entire conformity with their own views, and which they had, in fact, anticipated. This has been very satisfactory to me.

"I have seen all the European and native officers at Cawnpore, Meerut, Allyghur, Kurnaul, and Umballa, on my way to this place. Nothing can be better than the spirit which animates them all. The several regiments are in good order, and nearly complete in men; and the new recruits are excellent, but two or three months more are required to make good soldiers of them.

"Upon the whole, all things look well; and unless some unexpected calamity should occur, or there should be gross mismanagement at Cabul, I shall, I trust, be able, by the middle of December, to report

the honourable termination of that unfortunate enterprise in Afghanistan, and the return of the army, with its reputation re-established and its spirit raised by success. "Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, August 6, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

"We received two days ago news of the arrival at Marseilles of the Indian overland mail, and I yesterday received your letter from Allahabad of the 7th of June.

"Affairs in Afghanistan appear to be very much as might have been expected. Your officers in command of armies have made but little effort to relieve the difficulties under which the army under the command of each of them was labouring; or those efforts have been but little successful.

"But it is astonishing that General Pollock should not have obeyed your instructions in respect to the exchange of prisoners. If an exchange had been effected, you might have withdrawn the troops at any time, and nobody could have whispered a camp hint.

"Your instructions anticipated the very offer made on the part of Akbar Khan; and it is wonderful that men wishing, as those in command must, to effectuate the exchange did not at once accept the offer, and

carry the law into execution, so far at least as was in their power, by signing a treaty.

"I see that the political gentlemen are looking to the retention of Shikarpore.

"This is an important point in reference to an invasion of Afghanistan by the Lower Indus and the Bolan Pass. But I am not aware of any difficulty in reaching that town at any time from the forts at the island of Bukkur.

"I don't know exactly what are the relations of Shikarpore with Western Scinde, and whether the permanent possession of that town would not involve us in permanent petty warfare with the tribes in Western Scinde, as well as with Beloochees and others further to the north. On the other hand, an opulent town of that description, not very far from the Indus, might have much influence on the commerce by the lower parts of that river.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"The Lord Ellenborough."

"Walmer Castle, September 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I have heard of the arrival of another Indian mail at Marseilles, but nothing of its contents, excepting that a French courier, on his passage through Dover, said that the news was satisfactory.

"I have been out of town since the prorogation of

Parliament, either at Windsor or here, excepting for one day last week, when I met Lord Auckland by accident. Lord Fitzgerald has been at Cheltenham, and I have not heard upon what subject he intended to address you by this mail. When I last saw him, previous to the prorogation of Parliament he and some members of the Cabinet were rather anxious respecting the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan without having released or effected the exchange of the prisoners; and it is probable that Lord Fitzgerald will have written to you upon that subject. I gave you my opinion upon it in former letters, of all of which Lord Fitzgerald has copies. I quite concurred in your views of a negotiation for an exchange of prisoners, and in your instructions to General Pollock—that is, to give all that we had in our power for all that the Afghans had; but if the exchange was to be partial, that the Governor-General should decide upon the terms of the exchange of Dost Mahomed Khan and his family. It is curious that General Pollock should have omitted to act upon these instructions; one would almost suppose that he had not received them.

"As usual, the British public are beginning to become very unjust about affairs in the North-West of India. Having been in despair, and considering all lost, and deprecating the continuance of hostilities and leaving a British soldier beyond the Indus, the press now begins to discuss national disgrace, unburied bones, vengeance, &c. This was to be expected. But

I recommend to you to leave out of the question all this stuff.

"If the officers of the Government of Bengal on the spot at the time, that is, in November and December 1841 and January and February 1842, had made proper provision for supplying with means of conveyance the troops in operation beyond the Indus, and those about to cross that river for the relief and support of those in advance, you would have had the means of bringing away every individual alive, not already a prisoner, and would have taken such a position in the country as would have given you and those officers the command of the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners; and you would have withdrawn your armies without difficulty or inconvenience at the moment which might have best suited your own views.

"But, unfortunately, the armies were not properly equipped with means of transport, and being, consequently, unable to move, the only course that could be taken with them was to withdraw them to positions within the Company's frontier, in which they could remain upon the defensive, and be refitted and re-equipped for the moment at which their more active services and movements might be required.

"This is the view which I take of the case—which I will commend to Lord Fitzgerald, when he will desire to have my opinion.

"You will see the accounts of very serious transactions in the manufacturing and mining districts.

"We were fortunately enabled by means of railroads and steam navigation to move troops, ordnance, and stores with great celerity, and we have stopped the mischief. The law carried into execution must effect the remainder till Parliament will meet, at which period, I hope that means will be discovered of preventing the action of combinations of workmen to raise wages by means of force and violence exercised upon other workmen, which, as now existing in Her Majesty's dominions, is the greatest grievance ever inflicted upon a peaceable and industrious people.

"The weather has been beautiful for the harvest, which it is hoped will be very abundant everywhere.

"Walmer Castle, September 9th.

"Since writing the above, I have just now received your private letter of the 6th of July from Allahabad, which I have endeavoured to make out. As it appears that your troops cannot retire from their advanced position till a favourable period of the season, it appears to me that you judge correctly in encouraging their commanders to making the enemy feel the influence of their existence in the country while they will be under the necessity of remaining there. But the whole question is one of commissariat—that of commissariat one of means of transport.

"I gave my opinion some time ago to Lord Fitz-

gerald upon the subject of batta to the native troops serving under the Government of Fort St. George, and I understand that his Lordship has written to the Secret Committee on the subject.

"I did not see what Lord Fitzgerald wrote, nor do I know what orders have been sent to India.

"I will attend to all the other points referred to in your letters, but, as I must send this up to London this evening to be sent off by the overland despatch, I can add no more.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON."

"Simlah, October 4, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"You will see by the 'Gazettes' I enclose that the military operations in Afghanistan have been entirely successful. I learn, too, that the first division of Major-General England's column, under Colonel Bird, arrived with all the invalids, families, and stores quite safe, at Dadur on the 19th of September. The second division was to leave Quetta on the 21st, and the last about the 1st of October. Sir C. Napier is arrived at Kurachee, but I do not know on what day—I think about the 10th. He took with him 200 of the 28th Queen's, and the remainder of that regiment would follow in a few days, in a steamer. The 28th has suffered very severely from cholera. The 9th Light Cavalry is, by

to-day, on march for Buhawulpore and Sukkur, if its advance to that point should be required. There has been no hostile movement in Scinde, and nothing but a little plundering was expected on the descent of the second and third columns down the Bolan Pass.

"The Sikh Government is satisfied of our loyal intentions, but the movement of 14,000 men towards the Sutlej, and the descent of the columns from Quetta, has been necessary to give security to our position, and has materially contributed to the right understanding of matters on the part of the Durbar of Lahore.

"I am sending camels still, and buying mules. 17,400 animals have now been purchased or hired in thirteen weeks for General Pollock's army—of these, 15,500 have been purchased. The troops get supplies and carriage in abundance at Cabul, and General Pollock tells me the city is as quiet as the esplanade of Calcutta.

"I have sent 20 lacs more to him, which, with what he had, will pay both armies to the 1st of January, and bring them home. The expenditure of the armies on the right of the Indus is about £150,000 a month. This includes the troops in Scinde. I enclose a proclamation, which I signed the day after I received the news of the capture of Ghuzni and Cabul. It is not yet published. I keep it back, probably, till I know the day is fixed for the movement of the army from Cabul upon

Jellalabad and Peshawur. I have had it very carefully translated into Persian and Hindoostanee, and, to avoid all mistakes, I shall communicate it in those languages several days before I publish it in English.

"I have not yet received official information of the army having brought away from Ghuzni, as I desired it might, the gates of the Temple of Somnauth, but I have no doubt of the thing having been done. I intend to deliver them to the chiefs near Ferozepore, and to have them sent in triumph to Somnauth. I have written a letter to the princes and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwara, of Gwalior, and of Guzerat, which I may vary in some expressions, but which will be substantially that I enclose a copy of.

"I could not have credited the extent to which the Mahometans desired our failure in Afghanistan, unless I had heard here circumstances which prove that the feeling pervaded even those entirely dependent upon us.

"Here there is a great preponderance of Mahometans. I am told that the guns produced absolute consternation, visible in their countenances. One Ayah threw herself upon the ground in an agony of despair. The Commander-in-Chief observed it amongst his own servants. I fired forty-two guns for Ghuzni and Cabul; the twenty-second gun—which announced that all was finished—was what overcame the Mahometans. The Hindoos, on the

other hand, are delighted. It seems to me most unwise, when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth, not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenths which are faithful, and, avoiding everything which could be justly offensive to the Mahometans. I would make the most of our successes and of the recovery of the gates of the temple, treating it ostensibly as a great military triumph, but knowing very well that the Hindoos will value it as the guarantee of the future security of themselves and their religion against Mussulmans. All those who best know India tell me that the effect will be very great indeed, and I think it will.

"On the morning of the 1st I wrote to the principal sovereigns of India, to announce our success, in terms adapted to the nature of our different relations with them. I believe I shall now keep all quiet very easily.

"Our revenue is improving very rapidly. In the year ending in August the receipt is about £900,000 more than in the preceding year. Of this, £500,000 from opium. Amidst all these favourable circumstances which now surround me, I assure you my highest pleasure would be to know that you think I have done right.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Simlah, October 18, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"You will have seen that our original plan of operations in the Yangtse-kiang has succeeded perfectly. I did not expect peace quite so soon; but I knew the emperor would be obliged to yield. The naval and military commanders seem, by their letters to me, to have been very glad that I supported them in their own view of the best line of operations.

"I am satisfied, considering all the obstacles we know of—the lateness of the season at which the attack by the Peiho must have been made, the certainty of great loss by sickness during protracted operations on shore, the separation from the fleet, and the desperate resistance the Tartars would have made—that had the army, in pursuance of Lord Stanley's instructions, gone to the Gulf of Petchelee it would have been utterly lost, and perhaps the fleet too.

"Sir Hugh Gough proposes to leave between Chusan, Koolansoo, and Hong Kong, three Queen's regiments and two native regiments; I have desired him to leave another native regiment with a company of artillery at Singapore, in reserve.

"The descent of the army from Candahar and Scinde proceeds without a check.

"By the 1st of November all will be at Sukkur, that is twelve battalions besides artillery enough, and about 800 irregular cavalry, to which I have

added a regular regiment of cavalry, now going down. This is exclusive of a native regiment at Kurachee, and two Queen's regiments, the 22nd and the 28th.

"Sir Charles Napier is at Sukkur, unable to ride or walk in consequence of a wound from the bursting of a rocket he was trying.

"There is some difference to be settled with the Ameers of Hyderabad, and there are some diplomatic arrangements to be made. When the difference is settled, I shall break up this army, and only leave about four battalions in Sukkur and Bukkur, and a sufficient garrison in Kurachee. The diplomatic arrangement is to effect the exchange of the places I have mentioned, with a sufficient *arrondissement* for the tribute now payable to us, £30,000 a year.

"I hope to make Sukkur the emporium of the countries drained by the Indus, and to bring our troops and stores hereafter to the Upper Provinces by that river and the Sutlej.

"I should save time, lives, and money. I enclose a copy of a letter to my private secretary, from General Nott. You will see what he thinks of General Pollock's delay at Cabul. That officer is, in fact, in the hands of Captain Macgregor, the ex-political agent at Jellalabad, and the object of the delay is to try to set up that miserable creature, Futteh Jung as king.

"However, I believe General Pollock will have left Cabul about the 10th or 12th; the communica-

tion by letters has been much interrupted, and several of his and mine must have been intercepted. I agreed to permit the Sikhs to occupy Jellalabad on our retiring from it, they agreeing never to recognise any government in Cabul which we have not previously recognised. It was only to-day the Sikh Minister came, who was at last authorised to make this arrangement. It is almost too late. You will see into what a false position their ambition leads them. They will be obliged to keep their principal force in that quarter, and Lahore and Umritsur will remain with insufficient garrison, within a few marches of the Sutlej, on which I shall, in twelve days, at any time, be able to assemble three European and eleven native battalions, one European regiment of cavalry two regiments of native cavalry, and two of irregular cavalry, and twenty-four guns.

"The state of the Punjab is therefore under my foot. I only desire, however, that it should be faithful and innocuous. The conflict of parties in the Punjab will render it more dependent every year, and, indeed, he who knows it best does not think the Government can last a year. I intend to be most courteous and liberal to both parties, and to wait till I am called in.

"From the camp at Ferozepore I shall go to Delhi, and thence, at the end of March, return to this place. I could not well leave this position till I see things assuming a settled form upon the Indus; and I have reason to expect the Lieutenant-Governor

of Agra will go home. This would throw the government of the Upper Provinces upon me.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"&c., &c., &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Simlah, November 17, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I have had a copy made of my letter to the Secret Committee, which will put you in possession of the state of military affairs. It is shortly this—the armies have crossed the Indus on their return to India. The army of reserve is at Ferozepore. The troops lately in Scinde are concentrated at Sukkur and there are 14,000 men in Bundelcund and Saugor.

"I have given orders for the erection of barracks, for the European regiments, at Subathoo and Kassowly; this latter place is nine miles to the east of Subathoo, and about three hours only from the plains; but it is 7000 feet high, and very healthy. The battalion of Goorkhas, which will be armed with rifles, will be moved from Subathoo to Simlah. The Surmoor battalion of the Goorkhas will be similarly armed, and remain where it is.

"I shall remove all the available materials from the European barracks at Kurnaul to Umballa, applying to that purpose all the carriage of the returning armies. At Umballa there will be a regi-

ment of European infantry, one of European cavalry, three regiments of native infantry, a regiment of native regular cavalry, one of the irregular cavalry, and two batteries of horse artillery. It is a beautiful place, and very healthy, and within a night's dâk of Kassowly. I much regret that barracks for a European regiment have been nearly finished at Ferozepore. It seems to me to be a position in the air. I had much rather mass the Europeans in or near the Hills; between the Murkundah and the Sutlej. There will be the four regiments of European infantry, eight of the native regiments of infantry, and the two Goorkha regiments of rifles, one regiment of European dragoons, two of native regular cavalry, and two of irregular cavalry, and four if not five batteries, besides a company of sappers and miners. I mean to have the means of moving this force at once. The protected Sikh chiefs can furnish from 4000 to 6000 camels, on requisition, and I shall keep under an organised establishment a sufficient portion of the animals purchased for the army of General Pollock. At Ferozepore I intend to erect a small fort, like Fort Tigué at Malta, to cover the battering train I shall gradually collect there and the necessary stores.

"The climate of Kurnaul has, since the canal was brought to the place, been so destructive that it is a duty to abandon it, and the position of Umballa seems to be far preferable. Meerut will have the Company's two European regiments doubled up in the barracks, which can well hold them, and that

station, which is a favourite one and perfectly healthy, will have more troops than it has hitherto had. I shall be able to leave Ferozepore by the 3rd of January, and I shall move with a large camp to Delhi. I shall carefully examine the position of the magazine and of the citadel. I am satisfied that the magazine cannot be left as it is, and there are very strong political as well as military reasons for occupying the citadel; but I anticipate very serious difficulties in any negotiation for getting the old king out of it, and I shall have to decide whether, if that object cannot be effected without violence (which I would not now resort to), the magazine shall not be removed. It cannot be made secure where it is. It would be safe within the citadel. I shall have likewise to make inquiries at Delhi with respect to the cause of the great sickness which has prevailed in the cantonments. It has been most serious, and is so still, and the location is apparently unhealthy. It seems to me to be a duty paramount to all others to place the troops in healthy stations.

"As for myself, I have, after much consideration, decided on residing, during the spring and summer, at Meerut. I must not leave this neighbourhood in the present very uncertain state of affairs at Lahore, and I am nearer England and my other work than at Simlah; besides which I do not like affording the bad example of running away to the Hills. I am quite charmed with Sir Charles Napier. I think all he has to do will be finished before September next,

and I shall then, if he should not be very unwilling to come to this frontier, ask you to transfer him to Bengal on the return home of Sir R. Dick. It will be a great satisfaction to me to leave him in chief command here when I go to Calcutta, as I probably must in November next, unless some new event, or some evidently impending event, should detain me here. As the whole Council will be changed by November next, it will be desirable that I should, if possible, be at that most inconvenient place for carrying on the government.

"You would be delighted with the spirit which now animates the army. I have done all I could to create it. Praises, honours, and substantial rewards have been all lavished upon them; and I must say, that they have deserved everything which can be done for them.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever very sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Simlah, November 17, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"Since I wrote to you this morning I have received from General Pollock a letter, of which I send you an extract, with a copy of the commissary's letter he enclosed.

"I do not allow volunteering from the 41st or the other two regiments going home from China; I wish

to restore them to you as efficient as I can. The 41st will, I hope, embark on the Sutlej by the 4th of January and sail for England from Kurachee by the end of February, if Sir Charles Napier should not see reason for detaining them in Scinde.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Simlah, November 18, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"This evening I received a letter, of which I enclose a copy, announcing Major-General Nott's resignation of his command in Major-General Pollock's army.

"I do not know the immediate cause, but I know that from the time of General Nott's arrival at Cabul he has disapproved of General Pollock's proceedings.

"The latter has been absolutely puerile in his transactions with the sons of Shah Shoojah, being entirely under the influence of an ex-political officer, Captain Macgregor.

"I am very sorry this event has occurred. It is impossible that any officer can have obeyed his instructions from the Government more implicitly than General Nott has done, and I have a much higher respect for him than for any officer in the service.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever very sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Walmer Castle, September 27, 1842.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"The period of the despatch of the overland mail is approaching, and as I have looked over your plans of the works at Delhi, I avail myself of the opportunity which a moment's leisure gives me to write a few lines upon them.

"However inconvenient to retain the Mogul and his palace, and his court and retainers, in the town, I should prefer to leave them there than to incur the odium of removing them, and of exposing—particularly the Mogul and his family—to the inconvenience and expense, and degradation in the eyes of those attached to him, of a forced removal.

"In my opinion, the principle on which the works at Delhi are constructed is a good one. The exterior wall, from the river Jumna at Wellesley Bastion to the river Jumna under the fortified wall which encloses the Resident's house, &c., may extend about 3000 yards, which is too great an extent for defence, except as an intrenched camp. But the interior wall, surrounding the Residency and magazine, ought to be perfected, so as to render it impregnable as a citadel, excepting by regular attack by good troops well supplied with ordnance, ammunition, and the material for a siege.

"It appears to me that the palace of the Mogul would be under the guns of this citadel, while the works of the town wall would prevent any large

number of men from entering the space by which they are enclosed, a very small addition to the garrison of the citadel would enable the commanding officer to hold each of the bastions and towers of the external wall; to guard against the surprise of which troops it might be desirable to close up the gorge of the bastion with a wall of weak profile or other obstruction, as well as to close up each of the towers on this external wall. The troops in each of them would thus be secure from surprise, while the interior defence of bastions and towers would be so weak as that no enemy could maintain himself in them while we should hold the citadel. I observe that there are in the town many buildings pucka-built, as it is called in India. These, by degrees, must be bought and destroyed.

"And I would add that it would be desirable to endeavour to prevail upon the Mogul to construct no more buildings of this description within the precincts of the palace, at least not within the distance of cannon shot of the citadel.

"I have given you the best opinion I could form upon an inspection of the plans which you have sent me. "Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"P.S.—Referring to what I have above stated respecting the walls surrounding the city of Delhi, I observe that the Combermere Redoubt, at the Ajmere Gate, which ought to be occupied, and armed

with heavy ordnance, would defend two fronts of the whole extent—that from the Wellesley Bastion to the Combermere Redoubt, and that from the latter to the Cabul Gate. The other front would be defended by the flank fire from the citadel.

"His Excellency the Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough."

"Walmer Castle, November 3, 1842.

"MY DEAR ELLENBOROUGH,

"We have no intelligence from India. But I am apprehensive that the overland mail will be despatched on the 4th, as it was in October; and that unless I should write this day I shall have no opportunity of writing to you at all.

"I am anxious upon a correspondence which I have recently had with Lord Fitzgerald, of which he will probably send copies, on a subject arising out of a representation from the Vice-President in Council at Fort William, addressed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, in which a statement is made that they had not been regularly informed of the orders given by you, acting under your authority of Governor-General, separate from the Council of Government.

"You will probably have heard of this representation from Fort William; if not, you certainly will from London.

"In the existing state of the public mind, and of

the discussions of the press here on the state of the war in India, there could be nothing more injurious to you than that it should be supposed that you had not fully and fairly communicated to the President in Council all that you were required to communicate, or that any report had been made upon the subject to the Secret Committee till the time will come at which an opportunity will be afforded of justifying all the orders which you had given, and of showing how appropriate each of them was to the circumstances within your knowledge at the moment at which each of them was given.

"I think that Lord Fitzgerald has taken the course best calculated to keep the Secret Committee quiet till the time at which it will not signify much what they may do, and ultimately to induce the Court of Directors itself to take a moderate, but legitimate, view of anything which they may have reason to think not exactly consistent with law, in the omissions to give the information which has been complained of.

"As you will have my letters in your hands at the same moment as this, I will not add more, as, having returned from London and Windsor only at the moment at which the post is going, I have not time. Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

"Camp, Ferozepore, December 18, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I am greatly obliged to you for your suggestion for the improvement of the means of defence at Delhi. I shall be there before the 1st of February, and will then see what can be done. My impression is, from all I have heard, that to protect the magazine, leaving the citadel as it is, is impossible; but I had already come to your conclusion that it would be an unadvisable step to do anything having the appearance of violence towards the old king. With his successor, my successor may be able to make some arrangement for the transfer to us of the citadel. To have in our hands the ancient seat of empire, and to administer the government from it, has ever seemed to me to be a very great object.

"Unless we have the citadel, Delhi seems to be a very bad place for the magazine. It is very inconveniently distant from the North-West frontier, and hereafter I trust the water communication will be by the Indus and Sutlej, rather than by the Ganges. The delay by the Ganges, and yet more the losses, are terrible.

"I do not think that the sickness in the army returning from Cabul is, except in General Wyld's brigade, which was long in the Khyber Pass, of a serious nature. The soldiers have committed excesses in eating things which disagreed with them, and the sick are about 14½ per cent. amongst the best troops,

more amongst Wyld's—indeed, in his brigade half the men are ill.

"Sir R. Sale came over the river with the whole garrison of Jellalabad yesterday. General Pollock's force will come over by the 20th and General Nott's on the 23rd. The appearance of Sir R. Sale's brigade was beautiful. The Prussian officer, Baron von Orlich, seemed quite astonished by the appearance of the troops after a four-years' campaign. I am agreeably surprised by Lady Sale; she is not by any means unfeminine, as I had been led to expect, and her conversation is very interesting. I had the garrison and Sir R. Sale's family and the staff of the army to dinner (about ninety-six), and they were all well satisfied with their reception. The whole army was drawn out; I met them at the foot of the bridge.

"In Bundelcund policy and force are producing tranquillity and placing it upon sure foundations—the re-establishment of confidence amongst the chiefs. On the Nerbudda I shall have more difficulty, as there it is a sort of predial insurrection, and the hope of plunder makes most men join the insurgents when they can. The few Mahajuns and the honest cultivators offer no resistance, and are generally too much alarmed to give information. However, even there I think I shall be able to produce a return of tranquillity through the judgment of Major Sleeman and the operations of four or five regiments.

"I really cannot anticipate the progress of events

on the Lower Indus; but I apprehend that the Ameers of Scinde will never observe treaties until they have felt our force. Before they knew what our intentions were they were collecting troops, and these must in any case be dismissed, whether they accept the terms proposed or not.

"December 19.

"General Pollock came in yesterday with the 2nd brigade of infantry, the cavalry, and artillery of his army. I met him at the bridge, and when the 26th Native Infantry passed I had them formed into a hollow square, and informed the commanding officer, Major Huish, that I made them a light infantry regiment, at the particular desire of General Pollock, who had represented their distinguished conduct in the field and his great obligations to them on all occasions. In fact the 26th was the regiment on which he felt he could always rely when the others wavered at Peshawur in March last. On the whole, the troops with General Pollock looked well; but not so well as the garrison of Jellalabad. The remainder of General Pollock's army came in to-day.

"The honours which have been bestowed upon the officers who were at Jellalabad have given the greatest satisfaction, and I think all are particularly gratified by Brigadier Monteath's being made an aide-de-camp to the Queen. He is considered a most excellent officer. I cannot say how pleased I am at finding their services acknowledged as fully as they really deserve. I told them at dinner the other day,

and it is my genuine feeling, that they, in saving themselves by their constancy, had saved the British empire in India by their example. No successes which have since been obtained have in the slightest degree impaired my admiration for them, nor can anything ever diminish my gratitude to them.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Camp, Ferozepore, December 24, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I think it right to send you, for your consideration, the enclosed letter from Captain Moorhouse, of the 35th Bengal Native Infantry, representing his claims to some mark of public distinction for his services.

"He is an officer highly esteemed, and had he remained with Sir R. Sale during the action of the 7th of April, he would have been mentioned with the rest of the staff, and might have been rewarded as the other officers of the staff and of the several regiments and corps mentioned by Sir R. Sale were; but thinking he should be of more use with his regiment, he requested to be allowed to join it, and was permitted to do so.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most faithfully yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

[Confidential.]

"Camp, Ferozepore, December 29, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I find that I have not brought forward to the notice of Government, in the prominent manner in which I ought to have brought them forward, the services of Captain White of Her Majesty's 40th Foot. I understand from General Nott that Captain White was always in command of a battalion formed of the eight light infantry companies of the army which lately marched from Candahar to Ghuzni and Cabul, and that he on all occasions distinguished himself most highly. These eight companies were not called a battalion, in order to avoid the necessity of placing at their head an officer of superior rank to Captain White, who had the entire confidence of General Nott. I should mention to you that General Nott appears to consider Major Hibbert of the 40th to be the best officer he had in the command of a regiment. The 40th Regiment is in the most perfect order, and was relied upon by General Nott on all occasions.

"I do not find that General Nott has any very high opinion generally of his officers as men fit to command out of his sight. Brigadier Wymer, who more than once commanded a distinct corps in action, is, he says, an officer upon whom he could entirely depend for the exact execution of orders; and, besides, he had with him, as brigade-major, Captain

Scott, of the 38th Bengal Native Infantry, an old staff-officer of General Nott's, in whom he had entire confidence, and he knew that on any occasion of unforeseen difficulty Brigadier Wymer would consult and take the advice of Captain Scott. I have made Captain Scott paymaster of pensions at Lucknow. I placed the appointment at General Nott's disposal, and he named Captain Scott.

"There is a very young officer, Lieutenant Chamberlain, of Christie's Horse, a relation of the late Sir Henry Fane, of whom General Nott thinks very highly. He commanded two rissalahs at Candahar when the bulk of the cavalry had gone with Brigadier Wymer to relieve Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and did very distinguished service. If I should not retain Christie's Horse for the present, I shall make this young lieutenant a subaltern in the Body Guard, which I am going to increase to four troops by drafts from cavalry regiments.

"I have made Lieutenant Mayne, who was with the irregulars in Jellalabad, adjutant of the Body Guard. He is the favourite of the army, very young, but a most brave and able officer. I believe if I had submitted the two appointments of adjutant and subaltern in the Body Guard to the election of the whole army the officers I have named would have been unanimously chosen.

"General Nott assures me that the resignation tendered on his reaching Peshawur had no reference to any difference of opinion with General Pollock,

but was offered in execution of a determination he had long before made, in consequence of the vexations to which he had been subjected, of giving up the service at the end of the war. He told me he was ashamed of his weakness in adhering under such altered circumstances to the resolution he had made within himself, that now he would remain in India as long as I did, and required his services.

"I am altogether very much pleased with him. He is evidently very superior to all the others.

"I should tell you that he brought into this camp 6850 effective men. The sick were 780, but the cases are slight in general, and the number of sick is diminishing.

"General Pollock's army lost about 1500 men in the interval between the end of July and the day of their arrival here; but of these not 200 I think by the enemy. The loss fell principally upon three native regiments (those in the Khyber) and upon the 9th Queen's. General Pollock had nearly 1800 sick, and there were nearly 900 in the army of reserve on my arrival. These are principally in the 1st European Regiment, which has been at Kurnaul.

"The position of the European barracks at Kurnaul seems to have become perfectly deadly since the canal has been completed. The quarters of the native troops there do not seem to be equally exposed to malaria. I visited the hospital of the 1st Europeans, and I saw the convalescents and the men called effective, and really I do not think that any

man who has had the Kurnaul fever will ever be a good soldier fit for much service. Yet I daresay my honourable masters will be very angry with me for determining at once upon the removal of the European infantry barracks and all to Umballa.

"There has been a great deal of sickness in the cantonments at Delhi, which are at a considerable distance from the city. I must look carefully into the causes of this when I am there.

"Formerly troops were quartered in the city and near the magazine. The magazine is now under the sole protection of its own guard; and undefended as it is, and at a distance from the cantonment, it is liable to be occupied at the commencement of any popular insurrection by the insurgents.

"General Pollock, and indeed the whole army, seem to consider Brigadier Monteath to be the first officer. General Pollock has a very high opinion of Colonel Richmond of the 33rd Native Infantry, who commanded the rear-guard on the advance to Cabul.

"Nothing can exceed the good feeling between the European and native troops. The army is in the highest spirits—justly proud of its actions, and proud too of its force as exhibited in this camp.

"There are here eleven European regiments and more than 5000 cavalry, and I believe 100 guns could be produced in the field. There are eight batteries of horse artillery, and all are in beautiful order.

"I should think that, after allowing for the guards

of the camp, an effective force of very nearly 30,000 men could be produced at a review.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Camp, Ferozepore, December 29, 1842.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I have received from Lord Fitzgerald a copy of your letter to him respecting the delay in transmitting to the President in Council copies of orders given by me.

"I much regret that anything done by me in the discharge of my duty here should have appeared to you even for a moment to be deserving of censure; but I think you will hardly continue to disapprove of my conduct in this matter when you know that I only withheld for a time from the knowledge of the President in Council instructions having reference to the movements of armies in the field, under the conviction that secresy was essential to the success of those movements, and that secresy would not be preserved if they were officially communicated to the Council at Calcutta.

"No delay ever occurred in transmitting copies of all orders to the home authorities, and nothing has been ultimately withheld from the Council; and I feel satisfied that to the absolute secrecy preserved

by me with respect to the last combined movement of the armies upon Cabul was owing the capture of Ghuzni without loss, and the complete success of the whole operation without any material loss to the forces employed.

"I did not feel it safe to entrust even the secretary of the Government, who was with me, with a knowledge of the projected movements of the armies from Candahar and Cabul, and hence the letters to the Secret Committee, as I could not send them through him, were sent through the Board of Control.

"Undoubtedly this was a great irregularity; but they are really more answerable for it than I am who allowed to grow up in the Indian service a laxity of principle with respect to secrecy in official transactions which is as injurious as it is discreditable, and who created by their bad measures a state of extreme danger which could not be safely met by conduct adapted to ordinary circumstances.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Camp, Duthul, January 18, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"The last follower of the army passed the Sutlej on the 23rd of December towards sunset, and in a quarter of an hour afterwards both bridges were

carried away. General Nott's force came on in beautiful order. From Candahar to Ferozepore he lost about 400 men, and he recovered nearly as many prisoners at Ghuzni. I send you enclosed a return of the carriage he set out with, received on the march, and lost.

"The Maharajah having made a sufficient apology for the improper conduct of his mission at Loodianah, I received a new mission at Ferozepore, and he afterwards sent his son and the Minister Dhian Singh, who attended me to the great review on the 31st. Sir Jasper did not, I believe, move the army very well; but the appearance of the troops was splendid. I enclose the *Gazette* accounts of the reception of the troops and of the review. I visited the Prince at his tents, and received the presents for the Queen. I then went to a review of his escort, about 4000 men. A return mission was sent to Lahore, and most cordially received. The Maharajah paraded 65,000 men and 200 guns; but it took eight hours to get them into line, and when placed they did not move. Half the guns were without draught. The irregulars are said to have been very fine. The troops are disciplined, some in the French, some in the English, and some in the Sikh manner, and there is no subordination. The arrival of General Ventura is anxiously expected by the army. I am glad all is safe before he comes.

The army at Ferozepore was broken up on the 10th. Many regiments marched before. The 41st

Queen's embarked for Sukkur, on its way to Kurachee, on the 10th. It should have moved on the 4th, but there was delay consequent on the officers having neglected to indent for a sufficient number of boats. The regiment took eighty-five. The cavalry and artillery of the Bombay army recently attached to General Nott's force marched on the 4th for Sukkur. I was anxious to move these troops as soon as possible as a demonstration to assist Sir Charles Napier's negotiations. The Ameers have, in words, assented to all my propositions, but some have taken refuge at Enam Ghur, a fort in the desert, eighty miles from Sukkur and 110 from Hyderabad, and Sir Charles is moving against them with a very small force. He intended first to take the 22nd Queen's and the Scinde Horse, with two batteries. Want of carriage reduced this force to 350 of the 22nd and 200 of the Scinde Horse, and two 24lb. howitzers. At the end of the first march he sent back 150 of the Scinde Horse, which were knocked up, and was moving forwards on the 7th with the 350 of the 22nd on camels, two men on each camel, and fifteen days' provisions, with four days' water. He must then have been about thirty miles from Enam Ghur. This makes me a little nervous. There is ample force at Sukkur to repair any reverse or accident; but any such untoward event would raise all the Beloochees. I had hoped that everything in Scinde would have been settled as I desired without any fight at all, and it may be so still. Sir Charles Napier is authorised

to move the troops at Deesa and in Cutch, and the Government of Bombay will send more troops to Kurachee, if he desires it; besides, two more steamers, drawn from the Euphrates, have been repaired at Bombay, and have entered the Indus, so that all possible precautions have been taken.

"In Saugor there has been no further fighting. In Bundelcund we have not yet got possession of the ex-Rajah of Jytpore, and some other plunderers, and Major Sleeman seems now to suspect the Ranee of Oorcha of affording protection to them. I must change many of the subordinate officers in Saugor and Bundelcund before I can see the country well administered and tranquil.

"There has been a most respectable revolution in Nepaul. The Ranee is now regent, and she is most friendly to us, and disposed to peace. I trust we may look to long-continued quiet on that side.

"We have created a Financial Minister, and shall, I hope, remodel the departments at Calcutta so as to facilitate the transaction of business. The Five per Cent. Loan is closed. We are going to repay the money lent to us in our great difficulties by the protected Sikh chiefs. I have proposed the reduction of ten men in every company in the army, but shall not at present venture to carry reduction further. The receipts from opium have been very great, and are increasing. I reckon upon an improvement of revenue this year to the extent of a million. The rains which have fallen promise a good rubbee (crop).

I have every reason to think that the restoration of the gates of the Temple of Somnauth has conciliated and gratified the great mass of the Hindoo population. I have no reason to suppose that it has offended the Mussulmans; but I cannot close my eyes to the belief that that race is fundamentally hostile to us, and therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindoos, without doing anything which should in reason tend to create disaffection in the Mussulmans.

"At Delhi I shall have to consider whether the magazine should remain there. I am inclined to think, from all I hear, that it is impossible to make it secure against an insurrection without including the palace in the defences; and it is certainly too far from the frontier. I shall be glad to know whether you would prefer having it at Meerut or Kurnaul, or advanced to the new station of Umballa.

"I have written a letter to the Secret Committee as to the Punjab and the position of our troops between the Murkundah and the Sutlej, which I should wish you to have the goodness to read, and to give me your opinion upon.

"I am to inclined to think that on the Lower Indus I have anticipated your views.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

" Strathfieldsaye, December 1, 1842.

"My dear Lord Ellenborough,

"I have received your letters and despatches with the reports of events in the north-west of Hindostan up to the 18th of September last; and I sincerely congratulate you upon the certainty of the final evacuation of Afghanistan, under circumstances and in a state of affairs approaching as nearly as possible to what I told you, in a letter which I wrote to you some months ago, would be the *beau ideal* of such an evacuation. All that I sought for has been attained, excepting the safety of the troops comprising the garrison of Ghuzni, under Colonel Palmer, which, as Ghuzni has been taken by storm, it is now quite clear would have been attained, if Colonel Palmer had not thought proper to surrender.

"I have written to you by every overland despatch my opinion upon the state of affairs existing, and upon your orders, after I had obtained a knowledge of the reports made to you, and of the state of facts, of which you had a knowledge at the moment at which you gave out orders. I have with regularity written my approbation of them all. You have my letters written at the time. The perusal of them must be more satisfactory than anything that I can now state in this moment of success and exultation. I communicated them regularly, as soon as written, to the President of the Board of Control. I am ready at any moment to defend the opinions which I have

entertained and given. I can say no more to you on the expression of your desire that I should be satisfied and approve of what you have done.

"I now congratulate you upon the successful issue of our plans and operations in China. The first were formed while you were still in England. They have been carried into execution most ably and successfully, and you will have the satisfaction of feeling that you have been the instrument of rendering to your country the inestimable service of restoring peace to Asia. I cannot express to you how highly I estimate the importance of this service, knowing as I do the impression which the reports recently received from the East have made, not only in this country but throughout Europe, and feeling sensible of that which they are calculated to make throughout the world.

"Believe me, my dear Lord Ellenborough,
"Ever yours most sincerely,
(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General,
" Fort William, Bengal."

MEMORANDUM BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON GRANTING MEDAL FOR SERVICE IN CHINA.

" Strathfieldsaye, December 9, 1842.

"Lord Ellenborough has thought proper, by his general order of the 14th of October, to direct that certain badges of distinction shall be borne on the regimental appointments of certain regiments of the

army of the East India Company serving in China; and his Lordship has further called upon Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough and Admiral Sir W. Parker respectively to transmit to him lists of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the army in the service of the East India Company serving in China, and of the officers, seamen, and marines of the naval service of the East India Company serving in the fleet on the coast of China, who should be found deserving by their conduct, or by the conduct of the military corps, or the ship or vessel, in which such individual has been serving, to be distinguished, in order that his Lordship may confer upon such individual a medal with the devices described on the general order.

"It appears that inconvenience is apprehended from the course which his Lordship has adopted upon this occasion. The Government do not deem it expedient to disapprove of the course adopted by Lord Ellenborough; but it is felt that, however inconvenient in itself, it may be necessary to extend the grant of these medals to the flag and other officers, petty officers, seamen, and marines of Her Majesty's fleet in the China Seas, and to the general and other officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of Her Majesty's army serving in China.

"Lord Ellenborough has not intimated such intention, but the Government have thought proper to require the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the army and that of the First Lord of the Admiralty on the questions arising upon this subject.

"I beg leave to observe that the questions involved in this discussion are not professionally military.

"The Governor-General of India has, in the exercise of his authority, the power of granting in India such rewards as he pleases to the forces in the service of the East India Company, naval as well as military, under his command, control, and direction; and of ordering such badges as he may think proper to be worn in the regimental appointments of corps and regiments in the service of the East India Company, to permit the individuals serving in these corps to wear, in India, such medals or other badges of distinction as he may present to them. But he cannot give permission to Englishmen to wear in England such badges of distinction, and most particularly not in the presence of the Sovereign, without Her Majesty's permission.

"The Governor-General has in these respects exercised a power vested in him by law.

"It is no part of the duty of the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's army to deliver an opinion on that exercise of his Lordship's discretion. As a member of the Government he may have an opinion upon the subject, which is not required—that which is desired is his professional opinion.

"There are two questions under consideration: first, the grant of badges to be borne on regimental appointments; secondly, the grant of a medal to officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers.

"It does not appear that the Governor-General has expressed the desire or the intention to grant either to Her Majesty's military and naval forces.

"I will first consider the question of badges to be borne on the regimental appointments of the regiments in Her Majesty's service serving in the army in China.

"The usual course of proceeding would be for the commanding general in India, or even the commanding officer of the regiment to which such badges are proposed to be granted, to desire, by memorial that the Commander-in-Chief of the army would apply to Her Majesty that certain corps might have Her Majesty's gracious permission to bear on their regimental appointments the words, badges, or other distinctions, to signify that such regiment had been employed in the service in question. This is the common and not unusual course of proceeding. There are many regiments in the army which wear such badges and words on their appointments, always by the permission of the Sovereign; and if such badge is borne on the appointments of the regiments in the service of the East India Company employed in the same service, it would be desirable that, if the Governor-General should express the wish that the same should be borne on the appointments of the regiments in Her Majesty's service, application should be made accordingly to Her Majesty in the usual form.

"The grant of a medal to be worn by the general officers and soldiers of Her Majesty's army is a

different question, and one upon which personally I can give no opinion.

"As a member of the Privy Council I may entertain an opinion on the subject; as the Commander-in-Chief I can have none.

"It appears that the Governor-General has the authority to grant such a medal to the officers and soldiers of the army of the East India Company to be worn in India or elsewhere, but not in Her Majesty's dominions, and, above all, not in Her Majesty's presence. But the officers and soldiers in Her Majesty's service serving in India cannot be permitted to accept and wear such medals in the ranks of their several regiments, even in India, without Her Majesty's permission, and certainly not in England, and above all not in Her Majesty's presence.

"The first question upon which I understand that it is the wish of the Cabinet that the Commander-in-Chief of the army and the First Lord of the Admiralty should give their opinions is, What would be the feeling of Her Majesty's army in China and the officers, seamen, and marines of Her Majesty's fleet if Her Majesty was to withhold her gracious permission to the officers, soldiers, seamen, and marines of her army and fleets whose conduct has been found to deserve Her Majesty's royal approbation, if they were to see those employed in the service of the East India Company personally distinguished by the grant of and wearing such medal or mark of distinction, while they

should not be thus personally distinguished, although employed in the same service?

"All men are equally capable of forming an opinion upon such a subject; and I am not sensible that my social habits with, and long experience of the feelings of, military men give to my opinion any weight upon such a question.

"There can be no doubt that many men serve only to acquire the distinction to which their zeal, their abilities, their gallantry, and good conduct may entitle them, and that all, even if the lowest of the military professions, are sensible of the advantages resulting from possessing such testimonials of their conduct or merits.

"Such are, and must be, the feelings of those employed in these honourable professions.

"It is true that Lord Ellenborough, now the Governor-General of India, is not the Sovereign, but a fellow-subject; but he is a man of distinguished abilities, entrusted with great power by the Sovereign and the East India Company, who has exercised that power in the East greatly to his own credit and to the public advantage; and his name is known and respected as that of a man who has already rendered great service to his country; and the officers, seamen, and soldiers of the fleet and army must be desirous of being reputed to have promoted the views and objects of and to have co-operated in the services which his Lordship has rendered to the State.

"There can be no doubt but that whatever pre-

ference each might feel for a distinction of another description, all would desire to be distinguished by Lord Ellenborough as have those in the immediate service of the East India Company.

"I am sensible of the difference in the nature, the degree, and the length of the services of the different individuals in Her Majesty's fleets and armies in China. There must, consequently, be some little feeling that all equally distinguished by the same mark of honour have not rendered—they have not had the opportunity of rendering—the same service, in whatever mode that service may be viewed.

"This supposed medal is not like one granted to commemorate a single great event, distributed equally to all present on the occasion. Nor can the claims of the officers, seamen, marines, and soldiers of Her Majesty's fleets and armies be compared with those in the same line of service in the service of the East India Company. I don't mean in the sense of the nature and degree of the service rendered during the period of time during which each individual was in China, but for this reason: the Indian soldier is not bound—on the contrary, he volunteers—to embark, and when he embarks he relinquishes all his habits, quits his family, and takes a course inconsistent with his religious and social prejudices and habits.

"The case of the Indian seaman is not precisely similar. But he is not in the habit, in his profes-

sional pursuits, of being exposed to the casualties of war.

"This, therefore, is another circumstance which makes a difference between this grant of a medal and others which have been under consideration, and must be taken into consideration. But still, I cannot but feel that the British fleet and army would feel the grant of a mark of distinction to the Indian fleet and army for their services in China which should be withheld from them.

"As a member of Her Majesty's councils and as Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's army, I am sensible of the inconvenience attending these renewed grants of medals to all the individuals comprising a fleet or an army, even in a case in which the grant could be so limited as to render it certain that no one should receive the mark of distinction who was not present upon the occasion intended to be commemorated, which limitation cannot be made in this case.

"Medals were originally struck to commemorate certain great naval victories, one of each of which was distributed, according to certain rules, to each admiral, and, I believe, to each captain of a post-ship engaged; similar medals were subsequently struck to commemorate certain great events in the war in the Spanish peninsula, and one of each was distributed to the general officers, commanding officers of regiments engaged, and certain officers of the staff, according to certain rules laid down.

"In the year 1815 a medal was struck to commemo-

rate the battle of Waterloo, and then, for the first time, the restrictions in respect to the grant of medals as well to the navy as to the army were departed from, and the course pursued was otherwise irregular. However, the intention was that none should receive the mark of distinction not present in the great military event intended to be commemorated.

"I am sensible likewise of the feelings of some, of the increased difficulties in putting an end to grants of medals as a mark of distinction for naval and military actions, after the grant and the extension and confirmation by Her Majesty of this grant and distribution of a medal for service in China.

"In truth such a grant is an exercise of the Royal authority of the highest description, the most valuable to the Sovereign and to the public, the reward and distinction of its naval and military officers, seamen, and soldiers, which should be maturely considered in all its bearings before it is adopted, and that by the highest executive authority in the State.

"Such consideration is important for the interests and honour of the military profession, as well as for the interests of the Sovereign and of the State itself, otherwise these distinctions will become of no value.

"As a member of Her Majesty's councils it is my opinion that, at this moment, the best course to be adopted in respect to Lord Ellenborough's grant of a medal is that adopted in respect to his grant of a medal for the service of 1842 in Afghanistan.

"It might be desirable that Her Majesty should in

some manner declare her pleasure that officers employed abroad should report the operations of her fleets and armies, and should leave to Her Majesty to consider whether such service should be commemorated, in what manner, and in what manner those should be distinguished who, in the performance of their duty and in the promotion and attainment of the objects of their superiors in command, had, by their ability, gallantry, and conduct, merited to be so distinguished.

"In considering the grant of the medals for Jellalabad and Afghanistan I did not omit to consider, as I have in this case, which of the courses to be recommended to Her Majesty would be most consistent with the authority and dignity of Her Majesty's crown and station.

"There is but little, if any, difference in the two cases.

"The Afghan war was exclusively Indian, but was carried on by the resources in military force and by the aid of the counsels of Her Majesty's Government. Lord Ellenborough had been required to make an exertion to restore the discipline, subordination, tone, and spirit of the army, particularly of the native army, in India after the disasters which had occurred in 1841–1842.

"The Chinese war was imperial, but was carried on at first nearly exclusively, and even at last in great part, by the military force, including Her Majesty's regiments, in the service of the East India

Company, and under the direction of the Governor-General in India at first, and latterly under his superintendence, under the supreme direction of the Secretary of State.

"The operations of this war have ended in a treaty of peace, obtained by the success of their operations exclusively, to a degree in which no other peace was ever before negotiated, because no political consideration that could be brought to bear was to have had any weight in attaining the object, excepting the inconvenience to the Chinese Government of the successful operations of the fleets and armies engaged in the war.

"In the first place, the discipline, tone, and spirit of the army might have depended upon the confirmation of the act of the Governor-General.

"He has not yet intimated any intention of conferring this medal upon Her Majesty's fleets and armies.

"But his act in relation to the army and fleet of the East India Company employed in China would become nugatory unless in some manner confirmed by Her Majesty; that is, either by Her Majesty permitting her fleet and army to accept the same medal from the Governor-General, as in the case of the Afghanistan medal, or by the grant of one by Her Majesty herself to the whole navy and army employed in China, after well considering the restrictions and regulations for the grant, and disapprobation of the grant by the Governor-General

for a service exclusively imperial under the supreme direction of the Secretary of State.

"I am sensible that Her Majesty is the source of, and ought to originate, all measures of grace and distinction to her fleets and armies. Of these acts of the Governor-General, the first would have been, and the last will become, nugatory unless confirmed by Her Majesty; and the object of this paper is to point out in what manner Her Majesty can confirm this act, so as to protect the dignity of her great station and to perform an act of grace and favour to her fleets and armies which have performed this great service.

"First, then, I would recommend that Her Majesty should direct that the attention of those commanding abroad should be called to the great principle which should govern their course upon this subject—viz., that it is their duty to report, for the information of the Sovereign, the naval and military events which may have occurred, and that of which they may think it desirable that Her Majesty should be informed; of the conduct of the officers, ships, and troops in her service under their immediate command; but that they must leave entirely to Her Majesty to consider whether any, and what, reward, distinction, honour, or other notice in commemoration of such event should be granted.

"Secondly, that Her Majesty having taken into consideration the great and uniformly successful services rendered by her fleets and armies, and those

of the service of the East India Company, under the command of Admiral Sir W. Parker and Lieut.-General Sir Hugh Gough, throughout the war in China, and that these services had been followed by peace with the Emperor of China upon terms honourable to both empires (the only object of Her Majesty's solicitude and of the exertions made by Her Majesty's commands) and, as Her Majesty hopes, advantageous to Her Majesty's subjects, Her Majesty has been pleased to determine (in addition to the promotion and marks of her distinguished favour which Her Majesty has conferred upon the admiral, general, and other officers in the service of Her Majesty and the East India Company, and the rewards which she has graciously been pleased to command might be distributed to her admiral, general, and other officers employed on these services, and to the petty officers and seamen and marines of her fleet and of the naval service of the East India Company, and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of her army, and of that in the service of the East India Company) that a medal should be struck to commemorate the great services rendered to Her Majesty, their country, and the imperial crown of Great Britain by the fleets and armies employed in China, and the peace with China; and, further, that one of the same medals, with the name of the individual inscribed thereon, should be sent to each admiral, general, and other officer of the navy and army, including the officers, European and native, of the service of the East India Company,

petty officers, seamen, and marines of the navy of Her Majesty and of the East India Company, the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of Her Majesty's army and of that of the East India Company, including the native non-commissioned officers and soldiers; and, further, that the admiral and general commanding in chief should respectively send to the Governor-General in India, to be transmitted to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, nominal returns of all the admirals, generals, and other officers of Her Majesty's fleets and armies, and of the naval and military service of the East India Company, including native officers who have served in ships or in regiments, or other corps of troops which have been distinguished in the services and upon the occasions under-mentioned; and nominal lists of all petty officers, seamen, and marines who have served in Her Majesty's ships as above described and in those of the service of the East India Company, and of non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the several regiments and corps as above described, including those in the service of the East India Company, Europeans as well as natives of India—that is to say, those ships and vessels in the service of Her Majesty and the East India Company which may have served with distinction in any of the following operations: those in the Canton River, in the operations of 1841; those at Chusan, in 1841-1842; those at Amoy, at Ningpo, at Chinghae, in the River Woosuing, in the River Yangtsekiang, at the assault of Ching Kiangfoo; the

officers remaining on the staff of the several armies, including those of the ordnance, the medical, and the commissariat staff, and Her Majesty's superintendent and the officers employed under his direction."

"Strathfieldsaye, January 4, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I learn that the overland despatch will be sent away on the 6th. I thank God that there is nothing upon which to write to you in relation to pending operations in India. I trust that the troops are all in their defensive positions.

"You will have heard that there have been some difficulties here respecting the grant of medals by the Governor-General without previous reference to the Crown.

"A mode was discovered of arranging the grant of the Afghanistan medals, and of conferring the same by the Crown, without compromising the dignity and authority of the Sovereign.

"But when the affair was brought to conclusion, we received the account of the grant of a medal by you to the Indian navy engaged in the war in China.

"The feeling of the Cabinet in general was adverse to the further grant of general medals, and the subject was referred for the consideration of the Lords of the Admiralty and of the Commander-in-Chief. I wrote a memorandum upon it, which I sent to

Sir Robert Peel, in which I suggested two modes of settling the affair, either of which might be adopted without compromising the dignity of the Crown; and I have since seen a memorandum by Sir George Cockburn, stating his views upon the subject. But I cannot tell upon what course the Cabinet may have decided to act.

"I have recently received from the Horse Guards the copies of a correspondence between Lord Combermere and the Governor-General upon the grant in 1826 of a medal and honorary distinctions by the Indian Government on account of the Burmese war, on which the late Duke of York wrote an opinion.

"Of course, you could have no knowledge of these documents; but it is impossible that they should not have been known of in your offices at Fort William. I think that this affair will be settled to your satisfaction. The letters which I have seen are from Lord Combermere to the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, in April 1826.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"January 4, 1843, 11 P.M.

"P.S.—I have just now received a letter from Lord Stanley, dated Downing Street, at four P.M., from which I learn that the Chinese medal affair has been settled in a manner that will be highly satisfactory to you, to the fleet, and to the army of all classes and

descriptions, upon which directions will be sent to India by the overland mail to be despatched on the 6th inst.

"Ever yours, my dear Lord Ellenborough,

"W."

"Camp, Delhi, February 18, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I went to see the magazine this morning after my arrival here, and I enclose the observations I made and the report of the committee I appointed. The result upon my mind is, that the magazine should be removed from Delhi. If you should be of the same opinion after reading the report, will you tell me to what point it should be removed? I am assured that a small battering train can be safely deposited in the old fort at Loodianah, and I should think it might be for such time as would suffice for bringing up troops to relieve the fort from Umballa and the Hills; and I have directed the few heavy guns now at Ferozepore (where there is no protection at all for them), and some which are coming up from Sukkur, to be sent to Loodianah; but I apprehend that a magazine as large as that of Delhi should be placed in the rear of the frontier, where the stores it contains may be easily supplied to troops advancing, without the risk of its being in any manner endangered by the advance of an enemy. Either Kurnaul or Meerut would seem to

be the most convenient position. If you should approve of either position, or prefer any other, I propose transferring the magazine at once, and protecting it in its new location by a small work.

"There was a great omission in the plan of Delhi sent to you—the canal was unnoticed. It runs between the magazine and the palace. I send you a copy of a memorandum I made after visiting Delhi a second time, and the reply. I have decided that a correct plan may be made of the city of Delhi. There is none at all, nor any map of the country adjoining.

"I have received here the Rajahs of Bhurtpore, Beekaneer, Ulwar, Dholpore, and Kotah, and the Nawabs of Tonk and Jeypoor. The Rajahs of Kerowly and Jhalawar will meet me on my march to Agra. All I have seen are in very good humour. I have shown them to-day eleven regiments which formed part of the army at Ferozepore. I have said and done all I could to put the chiefs into good humour. If I had been canvassing Rajpootana I could hardly have done more. The Durbar at Gwalior has been doing everything hitherto with great propriety since the death of Scindiah. The boy adopted is nearest in blood to the late Maharajah. He is but eight, and the Ranee who adopts him is eleven. There must be a regent, or a regency of more than one. I advise a sole regent in the person of the Mama Sahib, maternal uncle of the late Maharajah, who can never succeed

to the Guddee, and has every reason to act well by the State and the minor chief. I decided on going to Gwalior instead of Meerut as soon as I heard of the Maharajah's death; and I adhere to my purpose, although I do not now apprehend that there will be any difficulty about putting things into order there. The circumstance of my being so near will steady any new Government of which I may approve. I have provided for the possible necessity of moving troops by making changes in the destination of three regiments, and so taking with me the 2nd Grenadiers and the 35th Light Infantry, the latter of which is commanded by your Colonel Monteath, who would be superior in rank to any other commandant of a regiment, and so have the whole force under him.

"Sir Charles Napier had the good fortune to find Enam Ghur evacuated. He must have retired from before it. He had only two 24lb. howitzers. The walls were of thick mud, forty and fifty feet high, and there were in the fort provisions for a considerable time and 20,000lbs. of powder. The powder was all used in its destruction. The four Bengal battalions reached Buhawulpore from Sukkur on the 8th. Sir Charles has left with him eight battalions and two regiments of cavalry, and another regiment of cavalry with two batteries must before now have reached Sukkur on their route to Bombay from Ferozepore. They formed part of the army in Afghanistan. This force is exclusive of the garrison of Kurachee. Subzulcote and Bhornybhara have

been given over to the Nawab of Buhawulpore, who has occupied his new acquisition with 1200 men. The details of the new treaty with the Ameers are now under discussion at Khyrpore, the principles having been from the first acceded to.

"Major Broadfoot, whom I have sent to Moulmein, seems to be a very sensible man. He knows the place and the country, and I am happy to tell you that, while he promises me some civil reforms, he bids me to be under no apprehension of being ever obliged to send a large force to defend Moulmein.

"The Resident in Nepaul expresses doubts whether intrigue will not disappoint the expectations formed of permanent benefit from the national movement. I attach little value to his opinion; and, relying upon the facts he has reported, I believe the national movement to have been of too decided a character to allow of the entertainment of any just fears from the intrigues of any man or party. I believe nothing can shake the Ranee permanently, and any attempt to overrule her would lead to the deposition of the Rajah.

"I have been obliged to make a very extensive change of men in the Saugor territory, where misgovernment has been the real cause of insurrection. I am going into Bundelcund, and then as far as Saugor and Jubbulpore next cold season. There is no understanding this country without seeing it; and I am convinced that, if it were possible, the Government should be carried on in a camp, constantly in movement.

"I hope I shall get on with Sir Hugh Gough as well as I have done with the present Commander-in-Chief. There is, however, one fault I have to find with Sir Jasper Nicolls—that of hardly ever standing between me and an improper application for allowances. It is always left to me to reject. This is not fair. However, you may be assured that it makes no difference in the decision.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, February 4, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"You will see in the newspapers the report of the Queen's Speech to Parliament on the 2nd, and the reports of the debates in the two Houses of Parliament on the motions in each for an answer to Her Majesty's Speech. Everything that passed must be satisfactory to you, as it has been to your family and your friends. We should have moved the thanks in the two Houses to the Governor-General and the officers and troops employed in India on Thursday next, the 9th, instead of on Thursday se'nnight, the 16th, only that we discovered that it would be absolutely necessary to bring papers on the table, in conformity with precedent, if we moved thanks to the Governor-General for military services, he not having been himself in the field.

"A perusal of the debates in both Houses on

the Address to the Queen will show you what wil be the topics in the discussions on the motions for thanks. In respect to yourself, they will be to your order of the 1st October, 1842, in relation to the policy of the Afghanistan war, and your letter to the rajwary of India in relation to the gates of the pagoda at Somnauth; the former will be made a bitter party complaint, the latter will be used as means to excite against you the feelings of the religious parties in this country.

"I am much more uneasy about the thanks to General Pollock than I am about those to yourself. I cannot understand how a man who knows what soldiers are made of, could think of giving an order for the destruction of the bazaar and two mosques at Cabul, and not be sensible that such destruction must and would be followed by the pillage and destruction of the town itself; and that if he thought proper to do the former, he did not put himself at the head of half the army and see the destruction effected, and to take care to protect the town from the pillage and destruction which it was certain must be the consequence by the other half of the army.

"I see that General Nott foresaw and foretold the consequences if the bazaar should be destroyed: even that the town could not be saved.

"This mistake, and the storming and plunder of Istalif; and two or three other events of the same kind that have occurred, and have been reported officially, will, I am afraid, render the discussion of

the votes of thanks to the officers of the army and to the army very *uncomfortable*, to say the least upon the subject.

"God knows! and so I shall say, that nobody ought to be more sensible than I am of the impossibility of preventing an army from plundering a town taken by storm, or of fixing the exact limits to which slaughter and violence shall go when once the onslaught commences. But these acts complained of were committed in consequence of orders given by the general to correct others more of the character of acts of vengeance than measures founded upon military or political necessity or expediency.

"In writing to you thus privately and in confidence, I confess that I do not admire the retreat made from Cabul to Peshawur. The officers had means of conveyance at their disposition, and numbers sufficient to have marched in as many columns as they pleased, and they ought to have moved in strength upon every road in the country leading to the eastward, so as to have been able to turn and take possession of the heights, which form all the defiles and difficulties on the main road, which should have been kept clear and open for the heavy artillery, carriages, &c., sick and wounded, &c.

"They would thus have made a clean retreat, would have lost no officers or men, baggage or animals—and, above all, no cannon!

"The best of it is that they were sensible of the manner in which they ought to have made their

retreat, as they commenced it in the form which I have above advocated.

"They ought to have had a strong advanced guard flanking the main road, flanked by columns on all the other roads leading to the eastward, and communicating with the main road by light troops across the hills, and the rear closed by a strong rear-guard; and the flanking columns should not have quitted their positions till they should have seen the rear-guard through the difficulties of the passes on the road.

"By this mode of proceeding, the retreat would have been what we call a clean one.

"You will receive by this overland despatch a letter from the Secret Committee respecting transactions in Scinde, which have given a good deal of uneasiness to the Cabinet, as these transactions will give ground for the assertion that affairs in Afghanistan are not brought to a close, and that the peace of India is not restored. I think likewise that the Cabinet is not satisfied with your having left the question of peace or war with the Ameers, and all the consequences, so entirely to the decision of Sir Charles Napier. I am sensible of the importance of Kurachee, Bukkur, and Sukkur, and even of Shikarpore, since I have read Sir Charles Napier's report of the topography of the country from Sukkur to Shikarpore, and of the difficulty of holding Sukkur without the possesion of Shikarpore. You will see in a former letter of mine my opinion of Shikarpore.

You may rely upon it that the great object of all, for India, for me, and for the Government, is to close the Afghan war, and make the Indian, as well as the European, world feel that it is closed and India at peace.

"I am sensible of the inconvenience which you will for some time feel from the very loose arrangements agreed to by Lord Auckland with the Ameers of Scinde. He, too, was pressed for time; he was watched in his views in respect of the treaty by Runjeet Singh, his ally, who had views of his own, as well as by Shah Shoojah Khan! and his arrangements were very imperfect. You will perfect them by degrees, with temper and patience. You have means of negotiation at command in the amount of tribute which each of these Ameers has stipulated to pay, and in the regulation of the tolls on the commerce of the Indus; and I recommend to you to trust to these means and to the reputation and reality of your power to obtain by voluntary negotiation and conciliation all that you require rather than by anything like menace or war. I see from the discussion on this subject how necessary it is that great caution should be observed in every expression of the orders upon such a subject as this.

"Some twenty years ago such a question as this would have been merely local; the Government would have had no occasion to take cognisance of it—the utmost that would have been done would have been for the Secret Committee to observe upon the trans-

action in a despatch to the Governor-General; but at this moment in particular everything that occurs in that part of the world is of importance, and becomes an imperial question, and must be treated accordingly with great care and deliberation.

"To this add that we have established throughout India at every headquarter of every cantonment, and nearly of every regiment, a licentious press, which publishes as fact every false report, every exaggeration, every scandal. These latter communicate with Bombay, those at Bombay with the newspapers in France, Germany, and England, and this in six weeks! Only conceive the mischief which they have it in their power to do in the way of impression, and how hopeless to attempt to counteract their effects by subsequent contradiction! No! I advise you to be very cautious, not only in respect of your acts, which I don't doubt that you will be, but respecting the modes of execution which you may adopt (especially to your agents), your writings, your conversations, even in private. It is lamentable to reflect that we are living under the influence of such a despotism: its influence and its tyranny are greater than that of the Inquisition ever was in the southern countries of Europe.

"I am very anxious about the mouth of the Indus. I don't like and am very jealous of the proceedings of the French Government in all parts of the world. If their object was to promote their own objects and the commercial or political interests of France, I should not

so much mind them, notwithstanding that even these objects require and deserve our attention. But what I see of them is everywhere, in every spot in which a French agent can be introduced, or even a subject of France, if only in the shape of a missionary, to intrigue, and excite the community against the interests and influence of the British Government. Yet, God knows that Government does them no harm; on the contrary, every commercial advantage is shared with them and with all who wish to partake of it.

"There is no part of the East in which they could intrigue with more advantage, and occasion more excitement against the British Government, than among the tribes on the Lower Indus, and between the mouth of the Indus and the Persian Gulf. You may rely upon it that you will ere long have a French frigate in that quarter, whose operations it will be the duty of the admiral to observe afloat, while your agents in Scinde, Beloochistan, Kelat, &c., will observe them on shore.

"The French Government have always had connections with the Sikhs. An Italian officer, who was heretofore in the service of Buonaparte, and has since been in the service of Runjeet Singh, but had returned to Europe, has within the last three months taken leave of Louis Philippe previous to his return to Lahore.

"His course should be observed. The religion, the social state, and the politics of the Sikhs render

them by far the most appropriate allies for the French of any in that part of Asia, and if once they could establish themselves on the Indus you would have them allied with the Sikhs, their officers in the Sikh army, the politics at Lahore under their direction.

"I strongly recommend to you therefore to watch carefully the mouth of the Indus.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"The Lord Ellenborough."

"London, February 6, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I enclose you a memorandum which I wrote for Sir R. Peel, Lord Fitzgerald, &c., on the 3rd upon the debate of the 2nd, and our prospects for the session. "Ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"The Lord Ellenborough."

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION OF 1843.

February 3, 1843.

"The discussions in the House of Lords last night demonstrate the course of the Parliamentary campaign.

"Lord Ellenborough will be attacked for all his acts and orders. He will be accused of having commenced with the intention of abandoning Afghanistan and of leaving the prisoners to their fate.

"Lord Lansdowne ridiculed the paragraph in the Speech which referred to the liberality of Parliament as having enabled the existing Government to bring to an early and honourable termination the war in China.

"He stated that the plan of the former Government was followed, and the same forces employed which had been by the Government at home and by the Governor-General Lord Auckland.

"We shall have the American treaty, Irish poor laws, commercial distress, and want of employment for the people.

"There is a good deal of cabal going on between Lord Stanhope and the most violent parties in the House upon the last-mentioned subjects.

"There will be some mischievous discussions on the Corn Laws, principally with the view of continuing the discontent with the measures of the last session.

"In respect to Lord Ellenborough, the papers already printed will, in my opinion, fully justify him.

"We must attend a little to the China question. The war in China was carried on by the late Administration by the use of the naval and military means, and at the expense of the resources in India, under the direction of the Governor-General, the Board of Control, the Admiralty, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

"The Cabinet will recollect that very shortly after the existing Administration was formed, certainly

before Lord Ellenborough's departure for India, I recommended, to regularise these affairs,—

"To place the conduct of the war in China exclusively under the control of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.

"That that officer should direct what officers, troops, ships, and stores should be sent; that the Governor-General should superintend the operations, under his directions, and should attend to his requisitions for ships, troops, stores, &c.

"I recommended this arrangement, I recollect, in consequence of a complaint from the general commanding in China of a want of blankets and great coats for the winter months.*

"From the period at which that arrangement was adopted it would be easy to ascertain what orders had been given as well in relation to plans of operation as to force, naval as well as military, stores and equipments.

"But I perfectly recollect that a great deal had been done by the existing Administration long before that arrangement was made.

"From the moment the Administration was formed Lord Ellenborough turned his attention to the next expected campaign in China. He wrote to Bengal to order another battalion of volunteers to be prepared; steamboats to be prepared, in India as well as at home, by the East India Company.

* "I have a copy of that Memorandum, dated October 30, 1841."

"By his desire I looked over the returns of the armies in India, and suggested from what quarters native troops could immediately be drawn, and field-artillery, horse-artillery with their horses from Fort St. George.*

"These orders must have been written to India; dates of them, and even copies, should be prepared.

"With a view to the operations in the Yangtse-kiang and the occupation of what is called the Golden Island, Kinshan, in that river, heavy ordnance and platforms were required from the Quarter-master-general, and a detachment of royal artillery for this service.

"The dates of these requisitions should be seen.

"At the same period Lord Ellenborough, in consequence of conversations with me upon the dangers of any operation in the river Yangtse-kiang, in consequence of the facilities which the enemy might have of launching fire-vessels from both banks to annoy the fleets with transports; and adverting to the mode which I informed him that I had adopted of protecting from a similar danger a bridge formed of decked vessels which I had formed in the Adour, urged the Admiralty to send out in each of the men-of-war about to be sent out at this period spars, with small anchors and cables, to enable those in

* "Upon reference to my papers I see that the plan for the operations of the campaign, and the enumeration of the troops to carry it into execution, was suggested to Lord Ellenborough in a Memorandum dated September 30, 1841."

command to construct booms ahead of the vessels, so as to protect them from the fire-vessels floated down the stream of the river, and to afford time to adopt measures to tow such vessels off and clear of the ships of the fleet or the particular ship intended to be attacked. These measures were, I believe, adopted. It would be easy to ascertain the date of the order.

"I think I have a copy of the original memorandum upon the attack by the Yangtse-kiang. It will be very important to fix and show these dates. The object being to prove that it was the existing Administration, and not their predecessors, who brought the war to a successful termination.

"I know that some of the officers and troops employed in the very last service were sent out by the existing Administration: for instance, Lord Saltoun and the troops under his command, and an Admiral Cochrane, who, I am certain, sailed from England in ur time. If I am not mistaken, I saw him at 'ortsmouth in December 1841, or January 1842, ien I went there to meet the Queen. All these tes can, and should, be ascertained.

"Upon the other subjects, as much detailed information should be collected and printed as can be got."

"Palace of Agra, March 22, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I must first thank you for the arrangement made with respect to the granting of medals for

service in China (an arrangement in the highest degree satisfactory and gratifying to the forces engaged).

"But next I must thank you most sincerely for your declared approval of my conduct in the direction of the late war in Afghanistan. It will set public opinion a little more right than it has been upon that point during the last six months, and indeed fix it in my favour; but if it were not calculated to have this effect, still I would rather have your approval than that of all the rest of the world.

"I hardly know how I could have accomplished the object of retaining possession of a commanding position upon the Lower Indus without a breach with the Ameers. We could hardly have justified our remaining at Kurachee; we could not have justified our remaining at Bukkur, after the termination of the war in Afghanistan, without a new treaty. What had occurred was sufficient to show that upon our retiring from the Indus, the existing treaty for the free navigation of that river would have been violated in every particular. The Ameers, too, had been strangely misled as to the real circumstances under which we retired from Afghanistan. They believed us beaten, and I firmly believe that our rear-guard would have been attacked had we moved from Sukkur with the avowed intention of leaving the Lower Indus altogether. I could not always keep a large force at Sukkur in a state of uncertainty. It seemed to me to be best, at the commencement of the

cold season, to require the consent of the Ameers to reasonable modifications of our treaty with them.

"It was really impossible for me to form a decided opinion as to the authenticity of Persian letters—that could be much better decided on the spot; and being satisfied that, if the letters were genuine, we were justified in requiring new terms, and that policy required us to avail ourselves of the opportunity of coming to a new settlement if we were justified in doing so, I left the matter in Sir C. Napier's hands. Even when I was at Ferozepore, it took twelve days to receive an answer from him, and no time was to be lost. Subsequent events and discoveries, and the late treachery of the Ameers, seem to have proved that I was right in believing them to be at once hostile and not to be depended upon. I do not see now what course can be pursued but that of taking the country we have conquered, with the exception of such portions as may be usefully made over to Jodhpore and Jessulmere and Buhawulpore, and perhaps even to the Lahore State, if the Maharajah will give some lands on the left of the Sutlej for lands on the right of the Indus above Shikarpore.

"I really believe that very few excesses were committed by the troops on the retreat from Cabul. In that city the bazaars and two mosques, and some houses of our enemies, were destroyed. I have no official information as to any excesses having been committed, and I do not place any faith in the reports furnished to the Indian newspapers, which

newspapers, however, I have not read since last June.

"I am very much obliged to you for your caution as to the language in which despatches are written, and as to the language I may use in conversation.

"My correspondence with Sir C. Napier having been more of a private than of a public character, although all made official, I may have been less careful in the choice of expressions than I should have been had I written in the name of the secretary.

"I believe that the terms of the treaty proposed to the Ameers were made known to the Secretary of the Bombay Government by Major Outram, but I could not prove it; because, when I officially desired to know from the Bombay Government from whom they obtained the information they communicated upon that subject to the Secret Committee, the Secretary of the Government pleaded the sacredness of a private communication. Sir W. Nott told me yesterday that he always suspected Major Outram of having made public the letter of the 13th of March to the Commander-in-Chief. There is a laxity of principle, a deadness of feeling, in India, with respect to the duty of official secrecy which really beat me. I have done all I can against it—as yet, in vain.

"I do not care what may be said about the Somnauth Gates. The measure was a politic measure for India—and I ought only to look to India. There has not been the slightest appearance of Mussulman feeling against their transmission to India. If I were to

abstain from doing anything here which could be disapproved by gentlemen over their firesides in England I should lose India. You know better than anyone the difficulties I found on my arrival. I have only been able to meet those difficulties by acts and language which, even in India, I should not myself have adopted under ordinary circumstances. But it is my duty to preserve this country, and, if I can, to make ours a strong Government, beloved by the people as well as supported by the army. I can not say how mortified I am, knowing how earnestly I desire and labour for the welfare of the people, to perceive the unequivocal marks of their indifference towards the Government. I shall endeavour to remove this indifference; but in order to do so, I must throw over English prejudices and act in the spirit of a native, not of a foreign, governor.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Agra, April 22, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"Sir Charles Napier has again been showing that he learnt war under you; and now I really believe with him that Scinde is subdued and the inhabitants rejoiced at the change in their rulers. I did not regard his telling me he should not want

the Bengal troops I had placed at his disposal, but ordered them on, and the 1st actually left Ferozepore the day after Sir Charles—finding he was more pressed than he expected—wrote for them. One regiment is already at Sukkur, two more are on the march, with four rissalahs of irregular cavalry and a camel battery. A company of European artillery will, as soon as it can, reach Ferozepore from Delhi, embark there, with four 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers, for Bukkur. These troops will be sufficient for that point; and the two Bombay regiments now there will probably be withdrawn to Hyderabad, and hereafter Upper Scinde will be held by Bengal troops and Lower Scinde by troops from Bombay.

"I am led to hope that the charge really incurred on account of the occupation of Scinde as our own will so little exceed that which we must, under any circumstances, have incurred in holding military possession of Bukkur and of Kurachee, as to leave a net increase of half a million to our revenue.

"I am very anxious indeed to have more steamers on the Indus, drawing a little water—two or three not drawing more than 22 inches we should have for the Sutlej. These I include in six I asked for now ten months ago—and I dare say the keel of one of them is not yet laid. The iron steamers 'Pluto' and 'Nemesis' are to go from Calcutta to the Indus. The 'Pluto' has been driven back. I hope no accident may have happened to the 'Nemesis.' We

have already six steamers on the Indus, but not one that will go up the Sutlej.

"I shall be delighted to have Sir Hugh Gough as Commander-in-Chief. I hope he will be up here by October, when I shall be about to move. I shall be satisfied if I can leave the frontier under his charge.

"I fear a break up in the Punjab may happen before then. General Ventura sides with the Maharajah, and he, presuming upon this aid, seems disposed to get rid of his Minister in the usual way in which Ministers are got rid of in India. The Minister at least thinks so, and openly accuses him of it, and says he shall die, like a Rajpoot, in the field. The Maharajah's health is not very good, and if anything happened to him, his son is too young to act an independent part; and there would certainly be a contest for the custody of his person.

"The Nizam's Government is on the brink of open bankruptcy, which, as you know, in India, means mutiny of troops for their pay. I must endeavour to stave off any crisis there till I am ready for it, which I shall not be till November in any case.

"Depend upon it, I will never, if I can possibly avoid it, have two things on my hands at a time.

"At Moulmein there has been, and is, a risk of collision, in consequence of our having put ourselves in the wrong. The whole thing arises out of encouragement given to a low mercantile speculation by a commissioner in the hands of merchants and their press. I am in hopes that Major Broadfoot,

the new commissioner, will be in time to stop the mischief and bring things right. He is the best man to prevent hostilities, or, if they cannot be prevented, to carry them on—but he will prevent them.

"Generally all is going on well in India—our only danger is from England. Here we have a good harvest, a devoted army, and our neighbours contented or alarmed. Trade is in that state in Calcutta in which it generally must be when carried on by gamblers; but distress in England, and uncertainty as to China, of course increase difficulties which would always exist. Our only danger is from England, because people there will think that India can be governed according to their own last new notion, and still more will believe that the press of India tells one word of truth. Then against us, too, we have the jobbing and little-mindedness of the Directors, intriguing and caballing against a Government nominally their own, because it will not make patronage practically their own. India can only be governed by great views, and as India; and these gentlemen would have me govern it on little views, and as England; but that I will not do.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"London, March 4, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"You will have seen the votes of thanks to the army and navy employed in China, and to yourself and the army employed in Afghanistan, before you will receive this letter, as well as the reports of the discussions on those votes; and I think that you will have been satisfied with what passed. I hope that Lord Brougham's speech will have been well reported. It was excellent—in his very best style. I was inclined to speak a second time, as I did not like some of the observations of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Clanricarde. But those who sat near me, as well as I, thought that it was better to leave the case where it had been left by Brougham, particularly as two of the bishops had stuck upon the question of the Gates, upon which I must have made some observations, which might have occasioned a fresh debate upon a question distinct from that of the military operations.

"We shall have a discussion upon the Gates, &c., on Thursday next, the 9th of this month, moved by Lord Clanricarde.

"It is curious enough that so little observation should have been made in either House upon the retreat from Cabul. But the truth is that the object of the party was to run at the Governor-General, and to lower him by extolling the conduct of the generals acting under his orders. Therefore the

obvious faults and blunders of the generals were unnoticed, and even the facts not referred to.

"Everything appears to be going prosperously in your quarter, and I sincerely congratulate you.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough,
"Fort William, Bengal."

"London, March 14, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I have received your letter of the 29th of December from your camp at Ferozepore. I perfectly recollect my correspondence with Lord Fitzgerald on a subject brought under his consideration by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors on a complaint made by the Vice-President in Council at Fort William, of your having omitted to give to the Governor at Fort William important information respecting special measures. This occurred at a moment at which the press in this country, excited by what had passed in the House of Commons and by the still more malignant and licentious press of India, was circulating the most unfounded and malicious reports respecting your operations and designs: that you intended to abandon the captives, and, God knows what else! that you intended to sacrifice the national honour, &c. In short, a crusade was preached up against you.

"It appeared to me to be very desirable not to give those active opponents such food for their malignity as would have been afforded by the publication at that moment of the complaint of the Vice-President in Council at Fort William to the Secret Committee, which would have been the certain result of allowing it to be forwarded to be laid before the Court. I therefore took the course most likely to soothe the Secret Committee and to prevail upon Lord Fitzgerald to prevent the publication of the complaint at that moment. I never doubted of your operations, nor that they would be eventually successful, particularly if not interfered in by the folly of the public in this country; and I always felt confident that, as soon as Parliament should meet and your friends could come forward and state your case openly, your triumph would be complete, as it has been. But in the meantime there was a good deal of mischief in progress, which it was important to counteract, and to attain that object was the foundation of my letters to Lord Fitzgerald, to which you refer.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General in Council, Fort William, Bengal."

"London, March 14, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"You will see that we had in both Houses of Parliament, on Thursday the 9th, debates on your

proclamation, or general order, from India of the 1st of October 1842, and upon your letter to the rajwary upon the Gates of Somnauth.

"Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the debate in the House of Lords, and I am told it was equally so in the House of Commons. The resolution was rejected in the latter House by a very successful majority, and everybody has since appeared satisfied.

"There is an end of the question.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough."

"London, March 15, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I enclose a note from the Horse Guards respecting the case mentioned by you in your note to me of the 29th December 1842, of Captain White and Major Hibbert, of the 40th Regiment. They have both been promoted by brevet, and both have received the Order of the Bath.

"Ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General, Fort William, Bengal."

"Agra, May 11, 1843.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"All has been quiet in Scinde since the capture of Omer-Kote. Meer Shere Mahomed and two or three of the younger Ameers have arrived at Shahghur and Allyghur, two forts in the desert, about forty miles from Jessulmere. I had anticipated their going to those places, and already the horsemen of Marwar are moving upon them.

"I have sanctioned the doubling of the strength of the Scinde Horse. With this corps raised to 1200 men Sir C. Napier thinks he can do without any other cavalry in Lower Scinde. He is establishing a police and getting into order his machinery for collecting the revenue. Meer Ali Morad of Khyrpore has followed our example, and has abolished slavery. The Ameers, fourteen in number, are prisoners at Bombay. One of them, who issued orders for murdering every Englishman, which orders led to the murder of Captain Ennis, has been strictly confined. The others are treated honourably as prisoners of war. I believe they will elect to go to Mecca when they find they have no chance of being restored to Scinde. I think we shall want permanently for Scinde ten battalions, four regiments of cavalry, and four batteries, besides ten or twelve steamers, with flats attached.

"General Ventura is with the Maharajah Shere Singh, and it is clear to me that, relying on his

support, the Maharajah will take the first occasion of cutting off his Minister, Dhian Singh. This Dhian Singh knows, and is prepared for. The break up in the Punjab will probably begin with murder. It is their way.

"In Nepaul, Mataban Singh is at the present moment all-powerful. He has the support of the army and carries the Rajah and his son with him, and the first use he has made of his power has been to cut off the heads of his hereditary enemies. I do not like this use of power, nor do I like the language attributed to him with respect to us, nor do I like his position, to maintain which, as well as to gratify his own ambition, he will, I fear, be disposed to gratify the army in its desire for war. They may wish to go elsewhere first; but they will always look with envy upon our plains, and with regret upon the hills we have taken from them, the possession of which would bring them into contact with the Punjab.

"Major Broadfoot will, I think, keep all quiet at Moulmein. I must if I can defer any financial catastrophe in the Nizam's dominions till all is settled elsewhere, and especially in Scinde. In all the rest of India everything *looks* quiet; but you know such looks in India are sometimes not to be trusted.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

"ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, April 5, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"I was in hopes that I should not be under the necessity of troubling you with a letter by the overland despatch which will be sent off to-morrow. But various information which has reached me within these few days, and particularly some correspondence which I saw this day at the Cabinet, between the President of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, induce me to think that I ought to write to you.

"The Court is not satisfied with their Governor-General, however meritorious his conduct. You are not the only Governor-General who has had the misfortune of falling under their displeasure after having performed eminent public services. The great Lord Clive and Lord Wellesley were in the same situation. I cannot write from experience of the consequences of the displeasure of the Court of Directors with the conduct of their Governor-General in the time of the great Lord Clive, but I know that in the time of Lord Wellesley it produced the greatest inconveniences and evils in India. It weakened the authority and enervated the action of the local Government. Their best and most confidential servants lost confidence in those who employed them and in their own exertions, and were frequently dismissed for the zealous performance of their duties, in the successful execution of the orders

of the superiors placed over them by the Court of Directors.

"But if the differences between the Governor-General and the Court of Directors were injurious to the public service in India, they were exceedingly inconvenient to the Government in England. I recollect that, in about the first conversation that I had with Mr. Pitt after my return from India, a very short time previous to his death, he stated to me the inconvenience to the Government at home of the disputes between the Court of Directors and the local Government of India, and the probable necessity that the Administration should adopt some measure to get the better of the inconvenience.

"The measure which was ultimately adopted was to send Lord Cornwallis to be Governor-General.

"It appears that the Court has stated several grounds of complaint with you. I say nothing of the Gates of Somnauth, which is, I think, made a *cheval de bataille* to acquire popularity for the cause, and this notwithstanding the risk which must attend the introduction of this topic into a public despatch, that the mention of it may occasion the very evils which it is alleged we apprehended.

"The Court then complains of your continued absence from the seat of your Government, Fort William, and of the consequent separation from your Council. It complains of large expenses to be incurred for forming new cantonments, barracks, and stations for the army, European troops as well as

native, without previously taking the pleasure of the Court, or giving to it the requisite information of the necessity for the new and expensive establishments, of the amount of the expense which they will occasion, or enabling the Court to acquire such information by the perusal of the reports recorded on the proceedings of the Court in the usual course, and the deliberations of the members of the Court thereupon, before any such plans could be adopted and ordered for execution, even if the previous sanction of the Court should not, according to order, have been applied for.

"With the exception of the first-mentioned subject of complaint, which is of temporary and, I hope, of momentary interest only, and is brought forward, as I believe, only *ad captandum*, these are all important topics, calculated to make a real impression upon the public, and they must be attended to by us, if, as I anxiously hope, they should not by you.

"There is nobody approves more highly than I do of those provisions of the Act of Parliament for the Government of India which enable the Governor-General to quit the seat of Government, and to exercise all the powers constitutionally extended to him while absent from the Council of Government. I am sensible of the great advantages which the public has derived from the execution of these provisions at different times, and most particularly upon the recent occasion by yourself. But it must never be forgotten that these provisions provide for extra-

ordinary cases and emergencies, and that they must be considered as an exception from the rule, and the course adopted under them to endure only as long as the emergency lasts, and not as the rule of Government.

"I have long considered the principle of the Acts of Parliament for the Government of India, and I am satisfied that it is the best that could be adopted for the administration of the government of a distant dominion, indeed the only one which can afford security for what may pass, or even a knowledge of local transactions, to the home authorities, while it provides amply for the most prompt and active exercise of the authority of the Government. This system was the proposition of the most able practical men of modern times. It has worked admirably, and I should be sorry to see it departed from.

"I am also of opinion that Fort William, in Bengal, is the proper seat of the supreme Government in India. The provinces administered by the Government of Fort William afford more resources of all kinds than an accumulation of all the rest. They are unattackable by sea as well as by land. The communication with them by sea, however, is perfectly practicable at all seasons; more so than with either of the other two great maritime settlements. This is, then, *the seat* for Great Britain of the local Government of India, the existence of which must depend upon the maritime preponderance of the empire.

"To this I would add the suggestion of the importance of giving the immediate superintendence of the Governor-General over the measures to be adopted for the improvement and application of the immense resources of the provinces under the Government of Fort William.

"It is true that the climate of Fort William is not in all seasons very agreeable, but I believe it is in no way unhealthy, if common care be taken; and there is now at the disposition of those whose duty requires their residence there the use of the sanatoria in the Himalaya mountains, to which the access will every day become more easy and expeditious in the progress of improvement.

"On the whole, then, I would earnestly recommend your early return to the seat of the Government at Fort William, with the decided intention of remaining there.

"With respect to the discussions of the Court of Directors on the recent formation and construction of new barracks at newly-formed stations and cantonments for troops, there is nobody more sensible than I am of the necessity for these alterations, arising out of recent political and military events, which have occasioned a revisal of our military position on the North-West frontier.

"I entertain no doubt that the principle, nay that the detail, of all that has been proposed to be done is right; that your own mind is convinced, not only by what you have seen, but by the reports of the

official and professional authorities, on every point, and that every shilling of the money to be expended will be absolutely required for the service, and will be expended with economy.

"But in proportion as I feel confident that it is all right, I anxiously wish that you had followed the course pointed out by your own regulations in carrying into execution these measures—for I am certain that it is yourself that, in the year 1830, made the regulation to which the Court of Directors refer in their report, forbidding the execution of any work, without their previous sanction, which should cost more than 10,000 rupees.

"I am aware that some inconvenience might have been felt, and some additional expense incurred, by the delay for a few months to execute these works, till the consent of the Court of Directors could have been received. But I have sufficient experience and knowledge of these matters to be able to measure accurately the extent of the inconvenience attending the delay, and I am certain that in public opinion it would not be allowed to weigh against the inconvenience consequent on allowing a departure from one of the fundamental principles of the Government of these British possessions.

"I have drawn your attention to the inconvenience felt here by Ministers at home in consequence of the differences between the Governor-General and the Court of Directors, and the consequence—the appointment, by the intimate friends of Lord Wellesley,

of the Marquis Cornwallis to assume the Government of India.

"Indian questions have as much of public interest at present as they have ever had—possibly more, as that interest can be more certainly gratified by the reception of monthly accounts of a date of six weeks anterior to their reception.

"Indian society in London and the East India Company have as much influence as ever over public opinion and in Parliament, and it is quite curious to observe the use made of these questions by parties in Parliament. It was intended at the commencement of the session to make a great effort to put down your character, which was defeated by the manly support given to you by the Government on the first day of the session and in subsequent discussions.

"It was then discovered that during the session five overland despatches would be received, each of which would convey some intelligence of events which would afford ground for questions and discussions on your measures. I entreat you, then, to give no ground to the Court of Directors to complain of you—for your sake, for ours, and for the sake of the public welfare, involved, as I believe it is, in the continuance of your supreme administration of the local affairs of India.

"You have saved that great empire in war. Enjoy now the satisfaction and the glory of establishing and consolidating its prosperity and the happiness of its

inhabitants in peace, and you will return to this country with all the honour which you so well deserve.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON.

"His Excellency the Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General."

"Agra, May 21, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I received yesterday your letter of the 5th of April, in which you were kind enough to make me acquainted with the disposition of the Court of Directors, and to place before me the consequences, as you had seen them, here and in England, of the determined hostility of that body to a Governor-General.

"It is certainly not an agreeable, and perhaps not a very safe, period of the year at which to commence a journey from Agra to Calcutta. However, I did not come to India to think either of agreeableness or of anything affecting myself; and having considered that nothing has occurred here which was unknown to you when you wrote of a character to alter the opinion you then entertained that it would be expedient for me to return to Calcutta, I defer to that opinion, and shall act upon it without delay. I shall, I hope, be able to reach Allahabad by the 7th of June, and to write to you from thence by the overland mail which will take this letter.

"I must remain at Allahabad till after the first rains have raised the river and cooled the air; but I trust I shall reach Barrackpore by the end of the first week in July.

"Had I entirely followed my own views, I should, supposing a visit to Scinde to have been given up, have thought that much benefit would have been derived from paying my announced visit to Gwalior and the Chiefs of Bundelcund in November and December, and then proceeding to Calcutta; but I adopt your view, and I only hope that my return to the Council at an earlier period may be of use.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Allahabad, June 9, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I received your letter advising me to return to Calcutta on the 20th ult., and on the 21st I determined to defer to your opinion. The decision being taken, I thought I should do well to carry it into effect at once, and to bring all my people, secretaries of the Government, &c., to this place before the rains. I left Agra on the 30th and arrived here in the night of the 7th, very much fatigued, but not ill. I should tell you, however, that I have been ill for the first time (in the week before I left Agra), and I

feel that I must not incur all the risks I have done since I arrived in this country.

"I hope the benefits which may be derived from my rejoining the Council will counterbalance the disadvantages which I cannot but feel are attached to my withdrawal from the Upper Provinces. I was wanted at Gwalior and in Bundelcund. I was much nearer Scinde. As for the Lahore Government, I think the appointment of Mr. Clerk as Deputy-Governor will keep that together while he remains; but he will hardly be able to remain after December.

"I shall then be very weak in the Upper Provinces, more especially if the reported illness of Sir Hugh Gough should be so severe as to prevent his coming up to Meerut. It is represented to be very serious.

"My last accounts from Scinde are of the 16th May. All was looking well. Shere Mahomed was nearly deserted. Ali Morad was in Hyderabad. Some chiefs had come in, and others were coming. The decisive measure of sending away the Ameers has contributed more than any other measure could have done to the acquiescence of the whole people in the change of Government.

"Sir Charles Napier has returned with a union of energy and of caution which has produced the best effects. In Scinde, as everywhere in India, now and heretofore, all depends upon one man. From the time we first advanced a few miles from our

ships, everything has been done by a few great men.

"I think I shall record this truth in the inscription upon Lord Wellesley's statue, which is to be erected at Calcutta, using the words of Sallust, who made the same observation with respect to the Roman Empire.

"I have fortunately got a bold, able, and, above all, an honest man into the Government of Tenasserim in the person of Major Broadfoot. He will, I trust, avert the war his predecessor had nearly matured, and he has already prevented an insurrection his predecessor had provoked. Yet I have little doubt that the supercession of Mr. Blundell by Major Broadfoot will give the *coup de grace* to me with the Court, if the entire change of officers in Saugor has not already done so. Everything I have become acquainted with since has only tended to confirm my opinion of the necessity of that change in Saugor. In fact, a long perseverance in maladministration led to the insurrection there. As for Mr. Blundell, his conduct now appears to have been so bad that the President in Council concurs with me in opinion that his appointment to the Government of the Straits should be cancelled.

"Financially we are going on well. I am not quite so sanguine as to what we can do as my colleague the President and our new Financial Minister, Mr. Dorin; but still, we are certainly in a very good way, if Parliament will not interfere with our

opium revenue. It certainly is a great advantage attending my being at Calcutta that I can mature measures of finance and of internal improvement better than at a distance.

"I shall not get the boats before the 24th or 28th, nor will the river be high enough till then for me to avoid the Sunderbunds. The voyage will not be long in the beginning of July. I shall hardly arrive, however, in time to write from Calcutta by the next mail.

"If we can collect the revenue in Scinde this year, which to a great extent I think we shall, we shall have a surplus revenue in the current year commencing on the 1st of May; but without a surplus of a crore in good years we cannot be sure of avoiding a deficit in bad years. Our surplus should not be less than that; and with that everything would be possible that could be desired for the good of India.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Allahabad, June 27, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"The letter which Lord Fitzgerald told me you had written to me on the affairs of Scinde I have not received by this last mail, which I very much regret. I suppose that it was too late for the post.

"All seems going on well in Scinde. We are

gradually extending our police and our revenue officers. The people receive us well, and readily submit to our government. I am going to send several good surveyors to survey the old water-courses and canals, and to report whether we can restore them. The Shikargahs, too, will be surveyed. A very large part of them will be restored to cultivation. The brother of the Ameer of Meerpore has been taken prisoner at Sehwan, in a well-managed affair, by Lieut.-Colonel Roberts. He had come down to Sehwan to facilitate the passage of the river by Shere Mahomed, who had before been prevented from passing by the steamers. Shere Mahomed's force is understood to be melting away. He will be pressed upon all sides as soon as the heat permits the troops to move. They are less sickly since the monsoon began. I have done what I can to press Shere Mahomed on the side of the desert, or rather to close it against him. About 450 good troops of the Jodhpore Legion, and from that number to 1000 Jageerdhar horse, will move to the Jodhpore frontier as soon as the rains are well set in—that is in a few days, and the Jessulmere people will move on Shahgur. Then, in all probability, Shere Mahomed will come in upon terms, and all will be quiet.

"Our friend Ali Morad is taking possession of lands which do not belong to the turban, which cannot be allowed; but I suppose he will listen to reason.

"The regent went away quietly from Gwalior,

and our Resident is gone to his bungalow at D'holpore, where he will remain in observation.

"There is some prospect of a collision at Gwalior, between the troops of Dada Khasgee Walla (the successful chief in this late affair of intrigue) and those of Colonels Baptiste and Jacobs. He wants to remove the latter from the palace, which they have guarded for years. I think the ultimate result will be that our Resident will be entreated by the Maharanee and the principal chiefs to return to Gwalior, and to settle the government. Unless this should occur, or some satisfactory settlement should be made amongst themselves, I do not feel disposed to let him leave Dholpore. He had better be in no manner mixed up with intrigues. I do not mean to withdraw the Body Guard from Agra till things are satisfactorily settled at Gwalior. Its remaining at Agra will keep up the expectations of my returning.

"Nothing new has happened in Nepaul. Mataban Singh means, I think, to be all-powerful at any cost; but he, at present, declines taking the office of Minister. The mischievous proceedings of the late commissioners at Moulmein left a feeling of ill-will and resentment there on the part of the Burmese, which it will require all the good sense and management of Major Broadfoot to render harmless.

"I am afraid the Arabs in the Nizam's territory may give trouble before I am quite ready for them; but the Madras army is strong—only I want to do one thing at a time. I have been speaking as if I

were to remain here; but, certainly, my expectation is that the next letters from England will, in some way or other, lead to my early return to England. I shall in any case leave India better than I found it, if not as well as I could have made it.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Dinapore, July 4, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"Mr. Bird, the Deputy-Governor of Bengal, who has in that capacity, and as President in Council, really done very well during my absence, is desirous of purchasing for his only son, William Wilberforce Bird, now in India, a commission in one of the Queen's cavalry regiments in this country, with a preference for the 9th Lancers. His money is ready at Coutts's.

"I enclose his letter to me. He has established a claim upon the Government by the very honourable manner in which he has executed his duties, and I shall be very glad if you should be able to oblige him as he desires.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Calcutta, August 12, 1843.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I arrived here a month ago, and the experience of that time satisfies me that although the communications necessary with the Council consume time and delay business about twenty-four hours at least, more commonly forty-eight hours, they do not in the slightest degree affect the ultimate decision. I get on very agreeably with my colleagues, and shall have no trouble with them. They require a little holding back with respect to Gwalior, but we are unanimous as to the expediency of the Commander-in-Chief forming his camp at Cawnpore on the 15th of October, and as to the necessity of having a large camp of exercise or observation at Agra, which will be under Sir Hugh Gough's personal command. The force in this camp will amount to twelve regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, and forty-eight guns. In the event of any movement being required, 4000 infantry and 1000 cavalry can be in a few days drawn together at Jhansi, and there will be besides a camp of exercise at Umballa or Khytul. In all about 24,500 men, besides artillery, will be under canvas. I am in hopes that the mere rumour of the preparation of this force may bring things right at Gwalior, and give us a friendly Government there. At present things look ill there. The regent, nominated with our sanction, has been expelled. A person hostile to us has all

power, and has a minor rajah, nine years old, in his hands. The whole army is concentrated at Gwalior, the Europeans and Eurasians in the Gwalior service have generally been turned out of camp with violence and insult. Men of bad character, hostile to us, and those recently put out of office on our representation, are placed in high civil and military commands, and everywhere the change of Ministers is considered a triumph over the British Government. In Berar they apprehend, but have not yet had, disturbances. Holkar seems to think he may imitate Scindiah, and disregard our envoy. The new Minister at Gwalior says, 'Now the Governor-General is going to England, and Colonel Sutherland must leave Rajpootana (on account of health), and Mr. Clerk has left the North-West Frontier Agency, we shall have all our own way.' I expect that plunderers will make the Gwalior territories (so much intermixed with ours and those of our allies) their place of refuge, and from thence attack our subjects and those of our allies. We shall demand reparation, which the Gwalior Durbar will be unable to give, for they can neither prevent nor punish such offences, and we shall be obliged to take such reparation as we can find. I look to occupying and administering the districts in which the Gwalior State exercises no real authority, and from which the bands of plunderers will come, and of covering such occupation by the camp at Agra.

"The troops from Bundelcund would only move if

there should be an advance, which will not, I think, become necessary.

"The troops at Khytul or Umballa would probably have gone there under any circumstances solely for the purpose of exercise, which they are much in want of. The native regiments which will be in that camp are the worst in the army.

"In Scinde all goes on well. There is every prospect of permanent tranquillity. The surveyors are already named who are to report on the possibility of reopening the Nara. The inhabitants are in our favour, and the Beloochees are disheartened. Still, it will be advisable to keep a large force there for some time; and in addition to the force now there, the 13th Queen's will go to Sukkur in December, where Sir Charles Napier has built excellent barracks. We are promised an ultimate revenue in Scinde of one million. I should tell you, by-the-bye, that we have now ten millions in our several treasuries, that the Five per Cents. are at six premium, and that the abundant rains which have fallen, or are falling, secure our revenue this year from the land, while we are getting 800,000*l.* more than in 1841–42 from opium.

"There is an impending crisis (from financial difficulty) in the Nizam's dominions. The old Minister, enfeebled by age and unable to meet the demands upon the State, resigns, with our concurrence, as soon as measures can be taken for conducting the government. We have authorised a loan of one

million, but on strict conditions which will give us the administration of the country. Whether the Nizam can advance money from his private treasury to pay off the debts of the State seems doubtful. I do not think he can, and I am satisfied he will not, and think the ultimate result will be our acquisition of the 'Dewanny' of his territories.

"We have abolished all custom duties on the North-West Frontier except those on salt, sugar, and cotton, and have added to the tax on salt. The preparation of a measure for the abolition of the transit duties at Madras takes some time, but it will be done; and we shall there, too, raise the duty on salt, as well as at Bombay, where we are to abolish the town duties. I believe all these measures will succeed. They are the last *great* measures we can adopt. All after these will only be the polishing up of what may have become defective.

"The affairs of the Punjab will probably receive their *dénouement* from the death of Shere Singh. He commits excesses and is not strong. His son, an amiable boy, will be a puppet in the hands of Dhian Singh.

"This mail will convey to you most interesting letters from Sir C. Napier. His conduct, and that of Major Outram, will at last stand in their true light; but I suppose misrepresentation will have had sway too long to admit of justice being done.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, July 5, 1843.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"The letters which I wrote to you in April last will have apprised you of the anxiety which I felt respecting the progress and the settlement of the affairs of Scinde.

"The opposition in Parliament had, at a very early period of the session, endeavoured by sarcasm, and observations upon passages and words in your general orders and letter upon the Gates of Somnauth, to ridicule your pacific professions, to place them in contrast with your conduct in Scinde, and to draw the conclusion that, notwithstanding your blame of the conduct of your predecessor in office, you were acting with views of conquest inconsistent with the declarations and principle of the law.

"These representations were soon taken up by the press; responded to, mis-stated, and exaggerated by the licentious press of Asia; resounded again by the press of France and Germany and England; and made a great impression upon the public, the East India Company, the Court of Directors, and members of both Houses of Parliament—among the latter upon some of the most noble-minded men and the best supporters of Government, who disapproved of all that they heard and read of respecting Scinde.

"The affairs there were in such a state, and indeed are still so undecided, that the Government

would not venture to lay before the public all that they knew.

"Several transactions required explanation, not only of the course pursued, but even of the result. We have been at times a month waiting to be certain whether a battle fought was successful or otherwise; that was the case particularly respecting the battle fought near Hyderabad, and it is even at this moment doubtful whether there will or will not be another great battle for the possession of Scinde.

"All this is to be attributed very much to the celerity of the communication between Bombay and England, and the existence of the licentious press at Bombay, and to the relative position of the seat of the war in Scinde, and Scinde itself, with Bombay on the one hand and your headquarters at Agra on the other.

"But whatever may have been the cause of the state of men's opinions and feelings and the circumstances which I have above described, there can be no doubt of their existence—of the extreme and growing embarrassment of the Government, and of danger to its existence and to the public interest, resulting from this Scinde affair.

"Lord Fitzgerald, having been very unwell almost from the period of the commencement of the session, at last died, at a moment at which I certainly did not expect that misfortune.

"Lord Ripon was appointed to fill his office of President of the Board of Control as soon as that

arrangement could be made, and I told him, at a very early period, that I would give him every assistance in my power, as I had done to his predecessor in office.

"At a very early period I gave him a memorandum about the outlay, of which I enclose a copy; and the Cabinet, having subsequently commenced to discuss, I gave him another and more detailed memorandum, dated the 11th of June, of which I likewise enclose the copy.

"This last will show you clearly what the difficulties of the question were in this country.

"The Cabinet has had many discussions; their decision has been postponed from time to time, in expectation that they might receive farther accounts and explanations in answer to previous despatches sent to you through the Secret Department; and at last a despatch was agreed upon yesterday, to be sent to you by the overland mail to-morrow, in which is suggested for your consideration a scheme for the future government of Scinde, which is deemed calculated to give satisfaction here.

"The adoption of this scheme is left entirely to your own decision. Since I saw the draft of their despatch I have seen your despatch to the Secret Committee of the 7th May, from which I can form a faint idea of the state of affairs in Scinde; of the schemes of defence by Sir Charles Napier, of their progress, and some judgment of their probable success. I think that the affair is in such a state

as to afford you time to obtain information to enable you to consider and decide upon this or any other plan for the future government of Scinde, and I am quite convinced that the Government will approve, confirm, and support whatever you may, upon deliberation, determine.

"My former letters will have shown you that I have long foreseen these difficulties.

"It is a great advantage for any individual to serve so great a nation as this is; but that advantage is attended by its drawbacks, its difficulties, and various disagreeable circumstances. These are all in operation at this moment upon this question.

"But a man such as you, endowed with your talents, who has performed such services as you have, and who has it in his power to serve his country as you have, should scorn these difficulties, and persevere to do all the good that he is permitted to do, be what they may the obstacles in his way.

"I earnestly recommend to you then to persevere. Thank God, you have health and strength and spirits.

"I beg you, however, never to lose sight of the fact that it is an English Parliament and public that you have to satisfy, and that through the organisation of the authorities of the East India Company, excited by the licentious London press discussing the exaggerated reports and misrepresentations of the more licentious press of India.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

"Barrackpore, September 20, 1843.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I am greatly obliged to you for your letter by the July mail, and the two memoranda, written for the Cabinet, which it enclosed. My colleagues had no more doubt than I had as to the manner in which it was necessary for us to exercise the discretion left to us, and we have been taking public measures, having for their object the removal of all doubt from the public mind here, and from the minds of the Ameers and their adherents, as to the future destiny of Scinde. We felt that uncertainty as to the future was the only source from which danger to our position could arise.

"I hope you will approve of the measure of garrisoning Scinde with Bengal troops only. The inconveniences attached to having the troops of two Presidencies there were constantly forcing themselves upon our notice, and we should soon have had the whole Bengal army infected by the extravagance of that of Bombay. All the reasons for the measure are detailed in the resolution of Government upon the subject, except one of some importance, which is, that if we had not settled the question, the tendency of the jobbers would have been to place Scinde under Bombay. The only hope of good government there, and of efficiency, was keeping it in the hands of the Government of India.

"I get on perfectly well with my colleagues, the

only difference is that the forms of the Council delay measures twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The measures are what they would have been had I remained alone.

"The Commander-in-Chief set off on the 12th for the camp at Agra. He is very popular, and we agree perfectly. If the Gwalior affair should not be settled before the camp is formed, I confess I shall be a little nervous at leaving such an instrument as the army which will be assembled there, and the other army I shall have in Bundelcund, in the hands of a commander-in-chief with any discretionary powers. I feel that I ought to be there myself. However, I hope all will be arranged before long.

"The Maharajah of Lahore is pulling his house down upon his head; the catastrophe was very nearly taking place three weeks ago, but it is deferred. The increasing intemperance of the Maharajah must ultimately be fatal to him. There does not seem to be any feeling against us. They are only quarrelling amongst themselves apparently; nor do I see the least show of hostility to us anywhere; but there are in many parts rumours of combinations to be declared in October. We shall be well prepared.

"The 16th Lancers will go home after the camp, and I think the Buffs; but I wish we had another regiment to take their place at Allahabad. I am sure we have not one European regiment too many in India. The Commander-in-Chief seems to approve of my general view of the positions to be occupied on

the North-West Frontier, and Umballa will become a great station. At Ferozepore and Loodianah we must have small forts. Kurnaul is become so very unhealthy that it must be at least temporarily abandoned. I am anxious to receive your opinion as to the place at which the advanced magazine now at Delhi should be fixed.

"The Nizam is represented to be ready to pay the arrears of the troops and the more pressing debts of the State from his own resources, and to name a Minister with our concurrence, and to adopt many useful specified reforms. I confess I am not sanguine upon these points; but all looks well at present, and the probable Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, is highly respectable. Things remain as they were in Nepaul, except that a few more of Mataban Singh's old enemies have been put to death, with the general concurrence.

"I am sending a new Resident to Nepaul, Major Lawrence, who was at Peshawur, and is now at Umballa. He has an excellent manner with the natives, and knows Mataban Singh; and I think he will do well there.

"To assist the Government in keeping Turkey and Persia at peace, we send Major Rawlinson to Bagdad, to be under the Queen's Ministers at Constantinople and Teheran, and to have under him all our people in and about the Persian Gulf.

"The death of the Rajah of Jodhpore, who was insane, relieves us from a great embarrassment.

Lord Auckland had, amongst other legacies, left me an engagement to keep out of Jodhpore the 'paths —religious mendicants, to whom the Rajah was devoted—and there seemed to be no good way out of the scrape but that which the Rajah has been considerate enough to take.

"A detachment of the Jodhpore legion marched between the 2nd and 24th of August from Jodhpore to Omerkote, and has proved to the Beloochees that we are in their rear as well as in their front. However, all seems quiet in Scinde. I have some fears for Sir C. Napier's health. He is ordered by his medical men to Kurachee. General Simpson will have joined him there before now. Should Sir Charles be transferred to Bengal on our only having Bengal troops in Scinde?

"Financially we are in a state of prosperity, and indeed everything seems to be going on well. We are going to abolish all the transit duties at Madras. The Draft Act is gone to Madras for consideration.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Barrackpore, October 18, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I received yesterday a letter from Sir C. Napier, of which I enclose a copy, representing the services of Lieutenants and Brevet-Captains Hutt and Henderson, and expressing his earnest desire that

those officers may have extended to them the same honour which is promised to Lieutenants and Brevet-Captains Tait and Jacob.

"I know the strong objections to a supplementary list of honours; at the same time there may be circumstances under which it is advisable to resort to that measure, rather than to leave meritorious officers without their just reward; and I shall be very happy if you should deem this to be a case in which that measure may properly be taken.

"There are certainly likewise some cases of officers who seem to be somewhat inadequately remunerated for their services last year. The cases which appear to be the strongest are those of Major Broadfoot and Major Sanders. The latter was chief engineer with Sir W. Nott's army. Major Broadfoot has had no reward for his services after the siege of Jellalabad, although they were undoubtedly much greater than those of many officers, almost of any officer, who advanced with Sir G. Pollock to Cabul, for he always led the advance.

"However, you know so well what officers' feelings are upon these points, and are so much more capable than any one else of appreciating their real merits, that I hardly feel justified in doing more than I should do if I simply transmitted their appeals.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Calcutta, October 20, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"There is no probability of our getting the Marseilles mail of September before the express leaves Calcutta to-morrow. The Falmouth letters have been brought by the 'Hindostan' steamer. We know, therefore, that the session is ended without any expression of the opinion of the Government either as to what has been done, or as to what is to be done, in Scinde. The inference drawn here will be that what I did has been really disapproved, that my acts will be recalled, and the Ameers restored. Not only must this impression generally weaken the Government here, but it will tend to produce serious misfortunes in Scinde, where it will encourage the enemies of our rule, and deprive us of all aid from those who wish us well. None will irretrievably injure themselves with the Ameers, supposed to be on their return, by giving support to us.

"I have done everything in my power to counteract this impression, and we have lately directed that the zenanas shall be brought over to Bombay, in order to induce every one to believe that the Ameers will never return.

"The Nawab of Buhawulpore—who has consented to diminish to the extent of one-half the duties levied by him on the Sutlej, to take but one duty on the transit of animals, whatever their load, and to make that duty, whatever the animal, only one rupee, and

finally to cede to us a strip of territory, which carries us to the Sutlej and enables us to complete a second line of customs houses—this friendly Nawab now believes the stories from Bombay, and believes also that, as a consequence of the return of the Ameers, he shall lose Subzulcote, in consideration for which he in fact made all these concessions to us. Then, again, at Gwalior, there is reason to suppose that the Dada Khasgbee Walla is holding out in the hope that my successor may deal with him more favourably than he thinks I shall.

"Everywhere the idea that what is solemnly done by a Governor-General is a matter of the greatest moment, may be reversed by orders from England, must have a tendency to weaken the Government. In fact, it has a tendency to make it necessary to do that by arms which, under all other, and I must say the usual, circumstances under which a Governor-General has been placed, would have been effected by diplomatic representation.

"Every succeeding account gives a worse and a worse picture of the position of affairs at Lahore. The army is paramount. Everything is managed by the regimental committees, which correspond and act in concert. The donations and pay extorted can only be paid for a short time out of the accumulated treasures. When these fail all will be confusion. Heera Singh has no real authority. His best adviser has been Ventura, but he is threatened now. Ghelab Singh remains in the Hills, either in sickness, in

grief, or in policy. He is securing himself there. Heera Singh will probably soon fly to Jummoo. Then a pure Sikh government will be formed in the Plains and a Rajpoot Government in the Hills, and Mooltan may perhaps break loose from all connection with the Sikhs. Ventura anticipates a long anarchy, from which the only ultimate refuge will be in our protection; I agree with him. However, you will see that the instructions given to Colonel Richmond are of the most fair and friendly character towards the Sikh State. We adhere to the policy pursued for so many years; and for my own part I desire the continuance of a government in the Punjab like that of Runjeet Singh. The thing, however, will not be; and the time cannot be very distant when the Punjab will fall into our management, and the question will be what we shall do as respects the Hills. Probably the Hills will be very much divided under separate Governments, and I look to the protection of our Government being ultimately extended to the Sikhs of the Plains and the Rajpoots of the Hills, and the Mussulmans of Mooltan, precisely as it is now to the Sikh chiefs on the left of the Sutlej. The Khalsa lands are worth half a million, and the payments from the Jagheers may be as much. There would also be lapses of estates. I do not look to this state of things as likely to occur next year, but as being ultimately inevitable, if we do not bring on union against ourselves and indisposition to our rule by some precipitate interference. I should tell you,

however, that there is, as there long has been, a great disposition, even in quarters not military, to disturb the game.

"The donation obtained by these mutinous troops and the high pay promised, twelve rupees, may, I rather fear, act injuriously upon some of the indifferent regiments now on the frontier. There has been already an indication of a bad spirit in that very bad regiment the 64th, now at Loodianah.

"We have been, of course, obliged to arrest the movement of the Bengal troops before ordered to relieve the Bombay troops in Scinde, with the exception of the 13th Queen's, which goes at once to Sukkur. There the great sickness renders us weak, and some attack is threatened from the Hills by Shere Mahomed. I hope the state of things in the Punjab will soon enable us to send two entire regiments after the 13th Queen's. In the meantime we have requested the Madras Government to commence the intended movements of relief by sending four regiments of native infantry, one of light cavalry, and a battery into the Valley of the Nerbudda, to set free our troops there, and another regiment to Cuttack, to set free our regiment there. We spare a regiment also from Barrackpore, and the Rajah of Nagpore lends us 400 good irregular cavalry. The first brigade of Madras troops, two regiments native infantry, one regiment light cavalry, one company foot artillery, and the Rajah's horse will be on the Nerbudda by the first of next month.

"The Commander-in-Chief prefers forming two corps, one in Bundelcund and one at Agra, to having one strong corps at Agra.

"I am most earnestly desirous that the chiefs at Gwalior should expel the Minister, and enable our agent to return without any actual intervention on our part, and I yet hope this will be done; but if they should not, can we prudently abstain from compelling his expulsion? The position in which we stand is greatly altered by the events at Lahore. There, within two forced marches of the best ford over the Sutlej, which is midway between our stations of Loodianah and Ferozepore, is an army of 70,000 mutinous soldiers, on whose conduct no man can depend. We must be strong in the front of this army within the protected Sikh States, and we shall have there 15,000 or 16,000 men altogether; but sickness has seriously affected our strength at Delhi and Kurnaul.

"Reinforcements are advisable in Scinde.

"It would be desirable not to postpone for any long period the relief by Bengal troops of the Bombay force in Scinde. Then in what a position are we in Saugor and Bundelcund! Along the whole of our common frontier with the Gwalior State plunderers and rebels will be sheltered. In Malwah, where the territories of Scindiah are intermixed with those of our allies, the result will be the same. Present apprehension may deter the Minister of Gwalior and the officers under him from giving

open support to malcontents; but when under the friendly but weak government of the late Maharajah there was not cordial co-operation from his officers, what can be expected of the Government of the Minister who has raised himself to power in despite of us, and who has exercised his authority by restoring to office ancient enemies of the British Government who had been displaced on our representations, and by turning out of office those who had our confidence? Then at Gwalior is an army of 30,000 men, with a very numerous artillery, mutinous and under no control. How can we act freely in Scinde or on the Sutlej with this force within seventy miles of Agra?

"If I were at Agra I cannot help thinking that I could manage to obtain all we want without actual war. I very much fear that in my absence this may not be done. I desire peace, and all soldiers do not. I believe you are amongst the few who would rather effect a necessary object peaceably than by war.

"The only objection I see to my going to the North-West is that my movement might be interpreted as indicating intentions against the Punjab. The only interpretation the Gwalior Durbar could put upon it would be favourable to peace.

"There has been an unfortunate event on the frontier of Nepaul. Some Oude troops have violated the Nepaul territory in the endeavour to seize a refractory Rajah, and there has been fighting. The Nepaul Durbar, under Matabar Singh, has made

very strong representations, and is in much excitement. I immediately, on hearing of this untoward event, desired Sir W. Nott to press the King of Oude to afford the most prompt and ample reparation, and I desired the Resident in Nepaul to make it known that I had done so. Nothing could be more inconvenient than a rupture between Nepaul and Oude.

"You see I have embarrassments all around me. I will do all I can to keep things quiet. I will *not* spare myself; but I am sure you will feel that this is not exactly the moment at which it is convenient to the public interests in India that a reasonable doubt should be entertained whether the Governor-General has the confidence of the home authorities.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever very sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Calcutta, October 21, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"It will not be until the last moment that it will be decided here what course shall be pursued as to Gwalior — whether we shall remain in silent observation, or move forward with a demand. I feel that everything depends upon a minute calculation of time—that we must not engage in an operation against Gwalior without being sure that we have time enough to finish it before our force can be

required elsewhere. The appearance that we were engaged in a lengthened operation at Gwalior would draw the Sikhs over the Sutlej; the assurance that we had settled everything at Gwalior, and that our rear was secure, would keep the Sikhs quiet on their own side of the river.

"However late and however carefully we decide, and however cautiously we may word our instructions, it is impossible that we should not be forced to leave much to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief. He tells me in a private letter that he fears the Sikhs will not give us the opportunity of going to Lahore. He can only desire an opportunity of increasing his name. He knows nothing of Indian politics. He will take, I apprehend, a limited view of our position, looking only at what is immediately before him.

"Our last accounts from Lahore give a still worse picture of affairs there. Everything portends another revolution and the flight of Heera Singh, who has no power over the army, and whom Gholab Singh does not make a movement to assist.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever very sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Barrackpore, November 20, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"You will see by the official letter I have addressed to Lord Ripon that I have acted as I

believed you would think right, upon receiving from him a copy of the resolution of the Court condemning the conduct of the Indian Government with respect to Scinde. I have determined to remain here until removed, or until I find I am unable to execute my duty with benefit to the country.

"I had long felt that my proper station at the present moment was at Agra; but expecting that the next overland mail might announce my supercession, I did not think fit to apply to the Council for the requisite powers. My colleagues, however —not yet informed of the resolution of the Court— pressed upon me the expediency of my proceeding to Agra. I thereupon showed them the resolution, and they at first agreed with me in thinking that I could not go, but when they had considered Lord Ripon's letter, they changed their opinion, and I deferred to it. Accordingly all the necessary measures have been taken, and I leave Calcutta for Agra on the 25th—that is, I wait for the next mail, under the impression that it is scarcely possible that it should not announce either my supercession by the Court, or that arrangements have been made by the Government for my immediate relief. In the latter case, I do not think that it would be fitting to exhibit to the army at Agra a discredited Governor-General, and politically my presence would have no effect. I find that Mr. Bayley, the director, has written to his son respecting the resolution of the Court, and I apprehend other directors have written, too; but it is not

generally known, I believe, and the colour they give to it is that it was only passed that the Government might not be able to infer from their silence that they approved of what had been done in Scinde, and so involve them in future responsibility.

"My expectation is that I shall be able to return to Calcutta by the end of February.

"In the Punjab, affairs are tending to another change. Either Heera Singh will be murdered or he will retire. He has lost all authority, but he still holds the treasury, into which, however, nothing comes, and from which much must flow. The mother of the boy Dhuleep Singh seems to be a woman of determined courage, and she is the only person apparently at Lahore who has courage. The result will probably be the early separation of the Hills from the Plains, and, when Dost Mahomed can gather a little more strength, the annexation of Peshawur to his territories. There is no movement against us, nor is there any present prospect of any, unless a complete break up should send plunderers amongst us.

"On our side we have one European and two native regiments of infantry at each of the points of Ferozepore and Loodianah, besides cavalry and artillery, and there will be a strong force at Umballah, besides a European regiment at Kassowley. Mud works are in process of erection round the magazine at Ferozepore. The old fort of Loodianah will be strengthened. Bridges will be established

over the Murkundah and Juggur, and a new line of road will join Meerut and Umballah. In short, all will be done which I thought necessary and began last year, for which the Court were so angry with me. The necessity of all then suggested is now apparent. Kurnaul must be altogether abandoned, on account of its unhealthiness.

"There has been, and is, a general sickness in Scinde, not confined to the troops but extending to the population, and beyond Scinde even to Candahar. Not a man has made the motion of a finger against us since the dispersion of Shere Mahomed's people in June.

"The Queen's 13th is now moving to Sukkur, and two native regiments will soon follow, that is, as soon as we are *quite* sure of quiet upon the Sutlej.

"The Nepaulese Durbar seems much gratified by our immediate intervention with the King of Oude to obtain reparation for the aggression on the Nepaul territory, and all is quiet and in good humour on that side.

"The succession to the Guddees of Jodhpoor and Indore have taken place under difficult circumstances with unanimity.

"All is quiet in Saugor and Bundelcund, and there has been nothing further on the side of Moulmein. All is quiet there, too.

"Our only present trouble is on the side of Gwalior; but there our position is much improved. The usurping Minister has been seized, and is in the

hands of some of the chiefs and their troops. He has, however, still with him the zenana and a large body of infantry, besides the artillery. Colonel Jacob, who has 10,000 men, stands wavering. In any case, instead of contending against a Government wielding a united army, we have only to deal with two nearly balanced parties, one of which desires our friendship.

"I have therefore changed the plan to which I had before inclined, and instead of occupying outlying territories while the presence of the troops at Agra kept the Gwalior army quiet at Gwalior, and thus compelling the Government to come into reasonable terms, I have abandoned the idea of occupying territory, as inapplicable to the new circumstances, and must do all, if any movement should be necessary, by an advance to Gwalior for the purpose of giving entire ascendency to our friendly chiefs. Accordingly the orders before given to the field forces of Rajpootana and Malwah and the Nizam's troops near Boorhanpore, to be ready for the field, have been countermanded.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Speirs, the agent at Gwalior, has gone beyond his instructions, and has made a premature demand in an awkward manner, which might, under other circumstances, have embarrassed us very much. As things have turned out, I hope no great inconvenience will arise from his *gaucherie* and precipitancy. You should send for the minute I wrote on the passing of the Act enabling me to

proceed to the Upper Provinces. It will put you in possession, generally, of my views with respect to Gwalior. If the army should be obliged to move forward, I believe it will be best for me to go with it, that I may be at hand to settle things diplomatically; but this I must decide upon when I arrive at Agra.

"I am in hopes that not one shot will be fired, and that the result of all this will be the establishment of our influence at the Durbar of Gwalior in so decided a manner as to secure for the future the cordial co-operation of the Gwalior authorities in the maintenance of order upon our common frontier.

"Some diminution ought to be made in their army. It is too large for the revenues of the State, and too near us to be a desirable neighbour, considering its composition and its temper. It has always been an object of apprehension whenever our forces have been occupied elsewhere. Still, I know that there is no more delicate operation than that of reducing an army, and that, besides, many men who are harmless as paid Sepoys in the barracks, would be very troublesome as plunderers in the field.

"I do not know what gentlemen in England may say about our proceedings with respect to Gwalior; but I assure you that upon that subject I have more moderation not only than my colleagues, but than any one I have seen. I have to back against a good deal of old Indian feeling; but I shall do whatever I think right, although I dare say what I do will be

condemned here on one ground and in England on another. I do not care about this, if I should succeed in doing what you approve.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Camp Munneah (one march from Dholepore),
"December 18, 1843.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I left Barrackpore on the 25th November, and reached Agra on the 11th instant. The first brigade moved on the 12th, and the day after to-morrow the whole of this portion of the army will be assembled at Dholepore.

"On the 13th I sent a letter to the Maharanee announcing my march and my objects. On the receipt of this letter orders were given for the delivery of the hostile Minister, and he is now a prisoner in my camp. From the disposition evinced at Gwalior, I have now every expectation that our objects will be effected without the actual use of force. The disbandment of a portion of the army is the only measure which appears to offer any difficulties, and much delicacy will be required in carrying it into effect. I have hopes that the troops of the well-affected chiefs may be able to do all without our actual presence. Near we must be, in order to give them strength and resolution. I have requested

the Commander-in-Chief to leave the battering train at Agra, with the exception of ten guns, which may be wanted if the troops to be disbanded should resort to the measure of defending their cantonments. It seems clear that no guns will now be wanted against the Fort of Gwalior. I wish, therefore, not to create unnecessary alarm at Gwalior, which might lead to some act of desperation, and I am anxious that the Sikhs should not imagine we are engaged in an operation likely to occupy much time. I do not desire either to block up our rear by 2500 hackeries attached to the train, as, if the Sikhs should move, we shall have to make a rapid counter-march. I am desirous of making this operation as short as is consistent with the effecting of all my objects and to get back the troops to Agra.

"I am acting upon your treaty of Boorhanpore, carrying into effect the spirit of that treaty by rescuing the person and Government of the Maharajah from the real subjection in which both are to the army.

"I shall carry into effect, too, Lord Wellesley's views as to the future relations of Scindiah with our Government, which would have been entirely defeated had we permitted this really unfriendly Government, with an overgrown and mutinous army, to exist at Gwalior.

"The territories of Runjeet Singh seem to be breaking into two parts, the Hills and the Plains, and the latter must soon experience a new revolution.

The army there is really the Government. In Scinde all is quiet, and there is nothing doing on the side of Nepaul, although I had a false alarm given to me there as I was coming up to Agra.

"Believe me, ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Camp, Gwalior, January 21, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I little expected ever to have to write to you about a battle in which I had myself been present—however, so it is. We crossed the Chumbul on the 23rd, the advanced brigade having passed on the previous day; but all the heavy guns and stores were not up at Hingonah till the 26th. The passage of the Chumbul, if opposed, would have been a very serious affair, as the ravines extend inland on the right bank for a mile and a half, and are so deep as to make all regular movement impossible. The contest, after the river had been passed, would have been one of man to man. The ford was 500 feet broad, and had a good bottom, but the water was three feet three inches deep, and, luckily, there was no current. I was very anxious to get the army over the Chumbul, not only to avoid a contest there, but to be clear of it before the rain, which might be expected at Christmas, had raised the river, as it usually does, about three or four inches for three or four days. The rain, fortunately for us, did not fall

until we were here in camp. The boats for our bridge did not reach the point at which we passed until the 29th—the day of the two battles—and the bridge was not formed till five or six days later. The boats came from Agra, down the Jumna and up the Chumbul, without any guard but one of 400 Burhundazes. We could get no sufficient boats in the Chumbul. The Gwalior people might, of course, have stopped the boats had they sent four companies, with a gun, to any point on the river.

"I was to have received the Maharanee and the Maharajah in the camp at Hingonah on the 26th, and to have proceeded with them to Gwalior; but it became evident on the 24th that no interview would be permitted by the Gwalior troops, who were determined to have a fight. Two of the vakeels went away on the 25th, having admitted that the army was all powerful, and that nothing they agreed to could be carried into effect. To what was proposed they were (for themselves) ready to agree.

"Accordingly, on the 25th orders were sent to General Grey to move by his left by Himmutghur, to form a junction with us, and we were to make a corresponding movement on Dumahla, where the Gwalior troops were understood to be collecting in force. The communication with General Grey was, fortunately, not interrupted before he received his orders; but it was interrupted immediately afterwards, so that we moved from Hingonah, on the 29th, not knowing whether he had received the orders of the 25th and

would make the march by Himmutghur to connect himself with our right and support our movement in advance.

"As for the battle of Maharajpore, you will have the Commander-in-Chief's despatch and two plans—one showing the march of the several columns from Hingonah, and the other some movements in the battle. The former plan is correct. The latter may be so where the Commander-in-Chief was, but it is certainly not correct where I was, unless altered since I saw it.

"The 39th Queen's and 56th Native Infantry were first in line, about a quarter of a mile or a little more in advance of Jowra towards Maharajpore. When ordered to advance, these regiments were formed into columns upon their centres, and in this formation they advanced till within about 500 yards of Maharajpore. They were then again formed into line. They could not have gone more than 1000 yards in column. The 56th Native Infantry was outmarched by the 39th Queen's. They were incommoded by their knapsacks, and the officers commanding halted the regiment that the knapsacks might be taken off. When the charge was made on the batteries at Maharajpore, the left of the 56th was behind the right of the 39th. As for the guns, which were at first on the left of the 39th, they went off to the left, and so did the cavalry.

"The ground was generally covered with bajree, full five or six feet high; the artillerymen could

not see how to point their guns. The guns of the enemy were concealed until discovered by their fire. Literally, batteries were put up like covies of partridges.

"The position of the enemy was known on the evening of the 28th, when Maharajpore was not occupied. It was higher than the rest of the ground, and a good deal in haze to us, who looked upon it against the sun at eight A.M.; but from Maharajpore everything could be seen.

"I only saw the 39th a part of their way. Nothing could be more beautiful than their advance. I was very anxious about them, as I had been with them at Agra, and had given them their colours. When I gave them to them I told them there was room for more inscriptions, and that they should have the first opportunity of adding to them. I hope you will think that their conduct in marching up to the enemy's guns at Maharajpore has rendered them deserving of the honour of having that name inscribed by the side of Plassy.

"I will say no more about this battle, as the despatch and the plan, where correct, will tell you all the rest.

"We were cruelly deficient in knowledge of the country. We had no map worth a rush, and no information to be depended upon.

"When General Grey was ordered to move by Himmutghur upon Puniar, we thought the road ran clear of Himmutghur, which is a strong but

unoccupied fort. The road ran close under it, and there was no other way of passing. Had the enemy been in time to occupy the fort and the position near it, the contest would have been serious.

"I do not know what may have been the baggage of an Indian army when you knew it. It is now awful, and I am satisfied that some day or other some terrible catastrophe will be the consequence. Officers seem to carry with them the whole furniture of their bungalows.

"General Grey had, I believe, 5000 hackeries. He, however, had fifteen days' provisions. We crossed the Chumbul with the same quantity. We left Agra with twenty-five, but in Dholpore we got nothing, which was an additional reason for moving on. Here we are amply supplied, at cheap rates.

"On the 30th, about noon, we heard that General Grey had had a successful battle on the 29th, and that the Maharanee was coming to our camp with the Maharajah.

"Her Highness came on the 31st. I desired that persons might be named by her for the conclusion of permanent arrangements for the future, that hostilities should be suspended, and a proclamation addressed to the troops at Gwalior, telling them that all who were not enlisted into the corps to be raised would, besides their pay due, receive a gratuity of three months' pay on their dismissal.

"I likewise intimated that the fort must be placed

in the hands of the contingent which is paid by Scindiah, but commanded by our officers.

"This last proposition seemed very distasteful. Discussion upon it was postponed.

"On the 3rd the right wing reached the camp, and General Grey came within six miles. I immediately brought in the contingent to this camp, communicated with the brigadier commanding it, and insisted upon the delivery of the fort. This was effected about half-past four P.M. on the 4th. General Grey moved up to our right on the morning of this day, and, with the army united—20,000 men, forty-eight field guns, six 18-pounders, four 8-inch howitzers, and the fort—we were masters of everything. Since that time we have taken into the fort 107 guns and 9000 small arms, given up by disbanded men. We shall have many more guns and 1500 more arms. We have enlisted 2500 men, who keep their arms, into the new corps. The treaty was signed and ratified on the 13th, on which day the Maharajah came to me. Eighteen lacs are assigned for the payment of the increased contingent out of the revenue of districts of which the management is made over to us. The districts selected adjoin our frontiers.

"The army of the Gwalior State is to consist of 3000 infantry, with twelve guns; 200 artillery, with twenty guns; and 6000 cavalry. The Council of Regency cannot be changed without our consent. It is to act according to our advice during the Maha-

rajah's minority, which terminates, when he becomes eighteen, on the 19th of January 1854.

"Yesterday I went through the city to the palace, to visit the Maharajah. There was an immense population (and very many disbanded soldiers) in the streets. All were quiet, and many salaamed.

"On the 23rd I leave this camp, on my way to Calcutta, where I shall arrive about the 27th of February. I leave six regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and eighteen guns here, at the desire of the new Regency, till the middle of March. We shall then have four battalions of the contingent ready for service.

"On the 24th of December I heard that a body of Sikhs had been moved towards Ferozepore. They have not moved further. I had only one more thousand men disposable—the Shekawuttee brigade—which I moved to Hansee, and I begged Sir C. Napier, if the Sikhs should cross the Sutlej, to do all he could in the way of demonstration on Mooltan. You will be pleased by his reply. All has been quiet in Nepaul.

"I have written a very long letter, and I must still ask you to read my public letter and all papers relating to this operation at Gwalior.

"I hope you will be satisfied with what I have done. Here, I have no doubt, many, and especially my colleagues, will think I have been too moderate. In that I am quite sure I have been right, if in nothing else. By moderation and firmness I have

saved this army from a desperate battle, in a city full of stone buildings, and I have saved that city from plunder and fire. I have also maintained the reputation of our Government, which seemed to me to be involved, in our treating the House of Scindiah in the person of a minor with protecting kindness and consideration.

"However, I dare say that everything I have done will be misrepresented in England and that the Court of Directors will be more hostile than ever.

"How long is it to be borne that a body so constituted shall possess any influence whatever over political measures in India? I am satisfied that if they were left to themselves they would lose the country in three months.

"In the management of the delivery of the fort, and in all the arrangements for the disbandment of the Gwalior troops, I have derived much aid from Sir R. Shakespear. He was in the battle, acting as an aide-de-camp, and is mentioned. He is not yet a captain; but if, whenever he may attain that rank, you should think him deserving of a brevet majority, I believe you would advance a promising officer.

"I have heard the Commander-in-Chief more than once express himself well pleased with Major-General Valiant.

"It would have been no bad thing for the officers and troops had the army of exercise continued together as such for two or three months. There was, I believe, much to learn.

"I have written to the Court, pressing that one more officer at least should be given to each regiment. They are really wanted.

"You will see that we are going to bring the ex-Ameers to Calcutta. Pray read my letter to the Secret Committee with reference to the resolution now communicated to me, which the Court passed in August.

"Believe me ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Camp, Futtehpore, February 11, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I enclose for your perusal a letter from the adjutant-general of the army, with its enclosures (and my reply), on the subject of the insufficient number of officers with the artillery of Bengal.

"The subject is actually one of very great importance. Whether the reason assigned by Brigadier Gowan for the guns not being fired quick at Maharajpore be the only reason for the fire of the thirty guns we had in the field there not being very effective, I know not, but certainly our guns would not seem to have done much. If we are obliged to meet the Sikhs at any time we shall have a very powerful artillery to encounter, and it is very necessary that every possible measure should

be previously taken to make our artillery most efficient.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

'Camp, Futtehpore, February 12, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"As soon as Colonel Outram landed at Bombay he sent off your letter to the Commander-in-Chief, and got leave for six months to go to the North-West Provinces. He wrote at the same time to my private secretary, stating his object to be military employment.

"The Commander-in-Chief wrote to tell him fighting was over, and, besides, he had no appointment to give him. I transferred to the military department the letter addressed to my private secretary, and, through that department, informed the Bombay Government that the application should have come officially through them; that, as regarded the thing asked, the Commander-in-Chief might appoint Colonel Outram, if he thought fit, to any situation tenable by an officer of the Bombay army, but that I was not prepared to sanction his appointment to any situation which could not be held by him according to the regulations of the service.

"Colonel Outram came on without receiving the letters, and reached Agra when the army was broken

up. He came down to Futtehpore after me. I have not seen him; but an appointment at Nemaur becoming vacant, in the country which he is acquainted with, and where he may be of use, I offered it to him, and he accepted it.

"His visit to you in London was immediately put forward in a newspaper. Your letter to the Commander-in-Chief was also strangely exaggerated, and put forward in a newspaper. I do not like having anything to do with men who, as the late Lord Londonderry used to express it, 'newspaper themselves,' and I could not have ventured to receive him without having my private secretary or some one else present; so, as he had (as he admitted) no public ground for asking an interview, I did not see him, in accordance with a general order I issued on my return to Calcutta in July last.

"The appointment I have given to him he is really eminently qualified to hold. He first distinguished himself by service in that neighbourhood, and he really knows nothing of any part of our provinces but that.

"Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Allahabad, February 15, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"There has not been another shot fired in the Gwalior territory, but we have now got all the forts

into our possession in the districts made over to us, and all into the Maharajah's possession wherever his 'reserved' troops and the contingent have yet been for the purpose of restoring the authority of the Durbar.

"The reserved troops have been conducting themselves unusually well, and our officers are much pleased with the recruits they have got from the disbanded regiments. Two of the newly-raised battalions have been already able to march from Gwalior.

"The new Regency seems to be going on well. All is reported to be quiet. All our troops will come away in the first week of March. Our course of proceeding with respect to the Gwalior army and State seems to have been highly appreciated at native Courts. Upon the whole it appears to be a terminated transaction, and one quite successful.

"I fear we shall hear of an imitation of the Lahore tragedy in Nepaul. Everything looks like it. Mataban Singh will do us an injury whenever he can, and I only hope the Rajah may succeed in killing him, rather than he succeed in killing the Rajah. There is no material change in the Punjab. Gholab Singh is strengthening himself, as he thinks, by new acts of violence in the Hills. Heera Singh has not increased his power over the army, and it seems doubtful whether the troops at Peshawur, deserting their post, may not let in the Afghans. One regi-

ment is already at Lahore, against orders, and Heera Singh is not strong enough to punish it.

"I earnestly hope that we may not be obliged to cross the Sutlej in December next. We shall not be ready so soon. The army requires a great deal of setting up after five years of war. I am quietly doing what I can to strengthen and equip it. I am fully aware of the great magnitude of the operation in which we should embark if we ever should cross the Sutlej. I know it would be of a protracted character. I should be obliged to remain at Lahore myself more than a year, and I should have all India to keep quiet behind me with very few troops, for we could not send any back till we relieved them.

"Depend upon it I will not engage in such an operation hastily or unnecessarily, and I will do all I can beforehand to secure certain success if I ever should be obliged to undertake it.

"I shall be at Calcutta on the 28th. I thought my return to Calcutta the surest measure for making the Sikhs believe I was not thinking of them, and for making all India acquire some degree of confidence in the continuance of peace.

"The measure I adopted of sending back the Madras troops after the mutiny of the 6th Madras Cavalry at Jubbulpore was entirely approved of by the Commander-in-Chief, who recently commanded that army, and my colleagues approve of it also. They only regret I did not order the disbandment of the 6th Cavalry, instead of earnestly advising it.

"The measure arranged between the Madras and Bombay Governments of sending Madras troops to Scinde without the concurrence, or even the previous knowledge, of the supreme Government has been productive of much embarrassment, greatly aggravated by the Madras Government taking upon itself to 'guarantee' to the 47th Regiment, sent from Madras to Kurachee, all advantages of 'foreign service,' which had been withheld from the Bengal and Bombay troops there.

"The Bombay people want an augmentation of their army; they seem to me to have no case, as I have, I think, shown in two letters I have just sent to them in reply to their representation.

"I shall be very glad to learn, as I hope I shall soon, your views as to the troops with which Scinde should be garrisoned. I fear we shall find endless and most serious inconveniences arise from any mixture of Bengal and Bombay troops. In point of expense it would be ruinous. All the Bombay establishments are so much more costly than ours, and their allowances are greater too. Every bad habit would be communicated from their army to ours.

"On the other hand our army does not like going to Lower Scinde. I wish I could have gone myself, in order to show them the way and do away with their fears of the climate; but my passage down the Sutlej would have frightened the Sikhs and have brought on some collision with them.

"On the whole we are now nearly where we were

in the opinion of India before the Afghan war, and all will go well with constant vigilance and preparation, but not without them. Financially we shall, I hope, do well too.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Calcutta, March 7, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"My colleague, Major-General Sir W. Casement, is going home, and is naturally very anxious to be known to you. He has given me very honourable and cordial aid and support in the Council, and he has always given an honest, fearless opinion, never considering what people might say of him, but doing what he deemed right. These are valuable qualities at any time and in any place, but especially in these times and in the Council, and I shall feel his absence very much. He has a most intimate knowledge of the army and of all the regulations of the service; and at this moment of difficulty, when his extensive knowledge and experience are most wanted, he is replaced in the Council by a prejudiced gentleman of the civil service, who has been mumbling laws and regulations and dabbling in codification for years in the law commission. Such are the materials they give me to work with.

"You will, I am sure, always receive true in-

formation and an honest opinion from Sir W. Casement, should you at any time communicate with him, and I know he will feel that he is honoured by your sending for him.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Calcutta, March 20, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"When the army was marching to the Indus in 1838, Lord Auckland's Government feared the troops would be unwilling to cross the river, and to induce them to do so gave them the same allowances which were first given in 1824 to the troops which passed the Burrampootur—that is, full batta and money rations.

"These the troops in Afghanistan always had; but when Cabul was taken and all seemed quiet in Scinde, the Government thought money rations in that country no longer necessary, and from the 1st of January 1840 they were withdrawn, but full batta was left.

"No complaint was made, and so the allowances continued for two years.

"When troops began again to move through Upper Scinde to Candahar, in consequence of the insurrection at Cabul, the state of things seemed to have been restored under which the allowance of

money rations was first given, and in June 1842 I restored that allowance from the 1st January preceding, when the new movements had commenced.

"When all seemed again quiet in Scinde last May, and all idea of going through Scinde to Afghanistan was at an end, I withdrew money rations in the same manner in which they had been withdrawn from the 1st of January 1840. The order was to have effect from the 1st of July, and as regarded the Bombay troops in Lower Scinde it had effect from that date; but, by some unexplained error, the order was not made known to the Bengal troops at Sukkur till the 14th of October, and from that date only it has had effect there. Full batta was not taken away—that the troops in Scinde still have in cantonments, although in Hindostan they have it only in the field.

"I hope you will not think that I did wrong in taking away the money rations under the circumstances I have stated.

"The troops which now refuse to go to Scinde claim these money rations, and make the restoration of them the condition of their marching. I rather doubt whether the withdrawal of the money rations be the real cause of their refusal. I apprehend it to be rather the panic fear of the Scinde fever, and the further apprehension that, once in Scinde, they may be taken on to Afghanistan.

"We have all doubted whether the troops understood how much they still had in Scinde beyond what

they would have in cantonments in Hindostan. The Commander-in-Chief certainly did not. I hope all now understand the whole question as stated in the general order of the 12th instant. To the Commander-in-Chief it had been before explained in two office memoranda transmitted to him.

"The general order makes no concession to the troops, unless it be considered concession to carry out the admitted principle of giving compensation, where the price of provisions is very high, by extending it to the minor articles which compose the ration. This is quite trifling, but it was well to close that question.

"As regards money rations the general order lays down as a rule for the future that which had in effect been the practice for the past, and which would have been done again under the same circumstances.

"The grant of batta to the troops which have been exposed to unusual sickness, as well as to those distinguished before the enemy, will, I think, have a good effect generally. In any case it will satisfy and secure the whole Bombay army, and gratify the 22,000 men who were at Maharajpore and Puniar.

"There has been sad want of judgment and of energy on the part of all the officers at Ferozepore. Sir R. Dick has proved himself to be quite unequal to the difficulties of his position, and we have transferred him to the Presidency.

"The 6th Irregular Cavalry marches on to Sukkur, the promotion given in the regiment by adding two rissalahs to it, and the present of 1000 musketoons,

will keep it right, and show others that the Government acts by reward as well as punishment. Punishment of the 34th Native Infantry and of the 7th Cavalry there must be, as our army is no better than that of the Sikhs.

"These neighbours of ours are doing all they can to induce our men to be disaffected as well as mutinous. They are moving troops towards Ferozepore and Loodianah, and the Durbar may under any circumstances be unable to restrain their troops. Under circumstances affording fair hopes of success they would lead the movement.

"The 64th is at present marching on towards Scinde, but it is doubted whether the regiments which have misbehaved at Ferozepore will not still induce it to halt. The accounts from the regiment, however, are good.

"The headquarter wing of the 27th, a new regiment formed on the wreck of that lost at Ghuzni, has volunteered for Scinde. This is to redeem the character of the corps. There is so high a feeling of honour amongst the troops that I am satisfied it afforded the means of arresting the mutinous disposition manifested at Ferozepore, had there been officers there with the ability to manage men.

"I am quietly doing all I can to strengthen the army, and make it equal to any operation which may be required from it.

"The example of a mutinous army at Lahore extorting higher pay, by menaces, from its nominal

Government is more dangerous to us than its force in the field.

"What a godsend it is at this moment that we have got rid of the Gwalior army! Our new contingent there is proceeding prosperously. The officers and men are equally pleased, and some of the battalions have already nearly their full complement.

"The Gwalior country is all quiet; so are Saugor and Bundelcund. In Scinde there are but 1400 sick out of 15,000 men. If it had not been for these mutinies I could have reported all well in India.

"March 23.

"As far as I know yet the 64th is marching on towards Sukkur very contentedly. In ten days there had been only one desertion. Everything I hear confirms me in the impression that *panic*, not withdrawn allowances, must be the real cause of the reluctance to go. There was no hesitation on the part of the 69th until, by the same mismanagement which has attended the transactions throughout, they were mixed up with a party of invalids returning from Scinde, who terrified them by their accounts of the fever and the want of medical aid. The fact is, the doctors were sick too.

"The Commander-in-Chief has conveyed an intimation to the 64th that if they march on he will strongly recommend an increase to their pay (beyond the field allowance they now receive in Scinde in

cantonments), and also that pensions shall be given to the families of men dying in Scinde, as if it were 'foreign service.'

"We have told the Secret Committee that we think the allowances which will be drawn under the general order of the 12th instant are sufficient, and that we are not prepared to give any more without specific instructions. We have added that if either point be conceded we think it would be preferable to give the pensions.

"Still, I have the greatest repugnance to a measure which treats as 'foreign service' service within our own territory.

"The Commander-in-Chief complains of the apathy of the officers. In fact, on questions regarding allowances, officers and men consider themselves in the same boat, and the Government never has cordial support.

"It would have been a very good thing if my proposition to abolish half-batta had been acceded to last year. You can form no conception of the extent to which that question has poisoned the minds of the officers of this army. It creates a good deal of embarrassment too in the disposition of the different regiments by affecting the annual reliefs.

"I am very much obliged to you for attending to my wishes with respect to Captains Ripley, Hutt, and Henderson, and Major Rawlinson.

"If we have active operations in the North West I must endeavour to give Major Broadfoot the oppor-

tunity of meriting further promotion by putting him at the head of one or two corps of Scindiah's contingent. I believe him to be as promising an officer as any in the army.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH.

"His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief."

"Calcutta, April 20, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"All our difficulties arising from the mutinies at Ferozepore are at an end. All the troops have marched to Scinde, except the 34th Native Infantry, which has been disbanded, by way of example.

"The Bengal troops which are returning from Scinde are healthy, and do not speak ill of the country, and those remaining at Sukkur are ready to move to Hyderabad. Next cold weather the Bundelcund legion, which has volunteered for Scinde, will relieve the 64th, the 4th Irregular Cavalry, and the 1st Company of Artillery which moved down, so that we shall not have to draw upon the regular army for service in Scinde for the next two years, and long before then all will be ready to go.

"There has been manifested at Ferozepore a sad want of influence on the part of the officers of the several corps, or a want of zeal and of a proper sense of duty. I am afraid that in matters relating

to allowances we must not expect hearty co-operation. You will see that we have thought it necessary to address the Commander-in-Chief secretly and confidentially on two points: first, with respect to his having intimated to the 64th Native Infantry that he would strongly recommend to Government that their pay should be increased, and that the advantage of family pensions should be granted to them; secondly, with respect to his having practically superseded our order placing Sir George Pollock in command of the Cawnpore division, by directing that the officer commanding the station (Sir J. Thackwell), being a senior officer to Sir George Pollock, should correspond direct with his headquarters pending a reference to Government.

"I hope we have expressed ourselves temperately but properly on these points. The Commander-in-Chief seems to be much annoyed at the removal of Sir R. Dick to the Presidency; but really the errors of Sir R. Dick were so serious that we all felt we could not venture to leave him where he was. I, besides, recollected his conduct at Madras with respect to the embarkation of the 2nd and 41st Regiments Native Infantry, and I knew that the crisis at Ferozepore required the exercise of other qualities than he there manifested.

"Heera Singh is receiving our deserters and discharged Sepoys into his service, and he is now entertaining the relatives of Meer Shere Mahomed of Meerpore. He is utterly reckless and unscrupulous,

and would cross the Sutlej the moment he thought he could do so safely. We can only consider our relations with Lahore to be those of an armed truce.

"I earnestly hope nothing may compel us to cross the Sutlej, and that we may have no attack to repel till November 1845. I shall then be prepared for anything. In the meantime we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves.

"I ought not to conceal from you that the anxiety I feel not to be called too suddenly into the field is much increased by a want of confidence in Sir Hugh Gough, who, with all his personal courage and many excellent qualities, certainly does not appear to possess the grasp of mind or the prudence which is essential to the successful conduct of great military operations. He would do admirably, I have no doubt, at the head of an advanced guard.

"We are altogether very ill-provided with officers for the higher commands. The whole army requires a great deal of teaching, and I am satisfied the eighteen months I ask are not more than enough to make it what it ought to be.

"The Commander-in-Chief sees all the danger of leaving the Delhi magazine where it is, and I think we shall remove it to Meerut, using the Ganges for the transport of stores instead of the Jumna. We can take them up to Gurmuktesar Ghat, within thirty miles of Meerut. The sickness which now annually prevails at Delhi is another reason for doing what will enable us to diminish the garrison.

"Our new magazine fort at Ferozepore is finished. It ought to hold out, with 1500 men in it, for two or three weeks; but we mean to have a really good work there. We have as yet done nothing to Loodianah, but I hope they are at work there by this time. The existing fort there has houses too near it; but for a native fort it is pretty good, although rather too confined.

"I say that we want 40,000 and one men. The 40,000 I can find, exclusive of artillery and 162 guns. The *one* man is a general, and him I cannot find; but he is as much wanted as the 40,000.

"Yours ever most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Calcutta, May 9, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I send you a memorandum written by an officer of the 4th Native Infantry, one of the mutinous regiments which has marched to Scinde. It contains some facts and observations which will interest you, who know what the Indian army used to be.

"Our unpleasant correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief is terminated, and he and I write to each other privately as usual. I think we could not have done otherwise than as we did, but I much regretted the necessity for entering upon any correspondence with him of an expostulatory character.

"Sir Thomas McMahon has consented to issue a new warrant to Sir Charles Napier for the holding of courts martial, so that embarrassment is at an end; but I think you will have issued a Royal warrant to Sir Charles for all the troops in Scinde, like that Sir Hugh Gough had for China.

"The destruction of Soocheyt Singh has had the effect of entirely separating the Hills, under Gholab Singh, f[illegible] the Plains, still ruled in a manner by Heera Singh. Everything is going on there as we could desire, if we looked forward to the ultimate possession of the Punjab.

"I expect that by the end of December there will be on the Sutlej seventy boats of about thirty-five tons each, all exactly similar and each containing everything necessary for its equipment as a pontoon. These will bridge the Sutlej anywhere, and when not so used they will convey our troops up and down, and save us an enormous charge for the hire of boats.

"Besides these, fifty-six pontoons will be ready for use in Scinde. All these are in hand at Bombay. We shall besides have, by the end of this year, I hope, two steamers drawing very little water on the Sutlej.

"We are very much in want of horses here; 1000 are required for the cavalry. We are going to give nine-pounders instead of sixes to five of our horse artillery batteries.

"The Gwalior contingent goes on very well.

There are now 6500 men in it; there will be 1000 more. The three additional companies of its artillery are complete. It will have twenty-four field guns, besides six or eight heavy guns in store at Gwalior.

"The total number of guns taken or given up now amounts to 380. The battalion added to the Bundelcund legion replaces the 34th, disbanded.

"There are five battalions of military police now in process of formation at Agra, Meerut, Delhi, Kurnaul, and Umballa. These will set at liberty three regiments for field operations.

"In Bundelcund and Saugor we have already five such battalions and two rissalahs.

"The Shekawuttee cavalry, formerly 400, is raised to 600, and the Bundelcund cavalry from 600 to 800. 200 are also added to the 6th Irregulars. 200 will be added to the Body Guard, and we have thrown into a ninth regiment of irregulars various detachments and supernumeraries remaining from the Shah's horse. In all, therefore, there will be a permanent addition of 1600 irregular cavalry—very much wanted.

"The Body Guard will soon be as strong as a regiment. It is at Sultanpore, Benares. I have only fifty men here.

"Sir Charles Napier will endeavour to raise two local battalions in Scinde, and he thinks he shall succeed.

"In November 1845 the army will be equal to any

operation; but I should be sorry to have it called into the field sooner.

"The want of brigadiers is most serious. The system of giving commands according to seniority is most injurious. I hope Major-General Considine will be able to return in November, as he intended. We may want him much. The rank of the Queen's officers often entitling them to commands, it is most important that those who come should be good. We had the other day at Gwalior two officers in brigade commands from the 9th Lancers, neither much considered. We certainly want a strong force of European cavalry, to give confidence to our native regular cavalry. Our irregular cavalry always behaves well.

"I wish Colonel Cureton could come out again. He is popular, and had his regiment in beautiful order. Nothing was ever seen so beautiful as the 16th Lancers, and the men are all young.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"His Grace the Duke of Wellington."

"Calcutta, May 26, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"I received on the 20th a copy of your memorandum from Lord Ripon. I always have attended to every suggestion from you, and if I

should remain here I do not think the gentlemen of the Court will have any colourable ground for complaining of my expressions; but I do not really believe any mere expressions of mine are the cause of their hostility. They are hostile to my acts because I do what I think right, whatever it may be. I certainly have not received from Lord Ripon the same support I received from Lord Fitzgerald. He allows the Court to say things which are offensive, and to do things which, being in disparagement of my measures, must necessarily weaken my position with respect to my colleagues and the service. There was an evident change in the tone of the Court immediately upon Lord Fitzgerald's death. It was observed by my colleagues as well as by myself.

"There has really been nothing like government in India for many years. Officers are not as obedient to orders even now as they ought to be. They enter into discussion with respect to an order, instead of zealously executing it. I want to make the Government of India respected by its servants as the Queen's Government is, and you must see how nearly impossible this is if it be known that my measures have not the support they are entitled to from the Board of Control.

"Every director has his correspondents here. These men, who have always seen the Administration conducted with a most scrupulous regard for individual interests, and none at all for those of the public, which has, indeed, here no representative but

the Governor-General, are necessarily most hostile to an Administration conducted, like mine, upon totally different principles, and they give to their account of actions and sayings and events the colour of their own disappointed minds. This feeling is again imparted to the directors to whom they write, themselves disappointed and incensed because, since I have been here, they have had no personal influence whatsoever. Then come the letters of the directors in reply, communicating all the discussions in the Court about Scinde and other things, and about my removal. I have had to contend against the whole influence of the Court collectively and individually ever since I came. Those in whose name the Government is carried on have been agitating against me, and doing all they can to weaken my authority.

"In this state of things nothing can maintain me but the constant support of the Board of Control, which ought to view with suspicion every reflection upon my measures proposed by the Court, and to allow nothing to pass but what is entirely in accordance with the president's own independent opinion.

"There should be no spirit of compromise with a hostile and unscrupulous body of men.

"The president should see into everything himself, and do all he considers right, as he can if he pleases.

"I am satisfied that so acting he would have the support of Parliament, and that a factious use of their power of recall by the Court would be met by an amending Act which should take away that power.

"I should respect the opinion technically of the Court, when I knew it to be that of the president of the Board, and of the Cabinet in cases where it might be necessary to consult the Cabinet; but how can I respect the opinion expressed by the Court when I have reason to know it is their own, proceeding from low motives, and only acquiesced in by the president from inattention or the timid spirit of compromise?

"I have, under all circumstances, thought it right to suggest to Lord Ripon a mode by which I may, with the least detriment, retire from this Government in the autumn; but I am entirely at your disposal, and whatever you think right I shall do. Personally, I should much prefer going home, unless there should be a war in the Punjab.

"In fact, my remaining here, unless my measures are thoroughly supported by the Board of Control, may be rather of prejudice than of advantage to India. Whatever I do, be it what it may, will be objected to by the Court; and if there be a disposition to conciliate the Court, and to make a compromise with them, rather than proceed to the extremity of superseding and disregarding their opinion, and making them say what they ought to say, the interests of the people of India would be safer under another Administration. Under another Administration a *fair* view might be taken of measures. While I remain here this will never be the case. There will always be a disposition to object to the measure, in order to offend and weaken me.

"Upon the whole, I think the Court will have been led to recall me, and that I shall hear of it by the mail which will arrive soon after the despatch of this letter.

"It is a very bad season for going home, but I shall go as soon as I can. I have now been uncertain since the month of November 1842 whether each succeeding mail would not bring out my recall. This is not the position in which a Governor-General ought to be.

"A resolute Minister might have arrested this mischief, and have made the Court very quiet; and a resolute Minister might at once appeal to Parliament should the Court recall me, and amend the Act; but neither of these things will be done.

"Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Ever very sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Barrackpore, June 9, 1844.

"MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

"We have had no events of importance during the last month. You will have heard by the last mail (from Agra) of the defeat of Uttar Singh and Bhaee Beer Singh by the troops of Heera Singh, and of their death, as well as of that of Cashmeera Singh. These events relieve Heera Singh from all danger of serious attack made openly by any chiefs; but he is become the object of much animosity on account of

the death of the holy man, Bhaee Beer Singh, and his life is as uncertain as before. We cannot prudently diminish our preparations for a contest which will some day take place, although it may be still deferred, and I have determined on sending to Sydney for 1000 horses we want for our cavalry and artillery. Everywhere we are trying to get things into order, and especially to strengthen and perfectly equip the artillery, with which the fight will be.

"You will be glad to hear that my correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief goes on much as before. Sir C. Napier has been anxious about the conduct of the 64th Bengal Regiment and generally of the Bengal troops sent to Sukkur, apprehending some possible disposition to mutiny in consequence of the hopes occasioned by the Commander-in-Chief's promised recommendation of increased pay and family pensions not having been as yet realised. Hitherto, however, the 64th have behaved quietly; they are at Shikarpore, where everything is cheap, and they have good quarters. I have not heard of the arrival of more than two companies of one of the other regiments, and they behaved ill, abusing the 64th. However, that is some time ago, and nothing has been reported since. You will see from a letter of Major-General Hunter's that the European officers of the regiments ordered to Scinde openly expressed their own disinclination for the service, and must thus have much added to that of the men.

"We are very much pressed for officers of infantry.

artillery, and engineers, and we have not enough medical officers. Where we are to find the money to pay them I hardly know, but we must have them, as all would go without an efficient army. In all directions every one asks for some increase of charge. No one cares a rush about the effect which these many small items of charge must have upon the out-turn of the year's account. Many of the requests are apparently not unreasonable in themselves. It is the joint pressure of the aggregate charges which tends to ruin us. There is no possibility of applying any adequate check to the number of persons entertained as establishment. Every idle man, and every foolish, vain man, wants to increase establishment, and to have more slaves bowing about him. There is a sad want of business-like habits everywhere. Men work but to small account. I have no assistance. Altogether it is almost disheartening. I see that so little progress is made, except by changes made by Acts of Legislature such as those in customs, transit, and town duties. Then there is not that obedience which is paid to a Queen's Government. I assure you no man can govern this country well without the most unqualified support from home. If that be withheld, it would be far better to send out another Governor-General, be he who he might, so that he were not a jobber, or afraid of responsibility.

"Believe me ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"Barrackpore, July 2, 1844.

"My dear Duke of Wellington,

"I was perfectly prepared for my recall by the Court, which I learnt by the last mail, the report I had received of their conduct having satisfied me that they intended to proceed to that extremity; but even knowing, as I so long have done, all your generous kindness, I was hardly prepared for your speech, of which you sent the report in the *Times*—a speech which would console me for much greater injustice and wrong than I have experienced at the hands of the Court.

"Indeed, I am so well satisfied with being relieved from all connection with the Court, and with my approaching return to England, that I can hardly feel the indignation I ought to feel at the manner in which they have treated me. I remain to receive Sir Henry Hardinge. All the public letters to England, which he cannot have seen, have been copied for him, and sent to Madras. There has been no important event. All India is in a state of profound peace. In the Punjab there is more of pacific appearance than at any time since the murder of Shere Singh.

"Immediately on the receipt of the news of my removal I advised the Government to send letters by express to all native Courts, to assure them that the change would not affect the policy of the Government, which would be altogether maintained by my

successor. I wrote myself to the principal Residents to the same effect, and sent a message from myself to Ram Rao Phulheea, the chief of the Regency of Gwalior. I was more afraid of some mishap there than anywhere, as the Regency depended so much personally upon me.

"I have written a letter to Lord Ripon with reference to the correspondence between him and the Court respecting me, with the intention that it should be published, if that correspondence has been.

"I expect Sir Henry Hardinge on the 25th, and I hope I may be able to get away on the 1st of August; but I shall stay longer if my doing so should be advisable.

"I go by Egypt; but the monsoon is against me, and I fear I shall not reach England by the end of September.

"The selection of Sir Henry Hardinge as my successor was a most wise measure. It has done all that could be done to obviate any evils which might otherwise have arisen from my recall. The most important object was to satisfy the army that the measure of my recall would not now injure them, in whatever spirit it might have been conceived.

"I really do not know how Sir Henry can get through the business during the first six months. He must take upon himself the Government of Bengal when Mr. Bird goes in September. It will never answer to separate the whole civil patronage

of Bengal from the Governor-General, nor could the senior member of Council, Sir H. Maddock, be trusted with the charge. He could not execute it well even if he tried; and all the civil servants job for each other—they constantly act in the spirit of a corporation.

"I am satisfied that Sir Charles Napier will very unwillingly encounter another very hot season in Scinde. He has indeed told me so, and I apprehend that his remaining there would be attended with serious risk to his life.

"The military at the Presidency are going to give me a dinner before I sail. It will be given after Sir Henry Hardinge's arrival, and I think I can manage not only to prevent any harm arising out of it, but to make it productive of some good. Unluckily, however, they have no good reporter in India, and the press disfigures everything as much as it can.

"I cannot say with what pleasure I look forward to seeing you again.

"Believe me ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,

"Most sincerely yours,

(Signed) "ELLENBOROUGH."

"London, October 7, 1844, at night.

"MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

"The East India Company, particularly the governing body, Court of Directors, Secret Committee,

&c., have been for some time nibbling at the festival given to you by some of the officers of the army previous to your departure from Fort William, and have required that I should enforce a general order of the army, which that body assumes to exist, prohibiting all festivals, demonstrations, &c. I had already, in private communication with the president of the Board, made known to him my opinion; but having learnt from Lord Ripon that some of the members of the Cabinet felt anxious lest the subject should come to be discussed in Parliament, I have thought it best to write upon the subject an official letter, of which I send you, in confidence, a copy, which will, in my opinion, put an end to the affair altogether, and the perusal of which will at all events amuse you.

"Ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

OFFICIAL LETTER BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON THE ENTERTAINMENT GIVEN TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH ON LEAVING INDIA.

"London, December 3, 1844, at night.

"MY LORD,

"I have taken into consideration the desire expressed by the chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company that I should notice as a breach of regulation, and inconsistent with good order and discipline, the part taken by certain of

Her Majesty's regiments in India in giving to the late Governor-General of India, the Earl of Ellenborough, an entertainment previous to his departure from Fort William, after his Lordship had been dismissed from the office of Governor-General; and the part taken by the officers of one regiment in presenting to his Lordship a testimonial—of what nature not stated.

"I have had no complaint upon these subjects from the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of Her Majesty in India, and of those of the East India Company in the Presidency under the Government of Fort William in Bengal, nor have I seen any from the actual Governor-General, or from any other authority civil or military.

"The complaint appears to have originated in newspapers published in India, scraps of paragraphs which I have seen, and I have perused the papers which your Lordship has directed should be laid before me.

"I have likewise examined the general order published by the late Commander-in-Chief, Sir David Dundas, on the 18th of January 1810, and have inquired into all the circumstances which caused its issue, and whether it has been repeated, and in what cases, and under what circumstances applied since it was issued.

"It is true that the Governor-General in Council exercises great military powers. But they are the powers of the Court and political government of the

country. There is no instance on record in the office of which I am the unworthy principal officer of the application of this order to the conduct of officers or soldiers expressing their approbation of the conduct or their esteem for the character of a civil or political governor. Yet there are some strong instances of such favourable expressions by officers, as for instance the approbation and manifestation of esteem for the late Earl of Durham expressed by a general officer and by certain other officers at a festival given by them to the Earl of Durham when he was quitting Quebec, he being no longer Governor-General of Her Majesty's dominions in North America.

"This is a precedent in point, and of recent occurrence. But there is another, a festival given to the late Governor-General, the Earl of Ellenborough, in a preceding year, by the officers of artillery under the Governor of Fort William.

"The Court of Directors of the East India Company had knowledge of this festival. But they noticed it not.

"The perusal of the speech made by the Earl of Ellenborough at the festival which I am now called upon to declare in general orders to be inconsistent with good order and military discipline, and a disobedience of the general order of Her Majesty's army of the 18th of January 1810, shows clearly that the festival was an affair, and in testimony, of personal regard and esteem. And, as far as I can

judge, nothing passed either previous to, at, or after the festival which could be construed into a breach of discipline or good order, or could excite the jealousy or even the suspicion of the most suspicious despotism that ever existed. I who am thus called upon to notice this affair as a serious offence against discipline and a breach of military orders, have served the public now for nearly half a century, and I believe I may safely say that neither in these times nor in any others did there ever exist an officer half so feasted and 'festivated,' or who received half the number of testimonials from those under his command that I have. "My table is at this day covered with them, in the shape of useful and ornamental plate. For it was my good fortune always not only to give satisfaction to my employers—the Sovereign, the Ministers of the Sovereign, Parliament, the East India Company, the several Governor-Generals and Governors of subordinate Presidencies, their several councils, the officers and servants of the several Governments, their servants, civil and military and political, in co-operation with whom I was acting, but likewise to the officers and troops whom and which I commanded. Accordingly I never went anywhere that I was not feasted and 'festivated,' and loaded with swords of honour, and other testimonials of regard and esteem up to the last moment of the year of the general order above adverted to.

"Indeed, I am not certain that the East India Company itself was not party to a festival given to

me in London, after my return from the Peninsula and France in the year 1814.

"Under these circumstances, and for the reasons which I have above stated, I must decline to take any notice in the way of military order of the transaction referred to.

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"The Earl of Ripon."

APPENDIX.

MEMORANDUM ON JOINT COMMANDS.

"Walmer Castle, October 16, 1841.

"My dear Lord Ellenborough,

"I have this morning received your letter of the 15th, but the day is so dark that I can scarcely read it.

"I shall be very sorry if my absence from London should be any inconvenience to you. I should wish to remain here till after the 2nd of November, as I have fixed for Wednesday the Dover Harbour Court. But I will go to town for a day whenever you please; and in the meantime will diligently peruse here whatever you will send me.

"I think that I can make out the Instructions for the Commanders of the Expedition in China.

"It is certainly right that they ought to be preceded by a decided settlement of the political objects of the war and a revision of the Instructions to Sir Henry Pottinger.

"This is not exactly my business. If required, I will give Lord Aberdeen my opinion and assistance, and in the meantime will reperuse the Instructions which Sir H. Pottinger has now, and state whether, and what, alterations ought to be made.

"The Governor-General has hitherto had the supreme direction of the operations in the China Seas, and he ought to continue to have it as Governor, that is, to point out to the commanders of the sea and land forces the general direction and object of their operations.

"When arrived on the spot, that is, in the China Seas, so much depends upon season, weather, and state of the navigation; and as the army can do nothing without the assistance of and being even joined to the fleet, the supreme direction of the course of operations on the spot must be in the admiral or officer commanding the squadron, he of course communicating freely with, and attending to the opinions of, the general officer commanding the troops. If they should differ in opinion, each is to put his opinion in writing, and that of the admiral is to be the rule of conduct.

"When the troops are landed, the general or officer commanding them is to be the sole judge and director of their operations, he taking care to keep the admiral informed of what they are doing, and where they will lead him, as both admiral and general must understand that fleet and army must not be separated.

"They must co-operate as military bodies; the army must depend upon a secure communication, and even union, with the fleet, for all its supplies of provisions, ammunition, and military stores.

"You are quite right in taking Lieutenant Durand

as your aide-de-camp. I will consider of the operations in the Punjab and in Nepaul. Let me see Lieutenant Durand's Papers. You could not commence an operation in the Punjab or Nepaul till after the end of the rains, that is, October or November 1842, unless, indeed, the Bengalee troops should have adopted my practice—that of keeping the field in the rainy season from preference.

"I do not know the Major Beresford whom you mention, but if you will show this note to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, he will let you know all about him, and state anything which may recur to him upon my suggestions in relation to the combined operations of fleet and army in China.

"Sir Charles Bagot has a son in India. You had better see him before you determine to take him as your aide-de-camp, though I believe him to be a fine young man, and very well educated. I recommended him to Sir Jasper Nichols, by way of introduction.

"Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

(Signed) "WELLINGTON.

"The Lord Ellenborough,
"Grosvenor Place."

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

00031941

Digitized with financial assistance from
Rotary Club
on 06 November, 2019